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"Participation" is one of a class of essentially contested concepts.
Review of major contemporary political interpretations of power and
possibility in the United States illuminates the wide-ranging meanings
for this concept. Particularly, the revision in the liberal-pluralist
conception in its criteria of application and moral point requires
critical examination. Another purpose of this study is to make a case
for expanding the scope and practice of participation.
The approach is contextual and follows the thesis gaining favor
that implicit and explicit normative commitments both shape and flow
out of any explanatory framework. It, therefore, makes sense to
recognize the 'hermeneutical ' or interpretive character of the sciences
of man.
A vision of the participatory society derives from the ideas of
Rousseau, T. H. Green, and John Dewey and provides a contrast model by
which to appraise the selected interpretations. The chief feature of
this model is the emphasis placed on the cognitive and affective
development of the Self under participatory social arrangements.
This development is fostered when all members of a community formulate,
discuss, and determine common issues affecting them. Through this process
the individual is encouraged to act as a moral agent and in the process
social stability can be promoted.
Tlie liberal-pluralist (e.g., Robert A. Dahl) views participation
as one of many roles competing for the individual's attention in
democratic society. Individuals are depicted as free to engage in a
range of political forms, but this range is limited in historically-specific
ways. The paradigmatic case of participation is voting. Dahl recommends
/
expanding the settings of participation, but, because of his theory of
abstract individuals, he misunderstands and rejects for the wrong reasons
the fuller classical vision as a possibility. Furthermore, he fails to
see why the present structure makes it irrational for some members cf
society to participate in the ways he prescribes, thus underscoring the
inadequacy of the consensus-integration framework.
The importance of the constitutional republican interpretation
(e.g., Grant McConnell and Theodore J. Lowi) is that it discloses the
manipulated use of the term in the liberal-pluralist vocabulary.
Participation becomes "cooptive" under present conditions and impedes
socially just policy. The analysis, however, leads to the unwarranted
dismissal of expanded and- enriched forms of participation by assimilating
the abstract conception of the individual to its theory.
The radical-liberals (e.g., Peter Bachrach and Arnold S. Kaufman)
advance the self-developmental model of participation and recommend expanding
the settings of participation to the workplace, the schools and universities,
the neighborhoods, and elsewhere. Appraisal of this Interpretation reveals
that how interests are "objectively" formed is an important consideration «/
to the participatory case.
The critical theory of Herbert Marcuse significantly shows distorted
communication as a form of social control. Marcuse 's work has theoretic
limitations, but his philosophy affords a synthesis with the radical-liberals
who appreciate the importance of experiential settings. Extending
Marcuse's insight, this study constructs a model of "repressive participation'
and considers the extent to which instances of ordinary political activity
approach the limiting case. "Representative participation" is activity that
serves the requirements of the established apparatus of production, distri-
bution, and consumption at the price of the cognitive and affective growth
of the individual. Repressive participation closes political discourse. *
This study concludes that the present forms of participation and
non-participation in American society, and the forms of participation
which are possible, are directly related to the language-structuring of
society. Class-structuring, the fracturing of people into cultural
units, is to a large extent the function of social language and who
controls it. Possibilities for self-development are linked to opportunities
for linguistic-conceptual development which expanded settings and enriched
forms of participation help to provide.
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1CHAPTERI
INTRODUCTION
- THE PROBLEM OF PARTICIPATION
EHte theory, including its pluralist variant, has had a firm hold
on V/estern social thought and practice and, if there were a reason to
believe thiat it has been held at an unnecessarily high price in lives
suffered and lost, we would probably be inclined to reexamine once again
the grounds and implications of that set of ideas and judgments. Just
such a reexamination has begun to take place, although it is not so clear
that all relevant viewpoints are engaged as parties in the debate.
A central claim pressed against elite theory from its challengers
involves the issue of the scope of participatory institutions and the
place of citizenship within the modern democratic structure. The claim
has usually been framed in phraseology that recognizes the individual's
capacity and right to share in the decisions which affect his life. The
call for exj)anded participatory structures, however, cannot be successfully
pressed if the elite theorists are correct about the necessity and in-
evitability of elite structure under the conditions of advanced industrial
society and the limited possibilities for human conduct on the whole.
There is some reason to believe that they are mistaken on several points.
Elite theorists are not correct in suggesting that a high degree of cir-
culation among elites compensates for the imbalance of authority obtained
between elites and masses, nor are they correct about the disinterested
perspective of professionalized elites. More importantly, they under-
estimate the tendencies for extremes to develop in society from a class
stratified set of arrangements,, and they do not take into account the
1
nature and causes of revolution. Finally, and most significantly, they
are unconcerned with the human need for self
-development and self-
reailj-zation.
On the practical side of life, the subject of participation is not
likely to be of interest to the individuals who have what they want,
when they are enjoying a state of wealth, privilege, and power. The
person who is materially well off does not need to see the interconnec-
tion between institutional structures and the character of hujnan
existence, unless he is pressed to do so. Interest in participation
generally arises only when one does not enjoy such a position. The
atte;apb to expand the scope of participation and invigorate the exercise
of participant rights by all is the atteiiipt to redress the existing dis-
tribution of bu_rdens and benefits. The underlying premise is the impor-
tance of the development of "self", through the interactive processes of
a community, for a stable and just democratic society.
This is the way interest in participation exhibited itself during
the early 1960's, a time vjhen American society looked to various groups
as though it were moving more and more in an inegalitarian direction with
2
power concentrated in an identifiable elite. The civil rights effort,
1
The influential role of Pareto, Mosca, and Michels is being referred
to here, and the developed arguments against versions of the elite inter-
pretation are fo^ond in T. B. Bottomore, Elites and Society (Maryland:
Penguin, 196U).
2 .
C. Wright iMill's, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford, 1956) lent
support to such a view. A frequently cited source on inequality has
been Gabriel Kolko's Wealth and Power in America: An Analysis of Social
Class and Income Distribution (New York; Praeger, 1962 Political
economists such as Robert Lampman, Herbert Oans, and Thomas Weisskopf
have given further attention to charting the dimensions of inequality.
3the struggle for voting rights, even the reapportionment cases could be
viewed as effectively symbolizing the failure of American politics to
make the representative process fair and open. In the course of the
^
decade, private and public obstruction of efforts to reshape power in a
more fully participatory way became even more visible. "Participation"
was captured as a hortatory word, taking on an ideological connotation.
An example of this was the controversial phrase, "maximum feasible partic-
ipation," in the Economic Opportunity Act of 196)4. This phrase was never
clearly thought out in the terms of its organi-zational requj.rements or its
political implications in a system of federal arrangements. The degree to
which it nurtiared a program of social action "loaded with political dyna-
3
mite" V7ent unnoticed by the ratifying congress. In all its ambiguity,
the phrase contributed to undelivered promises and conflict irrelevant to
tlie matter of enabling excluded and disadvantaged groups to articulate
their needs and aspirations and develop their capacities for critical
appraisal. Cynicism set in towards the use of a vocabulary which expressed
aspirations ujifulfilled by a practice that denied and limited them.
3
John C. -Donovan in The Politics of Poverty (New York: Pegasus,
1967) provj.des an accoimt of the genesis of the controversial section,
Section 202 (a)(3), of Title II, Economic Opportunity Act of 196ii; see
Ch. 2-3.
The political science profession did not clearly lend a hand to
k
support the claims of expanded participation. Conventional political
science offered empirical support to constricted interpretations of
advanced industrial society. For instance, some students of voting
behavior reacted to the claim for expanded participation by arguing
closely the evidence against this possibility. Others pressed claims
lor participation m terms of a very narrow range of application. In
T
Representative of mainstream political science I would take to be
the consensus perspective that is encouraged in the presidential addresses
of the American Political Science Association and the dominant empirical
approach that is revealed in its annual convention and Review papers.
The position is enunciated in the Association's history, Albert Somit
and Joseph Tanenhaus, The Development of American Political Science
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), pp. 176-180. ParticulariyTnfluential
in the application of this approach is the work of the University of
Mchigan's Survey Research Center (e.g., Campbell et al. The American
Voter, I960). Not until 1969 did acknowledgment of a challenge to~the
behavioral approach manifest itself; see David Easton, "The New Revolu-
tion in Political Science," a presidential address reprinted in American
Political Science Review, 63 (December 1969) :105l-1060.
Early arguments celebrating a passive citizenry were placed by,
for instance, Heinz Eulau, "The Politics of Happiness," Antioch Review
,
(1956) :259-26Iij and W. H. Morris Jones, "In Defense of Apathy7^^~PoIltical
Studies
, 2 (February 195U):25-37. Also, James W. Prothro and C. M. Grigg.
"Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement,"
Journal of Politic s, 22 (i960) :276-29U. Fears of a mobilized electorate
were expressed in the findings of Samuel A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity
,
and Civi l Liberties (Garden City, N. I.: Doubleday and Co., and by
Tierbert McCloskey's studies. The case was succintly restated by Nelson W.
Polsby and Aaron V/ildavsky, "Toward Participatory Democracy?" in Wall
Street Journal, August 3> 1972.5
Paradigmatic is the approach of Robert Dahl, whose work will be v
discussed. It should be noted that his later work seeks a broader sense
of participation than some earlier works. Also representative are V. 0.
Key's studies, including The Responsible Electorate (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1966) and Alan A. Altschuler's Community Control—The
Black Demand for Participation in Large American Cities (New York:
Pegasus, 1970). Also, Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in
America - Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper and
Row, 1972).
failing to identify their ideological assumptions they could be accused
of propping up a vi.ew of political participation which justified and
7
gave advantage to particular dominant interests.
These studies, however, overlooked possibilities. They seldom
questioned the legitimacy of a political system whose electorate turned
out at lower rates than most other European democratic systems, nor did
they indicate any suspicion that within the non-participant population
social discontents may be lurking. That they failed to ask how the
quality of life for all might be fostered—especially for those for whom
the question is rarely posed—meant that the relationship between social
structure and hiwian development could never be investigated. The ques-
tion of the relationshi.p between our concepts and the limits of our act J- on
derives from a different perspective than the static, a hi.storical con-
sensus perspective conventional political science works fromj that is
why the studies in political paxticipation as voting failed to bring to
life any of these considerations. It v/as the critics \rho returned to
the classical democratic theory, especially the ideas of Rousseau, who
refonrnolated the lost and vague ideal of a participant citizenship and
7
Such methodological limitations are considered in, for instance,
Herbert J. Storing, ed., Lssays on the Sci entific Study of Politics
(New York: 1962); W. C. Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory
(Cambridge: University Press, 1963T7"Chap. V; and Charles A. McCoy and
John Playford, eds., Apolitical Politics: A Critique of Behavioralism
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, .1$^67"). An empirical critique of the
"Apathy" thesis is provided by Lester M. Salamon and Stephen Van Evera,
in "Fear, Apathy, and Discrimination: A Test of Three Explanations of
Political Participation," American Political Science Review 67 (December
15'73):12d8-1326.
6
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pressed it as a just claim for all members of society. The proponents
of this position suggested that much of the evidence for a case for
participation had been lost in the narrowly confining social and economic
and bureaucratic arrangements of our societyj modern social conditions
are such that they stultify the individual's intellectual capacities and
sensibilities. Conditions were not promotive of the kind of participation
that the classical democratic model required.
That maiiy sides have deliberated on the meaning and possible role of
participation makes opportune a critical analysis of the concept and reform-
u].ation of that concept in terms of its fullest practical range of appli-
cation. That is, on one level, the task of this study - t)ie elucidation
and clarification cf the concept of participation. As has already been
implied so far, "participation" is far from having limited and specific
usage and can be usefully considered to be one of a set of important,
9
general and abstract, and internally complex concepts subject to dispute.
The key for elucidating the concept is to see it in contextual
8
The critics' paradigm is represented by, for instance Christian
The Structure of Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1968, ^19587); H.
Mark Koelofs, The
"
Tension of Citizenship (New York: Holt, Rineharb and
Winston, 1968 )j The Port Huron Statement (Students for a Democratic
Society, 1962); Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism—
A
Critique (Boston: Little, Brown, 196?); and Robert J. Pranger, The
E.clipsG of Citizenship-Power and Participation in Contemporary Politics
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965).
9
The significance of this characterization of certain concepts is
made apparent by Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (New York: Viking,
1959), PP» 230-231; and William E. Connolly, "Essentially Contested
Concepts in Politics" (Paper presented at American Political Association
Convention, September ii-8, 1973), pp. 1-19.
7terms—that is, within the interpretation of which it is an integral part.
An analysis in terms of major interpretations of the United States (as a
paradigmatic case of advanced industrial society) presumes the difficulty,
if rot the impossibility, of achieving a single broad-ranging, objective
theoi-y of human organization; and, therefore, the necessity of some de-
limiting perspective. Human purposes, in other words, are closely built
into any viev; of society, and it makes sense, as Charles Taylor contends,
to recognize "the unavoidably 'hermeneutical' component in the sciences
10
of man."
In this view of political inquiry two arguments are taken as per-
suasive: (1) Important examined and unexamined assumptions, including
assessments as to ultimate value, necessitated by conditions of uncertainty
11
and limited empirical control, shape the perspective that guides inquiry.
(2) These sometimes unexamined and often obtuse assumptions which make up
an explanatory theory have bearing on the recommendations that flow out
of an interpretation. The concept xial approach sets the range within which
12
things can vary and also sets normative conclusions. While it may not
always be possible to resolve conceptual differences, and differences
that involve paradigm disputes, it is possible to expose these differences
and this process makes likely a more explicit awareness of the commitments
10
Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review
of Metaphysics (Fall 1971), pp. 3-5l.
William E. Connolly, Political Science and Ideology (New York:
Atherton, 1968), pp. U8-5U.
12
Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," in Peter Laslett
and W. G. Runciman, eds., Ptolosophy, Politic s and Society,
3rd ser. (New
York: Barnes and Nobel, 1967), pp. 2b-i?Y.
8a theorist affirms or denies. At the least, it makes more difficult the
distorted or manipulated use of a concept.
At one level, the purpose of this study is to show the contextual
reasons for the many meanings of participation in contemporary usaf,e and
to provide an explanation in terms of theoretical and ideological differ-
ences. At another level, it seeks to rtiake a case for expanding the scope
and practice of a participatory style of politics. The value of partici-
pation is found in its two functions recognized by the classical theorists,
most notably Rousseau: First, to achieve self-development, the development
of the human personality in terms of its intellectual capacities and
sensibilities j and secondly, to redress the imbalance of forces in society
by so doing. The manifest function of social institutions, and modcm
politJ.cal ones in particular, is to mediate the extremes for bringing
social forces into balance; it is true that this function is not always
realized. The effect of participating in the formulation of a collective
pub].ic decision is to influence the individual's self-identity and thereby
broaden his range of considerations in terms of the vrider values of the
communn.ty. The process of making the law helps one to see the reasons
for feeling bound to the law; and this process should bind both those
for and against the particular item of legislation.
The case to be persuasive must show that the tv/o classical ends
claimed on behalf of participatory structures are theoretically possible,
if not actually achieved under conditions of advanced industrial society.
It must indicate the extent to which participation becomes possible
under various settings and with what consequences. My effort is to show
that in the prevailing interpretations choices ar.- iriAde which exclude
9this important theoretical possibility and to indicate how other inter-
pretations enable such a possibility to unfold.
Certain premises are essential for this effort. Those which I have
identified as particularly important to this enterprise are indicated in
summary form to guide the reader in the line of argument taken.
(1) Political inquiry must be guided by normative considerations.
Here I take my lead from classical democratic theorists who aspire to
establish the conditions of self-development for all members of society.
The empirical-normative dichotomy of conventional social science is
rejected as unfruitful.
(2) The view of a human "science" must be broadly conceived. The
behavioralists, in patterning their approach of that of the natural
sciences model, have drawn their methodology too narrowly for the study
of the human phenomena. Political inq^liry must be closely connected to
questions of political and moral philosophy,
(3) A theory of institutions and self-development is important for
bringing out the interconnections betvreen social conditions and human
character. Failure to see the interdependence of individual and environ-
ment can be linked to the British empirico-utilitarian tradition which
atomized subject and object. The strong connections between what happens
to hiiman personality under variable social conditions best appears in
the work of Rousseau, Marx, G. H. Mead, and in the focus on understanding
"action" in the more contemporary developments of pragmatic and analytic
13
philosophy,
13
Richard J. Bernstein in Praxis and Action - Contemporary Philo-
sophies of Human Activity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania,
1971) gives an excellent exposition of this development and its
significance.
10
(U) Examination of socio-political processes in the conventional
terms of "consensus" and "conflict" may have to be reevaluated in the
light of the view of man that is adopted here. Particularly, what becomes
important is the identification of issues shut out of public debate and
the social, political, and economic structures related to this process.
In SchattSchneider's sense, understanding the "mobilization of bias" in
a commujiity or polity becomes significant.
(5) The influential role of distorted communication in sustaining
and extending, if not establishj.ng, a class-divided society must be con-
sidered. Language as a social product, can shape consciousness for en-
couraging the development of a rational and moral being or it can be
used to limit and crush that possibility. Individuals carmot be autono-
mous when the conditions for that state are not available; that is
particularly so with highly centralized control of inforniation.
(6) Conditions of uncertainty in our knowledge about human organi-
zation cannot be used as an excuse for political scientists failing to
make recommendations for public policy. The purpose of social science,
of human knowledge in general, is to guide conduct. To put this off
means that decisions that must be made will be made by those less pre-
pared or ill-prepared to consider the problem in its fullest dimensions.
Analogously, non-participation is a process of decision-making by default.
I will undertake an examination of the concept "participation" in
the following way:
First, I will review the classical formulation found primarily in
Rousseau. Rousseau was concerned with the two aspects of participation—
the settings in which it can occur and the moral features they required
11
on the part of the participants. Participation developed the moral
virtues which were necessary for a modern social order. What is im-
portant to remember about Rousseau's standpoint, which is very unfamiliar
to traditional social science, is that he was concerned with the oppor-
tunities that would allow for the development of the individual, all
individuals, to their fullest capacities. In contrast, the contemporary
polj.tical behavioralist begins with the assumption of the necessity of
social stability and asks how it can best be achieved. Often enough, it
appears as if it is achieved at the expense of at least some groups in
society. Conditions of economic and social equality, solitude, and
respect for persons were part of the conditions required for Rousseau's
system of citizenship to work. T. H. Green made an important contribution
to one side of the classical case for participation in his theory of
political obligation; this theory required that the citizen put into
practice a moral theory of the common good. Citizenship was not the
highest state of morality for him but enabled the individual to become
self-realized, a rational and moral human being. John Dewey made a con-
siderable contribution to the institutional side of the case for partici-
pation, strongly promoting the cause of broad scale participatory insti-
tutions extending to all levels of government and society. For him they
were particularly important at the community level and in educational as
well as other social settings.
A second chapter will indicate the conventional position in political
science toward "participation." Within this interpretation several
Vfiiriants are apparent, depending upon assessments made about human capa-
cities. I take Robert Dahl's work as representative of the predominant
12
pluralist interpretation of the American political system. Participation
in intermediary institutions is seen as important for maintaining a
socially cohesive society, but participation refers to a more limited
range of activities than would be encouraged by a radical position.
Chiefly, Dahl is unable to deal vdth the problemmatic in advanced in-
dustrial society as many see it; the forms of participation that he
suggests are insufficient for resolving the prevalent social conflicts,
for they have not basically transformed the limiting and oppressive
conditions so that the individual can freely develop and critically
appraise his situation. Other social scientists deny effective parti-
cipation for the mass of individuals altogether. Minimal turnout for
presidential elections is regarded as a sign of a "happy" electorate, or
"expanded" participation is shown to be inefficient or impractical given
the scope of decisions required by the international and national scene.
This position is reflected in the interpretations of Irving Kristol,
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Edward Banfield, for example. But my concern
shall be primarily with the "strong" wing of the pluralists, the liberal-
pluralist case for expanding opportunities to participate.
There are a set of critics of the pluralist position who correctly
appraise, from the standpoint of this study, the political features of
the American system but draw mistaken conclusions as to what will
effectively remedy the problem. Specifically, I will examine the work
of Grant McConnell and Theodore Lowi, the republican interpretation.
This interpretation neglects the lead of classical theorists and suggests
that participation is a purely rhetorical device with little potential
consequences for realizing the public interest. Decentralization, as a
13
broadly open system of making as many of the political decisions as
possible at local levels, is regarded as a ruse by special interests.
Centralization becomes a more viable alternative. V/hat happens to the
individual personality in the way of becoming more impoverished in his
capacities for critical reflection and action, under the political system
McConnell and Lovri recommence is never regarded as a topic of concern.
Another set of critics, a position which we will identify as radical-
liberal, however, offers a sensible alternative to the recommendations of
McConnell and Lowi. Taking their lead from SchattSchneider ' s important
effort to reveal the "mobilization of bias" in the American party and
pressure group system, Bactirach and Kaufman are among the first to return
to classical theory for elucidating the shortcomings of contemporary
democratic theory. Bachrach makes the case for promoting the conditions
for self-development and attempts to show how increased opportunities for
participation in Baltimore restructure the balance of povrer in a more
democratically favorable way. Kaufman, who is cautious about the benefits
to be expected from a broadened scope of participation, nevertheless,
feels that participation has a self-fulfilling effect and that it can
work if it is believed that it will work. His work more clearly shows,
than Bachrach' s, what is required of the citizen as a moral agent.
The radical interpretation of advanced industrial society is framed
in the work of Herbert Marcuse. Central to his critique is the view
that social and political conditions are such that not only is the develop
*
ment of the personality not encouraged, it is outrightly disallowed.
Marcuse 's pessimism about existing society leads him to recommend a
position of refusal or resistance, of non-participation. Participation
Hi
within the established framework of po31tics is "repressive," subject
to the consequences of all delusory behavior. I will draw a model of
"repressive participation," suggesting the features that make his
critique of the liberal-pluralist conception such a controversial, yet,
important one.
V/hat this project attempts then, in brief, is a contextual analysis
of the contemporary liberal-pluralist conception of participation in
order to see to what extent it is challenged or defeated by alternative
perspectives. I begin with a preliminary commitment to the ideal of a
participatory society as envisioned by the classicists, but I am also
alert to the historically-unique conditions of advanced industrial-
capitalist society and the important functioning of elites under the
social arrangements associated with industrialization, bureaucratization,
and urbanization. Initially, I want to suggest the analyses of Bachrach
and Kaufman and Marcuse make possible an enriched conception of partici-
pation that satisfies both the ideals of the classicists and overrides
some of the limiting conditions of present social and political arrange-
ments usually offered as significant objections to it.
I believe that the qualitatively different society that Marcuse
imagines as possible would be a truly participatory society, but he has,
with his version of critical theory, no leverage for developing con-
structive strategies for change, nor does he have an explicit moral theory.
These matters are correctly identified as the weakest part of Marcuse 's
philosophy, but, I believe, that a convergence can be worked out between
the perspectives of the radical-liberals and Marcuse through other
radicals and with the important work currently being done in analytic
15
philosophy in terms of the concepts of "action" and "intention." The
radicals, while identified with Marcuse's critique in essential ways,
provide some more developed indications of structures of change. I have
in mind, particularly, the work of Andre Gorz, Milton Kotler, and E. F.
Schumacher and others. They have been involved, both in theory and
practice, in developing participatory structures at the grassroots level,
viewing these as ancillary to developing the Qualitatively different
society. Broad-scale participation in the communities, in the schools
and universities, and in other public and private institutions are seen
as important experiences for awakening the perception of another way of
life
.
But, most significantly, it is necessary for developing the social
language that is required for guiding human conduct. This is the im-
portant point, and so in the concluding chapter, I want to propose a
scheme by which forms of participation and non-participation can be
understood in terms of being language-constituted. This view recognizes
that individiials can only participate to the limit of their linguistic
ability. I find Habermas's distinction between the "purposive-rational
activity" model and the "communicative interaction" model as particularly
suggestive in this discussion. Attention to the role of language in
social life, of communicative interaction, suggests new ways for in-
vestigating forms of participation in advanced industrial society and
Tu
See Andre Gorz, Strategy for Labor - A Radical Proposal (Boston:
Beacon Press, 196?) and Socialism and Revolution, Norman Denny tr.
(Garden City, N. I.: Anchor, 1913)] Milton Kotler, Neighborhood Govern-
ment: The Local Foundations of Political Life (Indianapolis and New York:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1969); E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful-Economics as if
People Mattered (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973;. Also, see Hunnius,
Garson, and Case, eds.. Workers' Control - A Reader on Labor and Social
Change (New York: Vintage, 1973).
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may even, as well, go some way toward reconstituting the prevalent forms
of participation now practiced.
17
CHAPTER II
THE CLASSICAL VISION OF ROUSSEAU, GREEN, AND DEWEY:
PARTICIPATION AND THE CONCEPT OF SELF
Introduction
The classical vision of the participatory society has its roots in
the French political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for it vas he
who, in an age of social discontent and discontinuity, recognized the
plight of modern man in a most prescient, meaningful, and enduring way.
He identified the problem of alienation by framing the problem of human
society in terms of the dynamic relationship between social structure
and personality. Later in his life, Rousseau captured ttiis insight in
his Confessions
,
stating it as the one underlying principle from whj.ch
all his work flowed. "I had attained the insight," he wrote, "that
everything is at bottom dependent on political arrangements, and that no
matter what position one takes, a people will never be otherwise than what
1
its form of government makes it." Framed in this way, Rousseau's work
becomes a critical tool for examining and appraising the social and
2
political arrangements of advanced industrial society. But this view-
point has not always been favored,
Rousseau always considered himself an "historian of human nature j"
his concerns were precursors to those of philosophical anthropology.
1
Quoted by Ernest Cassirer in Rousseau, Kant and Goethe--Two
Essays (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970 /19U£/), p. 27.
2
We would be expecting too much if we seek in his writings con-
structive strategies as well. The emphasis is provided by Peter Gay in
his introduction to Cassirer 's The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau
(Indiana: Indiana Uni.versity Press, 1963 /19!?i£/), p. 27.
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Yet, many whose viewpoints have not been empathetic to Rousseau on this
have misunderstood and misappropriated what he wrote. Interpretations
have miscast Rousseau as a totalitarian, an irrationalist , a pessimist,
a Utopian. Having surveyed them, we are no further along in our under-
standing of the pervasive ills that we sense in our civilization. Anoth
k
tradition is much more resourceful and acknowledges its deb» .
3
The literature is abundant and all too familiar: For instance,
John W. Chapman, Rousseau ; Totalitarian or Liberal ? (New York: Columbia
Um.versity Press, 1956); George Lichtheim, "Rousseau and DeMaistre" in
The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays (New York: Vintage, 196?),
pp. 123-1257 and Judith N. Shklar, Men" and Citizens - A Study of Rousseau's
Social Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
J-
One must first recognize the debt of Marx to Rousseau and of all the
subsequent important sociology and social psychology, including G. H.
Mead's. Besides that of Cassirer, constructive interpretations to which
i am indebted have been provided by G. D, H, Cole, Robert DeRathe in trans-
lation in "Rousseau, Jean-Jacques," I nternational Encyclopedia of Social
Science, 13:563-571; and by Marshall Herman's The Politics of Authenticity
Radical I ndividualism and the Emergence of Modern Society (New York
:
Atheneum, 1970) . Implicit in this tradition is a fascination with con-
cepts of a similar sort: Alienation, exploitation, and repression.
Specific efforts to make Rousseau's concepts more analytically
meaningful to the contemporary period have been carried out by the
following:
I. Fetcher has made Rousseau's notion of freedom more meaningful by
distinguishing the independence of the natural man, the relationships of
domination in civil society, and the real freedom available to all when
regulated by law in which they have had a hand in making; see, "Rousseau's
Concepts of Freedom in the Light of His Philosophy of History," in Carl J.
Friedrich, ed., Nomos IV: Liberty (New York: Atherton, 1967), pp. 19-53
.
Brian Barry, in the context of a discussion of the public interest,
guggests the fruitfulness of Rousseau's notion of the General Will once
his usage is clarified; see, "The Public Interest" in William E. Connolly,
"ed,. The Bias of Pluralism (New York: Atherton, 1969), pp. 168-172.
George Kateb has attempted to put Rousseau's idea of the General
Will in more favorable light by showing that distributive "justice," along
Vith the concept of moral autonomy and the concept of fair play are at
the center of his concerns, in "Asp?cts of Rousseau's Political Thought,"
Political Science Quarterly , 76 (1961) :520-521.
I^Iaure L. Goldschmidt persuasively challenges the claim of Rousseau's
hostility to intermediary associations and contends that, "Neither as a
matter of theory or of practical recommendation does he reject all inter-
jnediary associations." See, "Rousseau on Intermediary Associations" in
fj, Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., Nomos XI : Voluntary
Associ-
ations (New York: Atherton, 1969), pp. 119-137.
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Ernst Cassirer, who comes. to Rousseau through Kant, tells us that
Kant was one of the few contemporaries of Rousseau who appreciated his
true ethical significance j^indeed, Kant was to describe Rousseau as the
Newton of the moral world. Rousseau challenged his own time, and ours
equally as well, with the problem of discovering those conditions that
would develop morally autonomous human beings, human beings who would act
in regard to each other on the basis of moral principle rather than
egotistic self-interest. Trusting his deeper self, Rousseau always
doubted the virtues of institutions which fanned illusions and vanities
and encouraged people to give the appearance of having lived rather than
really living. He had brought into focus the problem of authenticity.
According to Berman: "It was only in the second generation of the En-
lightenment, through Rousseau, that the search for authenticity came
into its own. Rousseau gave it a personal immediacy and urgency that
his age could not ignore; he forced his contemporaries to acknowledge
that the self was a problem as pressing for them as it was for him. In
forcing this problem to the surface of consciousness, moreover, he
showed how repressive, how profoundly alien to the self the modern world
6
really was."
One passage is indicative; Cassirer in his essay, "Rousseau and
Kant," writes: "What is truly permanent about hujTuin nature is not any
condition in wiiich it once existed and from which it has fallen; rather,
it is the goal for which and tov;ard which it moves. Kant looks for
constancy not in what man is but in what he should be . And Kant credits
Rousseau the ethical philosopher with having discerned the 'real man' be^
neath all the distortions and concealments, beneath all the masks that
man has created for himself and worn in the course of his history...",
p. 20.
6
Berman, p. 75
•
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The alleged ambiguities, paradoxes, and inconsistencies fall into
place in Rousseau interpretation when the philosopher is perceived as
on a journey of growth himself, tracing out the range of answers to this
problem of authenticity. This is the thrust of both Cassirer's and
Barman's interpretations of Rousseau's radical individuaUsm. Rousseau's
work, I believe, must be appreciated as a comprehensive unityj it is as
a single piece of cloth when viewed in terms of the guiding problem which
demands solution.
Cassirer brings out the significance of the crystallizing and form-
ative experience which helped to set Rousseau on this path. It occurred
on the summer day in 17ii9 when Rousseau read about the Academy of Dijon's
essay competition for which he was to submit his First Discourse. The
essay question posed was: "Has the restoration of the sciences and the
arts helped to purify morals?" Rousseau later recorded to a friend the
moment of insight generated in him by the question he read:
,.,0h, (Sir), if I could ever have written one fourth of
what I had seen and felt under that tree, with what
clarity, I should have revealed all the contradictions of
the social system: With what force I should have exposed
all the abuses of our institutions: With what ease I
should have shown that man is naturally good, and that it
is through these institutions alone that man became bad.'
It was a revolt, perhaps the first moment when one person's self-
8
consciousness became political consciousness. In the contemporary
vocabulary of psychology, this was a conversion experience. Cassirer
observes: "Indeed it was that moment which decided his fate as a
7
The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau , p. u7.
6
This is the theme Berman investigates in The Politics of Authenticity ,
p. XXIV.
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thinker. The question that suddenly confronted him focused all doubts
which had previously assailed him on one point.... At a stroke, his
feeling became clear and clairvoyant. Rousseau now saw where he stood;
9
he not only felt but he judged and he condemned " Others would
require such an experience as well. Rousseau's more concrete answers
as to how individuals might be freed of oppressive institutions were to
work themselves out in The Second Discourse on the Origin of Inequality
(1755), in Julie, or the New Heloise (I761), in Emile (1762), in the
Social Contract, or The Principles of Political Right (1762), and, finally,
in the Project of a Constitution for Corsica (1765) and in Considerations
on the Goverment of PolaM (1770-1771).
What Rousseau offered his age was an answer that involved a new view
of man in his relation to society and God; a new view of the roles for
intellect and feeling; a new view of the functions of the family, religion,
and the state; and a reasoned critique of inequalities. He asks us, as
well, to consider a new definition of "happiness and freedom," what Kant
10
views as a rationalized conception of freedom. Rousseau, ultimately,
9
The Question of Jean-Jacaues Rousseau, pp. U7-U8.
10
Here, Leon Emery suggests Rousseau's meaning of happiness: "It
requires a man to be fully conscious of his inner tranquility, and to
know that he is exempt from distress or fear, from barren or violent
passions. Happiness is the enjoyment of oneself, is an intense and
harmonious emotional life; it amounts to 'pulling one's feelings close
around the heart,' and enjoying to the full their ardent upswelling. . . ."
"Rousseau and the Foundations of Human Regeneration," Yale French Studies ,
28 (1960-1961) :6. '•'•his form of happiness required freedom: "To be free
and happy, a man must bear only the chains he knows to be natural, and so
does not dream of shaking off." Emery, p. 7. We will see later how
closely this conception resembles the Marcusean notions of existentially
necessary "sublimation" and historically unnecessary "surplus repression."
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asks us to consider whether for this new Being, the price would be too
high in giving up the pursuit of pleasure through power; in the loss of
some areas of privacy; in the sacrifice of material benefits; in the dis-
position of certain belief systems; in the loss of a system of social
status enjoyed and not enjoyed, and so forth, ^'his question lies behind
assessments of interpretations to be examined in this study.
The purpose of this chapter is to project a model of a participatory •/
society that has been assaulted and deformed by the dominant positivist
intellectual traditions of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth
centuries. Rousseau, and after him, T. H. Green and John Dewey, renew
our attention in the importance of a society established upon the basis
of an intersubjectively-created sense of the common good. Rousseau in
the first pages of the Social Contract has, therefore, defined a problem
that still merits our consideration: "I mean to inquire if in the civil
order, there can be any sure and legitimate rule of administration, men
11
being talcen as they are and laws as they might be."
First, a brief examination of Rousseau's crit:.que of society in its
alienation of the self will be set out to reveal the sources of modern
man's troubles. I will then attempt to characterize his chief solution
to the problem, the participation of all in the creation of the General
Will and what this must require on the part of mortal men and women.
Some major objections to this model of society will also be considered.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract and Discourses Tr.
and Intro. G. D. H. Cole (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1950), p. 3.
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Rousseau's Critique of Modern Political Society
In the preceding section we suggested that, personally and philosoph-
ically, Rousseau was concerned with defining freedom in terms of self- y
realization. This was the postulate which separated Rousseau from the
theorists who grounded their theories of the state in necessity or
utility. For, Rousseau's contribution to a theory of participatory
democracy lies in the intuition of the alienating aspects of a growingly
complex, stratified, and achievement-oriented society. Once making the ^
link between the rise of artifice in man's behavior and the structure of
inequality in property, power, and status, Rousseau had to go on to
pose the possibility of a more rational and, therefore, valid social
arrangement—one that involved a form of participation and a commitment
to it tiiat can only seem curious to many from the present-day nihilistic
perspective.
The unraveling of the conception provided by the Social Contract lay
in the description of the problem: "Man is born free and everywhere he
is in chains." A metaphor more historically provocative would be difficult
to conceive.
The openirig paragraphs of the Contract focus on one of the chief
paradoxes of social life, and one of the great social lies—the incessant
claim in social discourse and behavior that man is "free," perhaps even
that he has free will, and the recognition (for some at least) that such
a claim only provides a comfortable illusion to his real, class-bound
existence. More formally stated, Rousseau's remarks are a direct attack
on the basic presuppositions of classical liberal democratic theory, which
has a fairly coherent view of man in the universe as shown by C, B. Macpherson
2h
arid Steven Lukes. This is a static, mechanistic, Newtonian, first cause
view of the universe in which figures the "abstract individual;" these
individuals are deemed to possess, according to Lukes, "'independent
centres of consciousness,' and have given, non-context-dependent interests,
12
wants, motives, purposes, needs, etc." Lukes*. Individualism helpfully
probes, in this context, the conflation of these several unit-ideas in
classical liberal theory to make much clearer the dubious commitments
the distinct ideals entail. Much of Rousseau's work, and perhaps the
measure of his rhetorical capacity as well, is his ability to accomplish
Just that and to show the falling of the atomic view of man—to draw the
tensions between appearances and realities, the disjunctions between
Seeming and Being. Such disjunctions are embedded in his use of irony,
the double perspective, and the apparent contradictions, and it is the
13
source of his cynicism and hope.
The arts and the sciences are the target of all that has gone wrong
with man and society in the First Discourse . They have created masks
behind which modern man can hidej perhaps the point may be drawn from
the following passages:
So long as government and law provide for the security
and well-being of men in their common life, the arts, lit-
erature, and the sciences, less despotic though perhaps
more povjerful, fling garlands of flowers over the chains
which weigh them down. They stifle in men's breasts that
sense of original liberty, for which they seem to have
been born; cause them to love their own slavery, and so make
of them what is called a civilized people.
* * *
12
Steven Lukes, Individualism (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973),
pp. 138-139 and passim.
13
Roger D. Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 19thY, Pp. 210, 211, 213.
2$
Human natiire was not at bottom better than now; but men found
their security in the ease with which they could see through
one another, and this advantage, of which we no longer feel
the value, prevented their having many vices. (And in a
footnote in reference to the American Indian he asks: "¥nat
yoke, indeed, can be imposed on men who stand in need of
nothing?"
)
* * »
Politeness requires this thing j decorum thatj ceremony has
its forms, and fashion its laws, and these we must always
follow, never the promptings of our own nature.
* * *
We no longer dare what we really are, but lie under a perpetual
restraint; in the meantime the herd of men, which we call
society, all act under the same circumstances exactly alike,
unless very particular and powerful motives prevent them. ...-^^
The arts and sciences have had the effect of corrupting man, of nurturing
vices rather than virtues; there is the "appearance of all the virtues,
15
without being in the possession of one of them." Rousseau follows with
an historical examination of civilizations. When culture (useless
knowledge) flourished the great empires, like Egypt, Greece, Rome, and
the Eastern Empire, began to crumble. Under these conditions the true
virtues, which will make for an enduring and self-satisfying society, go
unhonored: "A wise man does not go in chase of fortune; but he is by no
means insensible to glory, and when he sees it so ill-distributed, his
virtue, which might have been animated by a little emulation, and turned
to the advantage of society, droops and dies away in obscurity and in-
16
digence...." Surely this statement appears rhetorical, but the
The First Discourse (Cole Edition), pp. Iii7-lu9.
Ibid., p. Ili7.
16
Ibid., pp. 168-169.
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rudiments of a critical theory of culture and personality, which will
later be unfolded by Marcuse's synthesis of Marx and Freud, are here.
The failur-e of citizenship to materialize can be found in these conditions
j
Rousseau's passage continues:
It is for this reason that the agreeable arts must in time
everywhere be preferred to the useful; and this truth has
been but too much confirmed since the revival of the arts
and sciences. We have physicists, geometricians, chemists,
astronomers, poets, musicians, and painters in plenty; but
we have no longer a citizen among us; or if there be found
a few scattered over our abandoned countryside, they are
left to perish there unnoticed and neglected. '
Aspects of the socialization process have had the effect of making men
mean, corrupt, and miserable, rather than simple, courageous, and virtuous.
Worse than this they have become specialists and are no longer comprehen-
sivists. Man's natural being, and his natural needs, and his natural
potentialities, have been usurped by artifice and artificial wants.
Man is chained, in a psychic sense, by all sorts of cultural
techniques and other symbolisms, including language—but he is also
chained, in a more physically real sense, by certain conditions associated
vith civil society. By the Second Discourse Rousseau's thought has taken
on more positive eind radical content, and there is the recognition of the
inevitability and the necessity of society. The ornaments of culture are
useful for veiling and deflecting truths and, in general, for reproducing
18
the society itself. But these are still only the manifestations of an
alienating society. The root cause of its instability and of unfreedom
17
Ibid., p. 169.
18
Rousseau writes: "We should see the magistrates fomenting every-
thing that might weaken men united in society, by promoting dissension
among them; everything that might sow in it the seeds of actual division.
27
is inequality, which has its origin in property and the first act of
possession. Accompanying the structure of inequality of property come
the differentials in prestige and power.
The Second Discourse is, in essence, a hypothetical account of how
natural man progressed to the point where he was able to make the claim,
"This is mine," and have others accept this declamation. According to
Rousseau's conjectures, from this moment on the tendency towards greater
and greater extremes of inequality moved inexorably onwards. Social dis-
19tinctions cultivated the vices of vanity and contempt, shame and envy.
The distribution of property, which came with its cultivation and the
division of labor, necessitated a system of justice, but there were no
forces to sustain the side of equality:
In this state of affairs, equality might have been sustained,
had the talents of individuals been equal, and had, for
example, the use of iron and the consuiaption of commodities
always exactly balanced each others but, as there was nothing
to preserve this balance, it was soon disturbed; the strongest
did most workj the most skillful turned h.s labour to best
account; the most ingenuous devised methods of diminishing
his labour; the husbandman wanted more iron, or the smith more
corn, and, while both laboured equally, the one gained a great
deal by his work, while the other could hardly support himself.
Education only served to increase diversity and the distances between
21
individuals. The process generates extremes of sufficient force to
demand some ameliorative solution, and thus, government is born: "All
ran headlong to their chains, in hopes of securing their liberty; for
they had just wit enough to perceive the advantages of political
while it gave society the air of harmony everything that might inspire the
different ranks of people with mutual hatred and distrust by setting the
rights and interests of one against those of another, and so strengthen
the power which comprehends them all." Second Discourse (Cole edition),
pp. 267-268.
19
Ibid., p. 2iil.
20
Ibid., pp. 2i;6-2ii7.
21
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institutions, without experience enough to enable them to foresee the
dangers. "The most capable of foreseeing the dangers," acconiing to
Rousseau, "were the very persons who expected to benefit by them; and
even the most prudent Judged it not expedient to sacrifice one part of
their freedom to ensure the rest; as a wounded man has his arm cut off
to save the rest of his body."' It was only a few short steps to wars
between nations and ultimate tyranny.
The problem of the origin of society and state which Rousseau is
trying to explain, perhaps, fails to be satisfying today. Marx's histor-
ical dialectical explanation, for instance, stands out as more empirically
accurate. But it is important to remember that Rousseau is also constrained
by responding in the format of a problem set before him by Hobbes and
Locke. The view of human nature, of reason and sentiment, and of possi-
bility, however, were respectively distinct. Unlike the static view of
hujnan nature assumed by his predecessors, Rousseau had, through intro-
spection, given attention to the malleability of the instincts and
impulses under varying conditions. Or as, Stuart Hampshire now phrases
this, "A reflective man is aware that he would have recognized, and acted
from, other motives in himself if he had been born and formed in other
circumstances He could see that the human creature was innately
susceptible to socialization by his environment and that language (syrabo-
lism, broadly) played a most important role. The worst problem of
corrupting society was that of its unhealthy competitiveness as the
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
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Stuart Hainpshire, Thought and Action (New York: Viking, 1963),
p. 2iUi.
25
Second Discourse
, pp. 216-217.
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feeling of "amour-propre," egoism ard pride, replaced the natural feeling
of "amour de soi," self-love or self-respect.'' Under institutionalized
arrangements, man became "the infinite appropriator," "the infinite
consumer," to use C. B. Macpherson's opprobriative terms, as needs and
wants became externalized. An artificial, ascribed-status or a con-
trived, achievement-status system must bear the onus for stunting the
grov^bh of the complete person who can trust his own instincts and im-
pulses to satisfy his life processes. In the long run, what Rousseau fore
saw for civil society was a state of affairs very much like that of
Hobbes' state of nature unless some insight could be obtained to transcend
the pettiness, and the tyrannies, of the presmr^ably urbane and cosmo-
politan existence.
In attaching meaning to the socialization processes of culture and
the degenerative aspects of inequality, Rousseau was able to place great
significance on the impact of social arrangements in fostering the
emergence of individually- and socially-harmful behavioral characteristics
Freud was to capture this same process in his distinction of the conscious
and the unconscious and the role of the mechanism of repression. Culture
could then be viewed in its manipulative aspects, and inequality in status
26
Self-respect, for Rousseau, "is a natural feeling which leads every
animal to look to its own preservation, and which guided in man by reason
and modified by compassion, creates humanity and virtue." Egoism, which
Rousseau claims has no need of existence in primitive society, "is a
purely relative and factitious feeling, which arises in the state of
society, leads each individual to make more of himself than of any other,
causes all the mutual damage men inflict on one another, and is the real
source of the 'sense of honor.'" p. 223.
27
C. B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory; Essays in Retrieval (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1973), Sssay ^I, "Democratic Theory: Ontology and
Technology," pp. 2ii-38o
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wealth, and power could be seen for its more pernicious effects in
exciting rancorous conflict.
These insights could not have been achieved had not Rousseau held
two important conceptions. The first is an evolutionary and morphological
conception of social institutions, which Herman's reading discovers as
much as my own. Herman says, Rousseau's was "the celebration of man's
2o
historicity." Man was a structuring force in the universe, not merely
a God-given object in it. The second was a genetic or developmental
concept of man, such as can be followed through in the compelling work
on moral development of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, and it is to
be found as well in the writings of psychoanalysts such as Karen Horney,
29
Erich Fromm, and Carl Rogers.
These assumptions are what constituted the unique perspective of
Rousseau. How did he come by them?—Perhaps, through accident in the
selection of "natural" as opposed to mechanistic models. Such seems to
be the apparent bias of his metaphors and analogies. As some of his
commentators have pointed out, Rousseau had cut through centuries of
thought and returned to the models of Plato and Aristotle. Rousseau, as
De Jouvenal has significantly pointed out, was "the first great exponent
30
of social evolution."
2B
—
Berman, pp. 1U6-1U9.
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For instance, the closeness is suggested by a consideration
Rogers proposes: "Do we dare to generalize from this type of exper-
ience that if we cut through deeply enough to our organismic nature,
that we find that man is a positive snd social animal? This is the
suggestion from our clinical experience." In On Becoming A Person
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 196.1), p. 103. It must be kept clear,
however, that Rousseau has both a psychology and a moral theory^ this
distinction seems to be confused in Rogers.
30
Bertrand De Jouvenal, "Rousseau the Pessimistic Evolutionist,"
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Rousseau's Solution: The Idea of the Social Contract
The Social Contract framed one answer to Rousseau's problem: "The
problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect
with the whole common force the person and goods of each association,
and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey him-
31
self alone, and remain as free as before." What would seem to be
enigmatic on the face, can be better understood by considering what is
required of individuals and, therefore, what is gained and lost in the
process.
If another sort of happiness and freedom was to be desired, a more
simple and natural life of virtue, what was the course open to the indi-
vidual? As many have recognized, there are two apparent solutions in
the v/ritings of Rousseau. He never seemed to consider as realistic or
32
desirable a return to nature. Perhaps a retreat to some commune might
have made sense to him, but of this one cannot be certain.
There is, first, the choice of the life of "natural man" in the
classical sense, the life personified by Emile who is reared in a care-
fully determined environment in isolation from society. Emile becomes
forever the "amiable foreigner." The significance of his isolation was
to show the corrupting strength of existing institutions, which was
Yale French Studies
,
28 (1961-1962) : 83 . And Masters, p. 223, for his
interpretation of the important role of history in Rousseau's thought.
Cf. Shklar's interpretation which takes Rousseau to be a- historical and
sees him as engaging in the construction of a timeless utopia. Men and
Citizens
,
chap. 1.
31
The Social Contract (Cole edition), pp. 13-lli.
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Appendix to the Second Discourse (Cole edition), pp. 281-282.
32
abundantly evident in the very inauthentic and mutilated self Julie became
in LaJWelle Heloise. That this could be a seriously considered alter-
•
native does not seem probable to me, and this is Beman's account as well:
"Authentic action would have to be interaction. Only through unity with
33
others could the uniqueness of the self emerge." But, there was "a
profound contradiction between the hiunan need for mutuality and the
social tendency to convert all human relations into mutual exploitation...,"
and so Rousseau's partial hope was that the romantic relationsliip would
provide a kind of paradigm, in the sharing of meanings and a trust of
motives, for the kind of interaction that was more broadly required for
a larger commun.ity. According to the account, then, political con-
sciousness accrued in steps. First was the internal awareness that came
vdth anxiety. Next came the attempt to capture and realize one's identity
with and through another j this was the experience of "the authentic person."
One's self-identity had to be confirmed by others: "¥hat they would not
35
recognize, he could not assert." Finally came the broader kind of
authenticity derived as a participating member of a community. This was
the experience of "^the authentic citizen."
This last stage was the second model that Rousseau pursued in his
political, as opposed to fictionalized, writings. It figures as strongly
in his practical pieces intended as guides to action, his writings for
Poland and Corsica, as it does in the Contract. This is the model of a
society of an active, participating, moral citizenry.
33
Herman, p. 188.
Ibid., p. 188.
35
Ibid., p. 103.
33
In contrast to the worst fonos of internal and external tyranny
that could be generated in modern states by a practxce of everyone pur-
suing his own self-interest ("amour propre") and an ideology that
encouraged it, stood Rousseau's answer. Rousseau's critical powers had
allowed him to postulate a synergistic possibility-that several in-
gredients could be more enhanced in combination than any singly. This
was the original nature of the conception projected by Rousseau's new
36
use of the social contract.
The notion of the social contract had utility in suggesting some
means by which society first occurred and made social ties between
members possible. This was the familiar approach for political phil-
osophers of the time. Once Rousseau could explain human association,
it was possible to distinguish between particular wills, the will of all,
and the General Will. Moreover, he could particularly show the inade-
quacy of the social theory of classical liberalism which predicated
itself on a concept of a public interest as the mere sum of the particu-
lar interests.
Essential to the hypothesis of the General Will, as the basis for
a good political order, was the notion that a rational order, in contrast
to the order achieved in the natural state and the disorder of chaotic
claims that characterized civil society, could be achieved by replacing
physical force (coercion, which was necessary to maintain the multitude
of warring fantasies) with moral force. And this is what makes Rousseau's
—w~
The conditions Rousseau presumed under which the contract would
take effect must be pointed out. In order to restrict the privileged and
powerful minority, a proper economic and educational environment had to
be established. Rousseau, while requiring a relatively equal economic
structure, did not reject the private property system and, instead,
called for a progressive tax policy.
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consensus a "moral" one; it is a connnunity consensus in which each person
votes for a policy that he is willing to live with if everybody else will
abide by it. The moral force is obtained when everyone recognizes that
in giving himself up to the common good, he gives up nothing. That on
this basis each obtains equality, not under domination as a subjugated
being, but equality before the law that they have all participated in
making and know the true reasons for obeyi.ng.
Only in the legitimate state, the state based on right, in which a
policy represented the interests of everyone in common could it be said
that a General Will existed. Its elements can be seen from Rousseau's
own statement:
The undertakings v;hich bind us to the social body are
obligatory only because they are mutual; and their nature
is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work for otners
without working for ourselves. Why is it that the general
will is always in the right, and that all continually will
the happiness of each one, unless it is because there is
not a man vho does not think of "each" as meaning him, and
consider himself in voting for all? This proves that
equality of rights and the idea of justice which such
equality creates originate in the preference each man gives
to himself, and accordingly in the very nature of man. It
proves that the' general will, to be really such, must be
general in its object as well as its essence; that it must
both come from all and apply to all; and that it loses its
natural rectitude when it is directed to some particular
and determinate object, because in such a case we are judg-
ing of something foreign to us, and have no true principle
of equity to guide us.-^'''
This was the ethical premise at the basis of the social contract; the
emphatic position of everyone to every other made possible the establish-
ment of universally-applicable rules for governing behavior. What is
required of tlie individual is made clear in Brian Barry's essay which
37
Social Contract (Cole edition), Book II, chap. iV, p. 29.
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develops the contrasting meanings of the public interest:
llfTJ^^'i: citizen's deliberations to comprisetwo elements: (a) The decision to forego (either as ,1^++^.! ki
or as i^oral) policies which would be fn one's own p™/"'"'interest alone, or in the co^non interest of a group^™^than the whole, and (b) the attempt to calculate whichfoflhevarious lines of policy that would affect oneself eqSaily wUh
for lllZl:^^ others are like LI
'
Attention was now drawn to the "reflexive mood," to use Mead's terms.
Empathy and true communication were the keys to any success this deUb-
erative process might enjoy. Attentiveness would have to be given to
encouraging the art of dialogue, the art of conversation, and full access
to pertinent information would be necessitated as well. Finally, Rousseau
had a place for solitude as a necessary condition for independent reflec-
tion to occur.
Who should participate? According to the formula of the Port Huron
1/
Statement, "Everyone should participate in the decisions that affect
one's life." Rousseau's view was apparently more inclusive; he would,
for instance, have excluded women from an active role in the political
circles or from participating in other ways in the life of the community.
But this discriminatory policy is not required by his theory and hardly
seems justifiable in terms of his own recognition of the nat\ire of the
General Will, For, as Barry brings out, the General Will would represent
a "single policy which is equally in the interests of all members of the
group," and "only where all are equally affected by the policy adopted can
39
an equitable solution be expected."
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Brian Barry, "The Public Interest," in Bias of Pluralism
, pp. 159-
177.
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Also, the General Will cannot be expressed when all who are affected
and allowed to participate do not do so. To insure equality, that is that
everyone have the same chance as everyone else to determine the General
Will, Rousseau^adamantly required one-hundred percent participation by
the citizenry. And to encourage the participation of all he proposed
an incentive system based on the public awarding of civic prizes and
honors. This was the only opportunity for inequalities to express them-
selves in Rousseau's society.
There is one other important aspect of Rousseau's citizen that must
be noted, for it is also a view that tends to be discounted and criticized
quite frequently, especially by political scientists. That is the strong
emphasis placed on the citizen to be "omnicompetent." The omnicompetent
citizen was necessary to overcome particularist forces in society. The
following is an excerpt from the Considerations on the Government of
Poland :
Our distinction between the legal and military castles was
unknown to the anciects. Gitizeria were tieitheu lawyers nor
priests by profession; they performed all these functions as
a matter of duty. That is the real secret of making every-
thing proceed toward the common goal, and of preventing the
spirit of faction from taking root at the expense of patrio-
tism, so that the hydr of chicanery will not devour a nation.
Rousseau saw sufficient evidence to fear several forces in society: The
bureaucracy, the military, the legal profession, and the church, as well
Unanimity of vote was not required; the majority rule principle
seemed to be acceptable to him; but it mattered that every vote was
counted. Social Contract (Cole edition). Book II, chap, iii,
ia
Quoted by Goldschmidt, p. 133.
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as economic monopolies. "His hope," according to Goldschnddt
, "was that
the ordinary citizen could overcome the specialization of labor to the
extent that^he could perform i^ejxhan^eab^ a wide range of government-
functions." But this is also very much a part of Rousseau's notion
of a complete and self-sufficient person as well. In his sense of a good
citizen, the individual could not be allowed to beg off, to claim that he
is ignorant, indifferent, or unconsidered on this or that issue. It was
his responsibiUty in order to enjoy the benefits of a well-run society,
which contributed to his own well-being to participate in a meaningful and
involved way, to become a deliberative human being.
The requirement of omnicompetence has been mistakenly, I believe,
viewed as requiring repression of one's private life of such a drastic
sort so as not to seem viable. It has also been argued that there are
other activities as well, besides the political, which many or most
hh
individuals like to spend their time. What Rousseau was arguing was
Ii2
Emphasis added. Goldschmidt, p. 133,
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According to Shklar, for instance, the citizen "loses himself in"
or is "absorbed by" the polity in a total and complete sense: "...the
individual loses his personal identity and becomes a part of a purposive
social unit. Here alone the group absorbs all his resources, emotional
as well as physical." Men and Citizens
, p. 15. The problem of tnis
interpretation lies in continuing to view the individual as a dependent
and passive creature, which he cannot be under Rousseau's regime.
According to Michael Walzer, many have found other ways to cope
short of being militant activists: "They stay away not because they are
beaten, afraid, uneducated, lacking confidence and skills (though these
are often important reasons), but because they have made other commit-
ments...." "A Day in the Life of a Socialist Citizen," Dissent
,
l5 (May-
June 1968) :2U6. Here Walzer hopes to argue that these nonpartiespants
(by choice) have rights too. In stressing their rights, he neglects
their obligations. In general, the point that some limits have to be
found is acceptable, but I believe it was one that Rousseau was aware of.
Rousseau is unconcerned with dogmas and ideas except insofar as "they
have reference to morality and to the duties which he who professes
them is bound to do to others," Social Contract , Book IV, chap, viii,
p. 139.
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that the political life was important and necessary to the entire struc-
turing of one's life circumstances. In Dewey's terms his concern was
the nature of one's "conduct"-the underlying tendency of one-s acts.^^
Once the proper direction had been set, perhaps, it would become more
likely that the individual would have greater time for his personal
enterprises. Rousseau was so heavy-handed in his denial of private
activities, because he was most .conscious and fearful of the degenerative ^
forces that always lurked within society. If one was not constantly
concerned with this aspect, then one could only blame himself for the
fragmented, limited, and probably unhappy existence he would have.
But even this view, as Rousseau would point out, cannot be tolerated
very long for its inherent selfishness. Aside from this argument,
Rousseau's Contract allowed the person the freedom to leave, a freedom
not allowed by the Soviet Union's policy of restricted emigration, for
instance.
In the respect that individuals obeyed the laws, they were subjects,
but in the respect that they made these laws they were sovereign.
Sovereignty could be said to be lodged in them. In sum, sovereignty was
inalienable, indivisible, and could not be represented. This distinction
made it possible, as T. H. Green has shown, to abandon the Hobbesien and
Lockean arguments of obligation or resistance to the sovereign. Such
notions were now fiction; one would, of course, obey oneself or what was
in one's interest.
The reinterpretation of sovereignty was not unimportant in Rousseau's
—
—
John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1959), p. 11.
schema in another way. It is closely related to Rousseau's attUude to
social institutions in general. While it seems to be in the nature of
social institutions to require authority relationships that stress the
Obedience of one man to another, it is each man alone and not his insti-
tutions (any cabinet, committee, board or any principle of majority rule)
that is held ultimately accountable for his actions. This is taken to
be the meaning of the Nuremburg Trials, and painful reminders of the
difficulty of learning this lesson are found in the My Lai massacre.
Historical example demonstrates so well how institutions benefit by
creating the belief that obligation, allegiance, is owed to them solely.
In this illusion they create both heroes and victims. Rousseau was well
aware of this gambit, and for this reason certai.n institutions, in his viewho *
were circumspect. When they destroyed social unity by setting man against
man, group against group, or by fragmenting man himself, institutions were
dangerous.
While his ascerbic chapter on Christianity in the Contract stands
out, along with his famous phrase of "forcing man to be free" as the
height of intolerance for many interpreters, the assumed paradox—of
his presumably disguised totalitarianism—becomes comprehensible. Thus,
when Rousseau emphasized, "All that destroys social unity is worthless,
all institutions that set man in contradiction to himself are worthless,"
he was enjoining his reader to give concern to the problem of the social
control of necessary, but, nevertheless, still sometimes possibly rabid
Established religion was perhaps his favorite target: "Christianity
preaches only servitude and dependence. Its spirit is so favorable to
tyranny that it always profits by such a regime. True Christians are
made to be slaves, and they know it and do not much mind: This short life
counts for too little in their eyes...." Social Contract
, Book IV, chap,
viii, pp. 137-138.
ho
institutions, and the Catholic Church, for hi., was a good exa^le of the
ill-effects of license practiced as tolerance.^' If was to be truly
sovereign, in the sense that Rousseau intended, he surely could not let
his institutions get out of control. Rousseau was not against intermediary
associations j^er_se. Indeed, he viewed some, like the political circles
of Paris, as important associations for promoting meaningful conversation
and a sense of mutual respect. .He was hostile only to those that generated
animosities within or between societies. This view was strengthened by
his appreciation for decentralized and federalized arrangements.^^
Rousseau's appreciation of citizenship rested not merely on its
value as a virtue, and a lost one at that, but as a right. The goal of
society was not something ulterior to the individual j it was the individual
himself. Rights secured this end. Rights recognized the rights of others;
all, therefore, found themselves on a footing of equality. Rights also
bring with them corresponding duties, this aspect placed serious require-
ments on the time, energies, and capacities of each of the individuals
that made up that community or society. But the exchange could be con-
sidered worthwhile. The individual was recreated anew; as a citizen, he
hi
"Wherever theological intolerance is admitted, it must inevitably
have some civil effect j and as soon as it has such an effect, the Sovereign
is no longer Sovereign even in the temporal sphere: Thenceforth priests
are the real masters, and kings only their ministers." Social Contract
(Cole edition), Book IV, chap, viii, p. li;0.
U8
See The Considerations on the Government of Poland
,
chap. V, "The
Radical Defect," in Frederick Watkins' (tr. and ed.), Rousseau-Political
Writings (New York: Nelson, 1953).
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received a non-threatening social order, a setting in which he was needed
and valued and in which he could be sure that his foculties have been
encouraged to grow and blossom. The deroands ,nade upon him would be of a
worthwhUe rather than of a benign or impairing sort. Rousseau had gone
beyond the traditional view of letting the individual a]one, toward the
view that the proper conditions will help to nurture the human personality.
He had moved in the direction of a radical liberalism. Nevertheless, the
balance point between individual and society had not come to rest.
Rousseau had, however, marked some important routes for more careful
charting. Under the conditions of his social contract, power struggles
would be mitigated. And when, power, like wealth, is distributed so
that no one has more of an advantage than anyone else, then the conditions
have been established for a rational and moral society in which all
individuals have the opportunity to develop their intellectual capacities
and sensibilities to the fullest.
ii2
T. H. Green's Contribution to a Participatory Theory of Society
T. H. Green, an overlooked political theorist, also offers an
important contribution to developing the model of a participatory
society patterned after the classical Greek city-state.^^ It would be
proper today to disparage the idealism that he assumes, except that if
we desire a more rational basis for making social policy, we have some-
thing to learn from this maligned position, particularly as it sheds
light for a philosophy of mind.
Green, much more than John Stuart Mill, recognized the dilemma of
the individual versus society. The problem with Mill, Green asserted.
50
IS that he had no clear philosophy of rights. This recognition set
the way for Green to come down firmly on behalf of the realization of
the Self as the telos of the individual, just as realization of the
Common Good was the telos of the society. Ethics and politics were
connected. The result was a penetrating critique of the whole empiricist
tradition, a critique which has been resumed only recently in works in
moral piiilosophy. Green's position also offers effective complimentarity
to the materialist position of Marxism which must deserve serious critique
in at least one aspect. That Marx misjudged the limits of action gener-
ated by one's class position bespeaks the need to focus more attention
w~-
This is an adaptation from my paper, "Thomas Hill Green: The
Community of the Good as a Basis for Political Obligation." An important
reference to his ideas, not noted here, is Melvin Richter. The Politics
of Conscience; T. H. Green and His Age (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 196i|).
50
Green criticized Mill for having "no clear philosophy of rights,
through which alone the conception of liberty attains a concrete meaning;
he had no clear idea of that social whole in whose realization the false
antithesis of 'state' and 'individual' disappears." Ernest Barker,
Political Thought in England : l8i|6-191ii (London: Oxford University
Press, 1928, 2nd ed.), p. h»
h3
on the cognitive processes that Green prompts.
In the problem of the self, Green recognized that new categories
for explaining the special^nature of mental phenomena and of their
interrelation were needed. Green sought to do this by showing that
social relations are the product of consciousness, and consciousness
was the special agency of society. In other words, the ties between
man and his society were obtained through the one unique feature that
distinguished man from the animal world, his ppwer of cognition. The
activity of thought is the unifying principle of consciousness. This
consciousness brings with it the power to frame ideals, which Green
considered to be the essence of man's nature. The self is a social
self J thought and practice weave dialectically:
The common element to both (theoretical speculation andpractical willing) lies m the consciousness of a self
and a world as in a sense opposed to each other, and in
the conscious effort to overcome this opposition.
...One(I.e., speculation) is the effort of such consciousness
to take the world into itself, the other (i.e., willing)
Its effort to carry itself out into the world.
...Neither
action can really be exerted without calling the other
into play.-"^
^1
„ o
^' '"^^^ Social Origins of Absolute Idealism," Journal
of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods
, 12 (1915) : 172^^^173^
—
Essential aspects of Green's complete pnilosophy include: A
theology, an organic conception of society and a progressive view of
history, a view of rights as derivative from society, and the notion
of a non-competitive Common Good (derived largely from Rousseau's
General Will) communicating itself to man by his reason and acted upon
by his will. The Common Good was another of Green's rejections of
Utilitarianism and its principle "the greatest good for the greatest
number."
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John R. Rodman, ed.. The Political Theory of T. H. Green -
Selected Writings (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1961; ), "Intro-
duction," p. 3Fr~
ons
Green seems to suggest that rights only emerge around points of
agreement in the social consciousness. One cannot have a right except
as a member of society. Rights and obligations, as the concrete form
that freedom takes in modern society, then, only arise in such conditi
of consciousness. A level of societal development can, therefore, be
measured by the degree to which the Common Good is rationalized. And, it
follows that a person is judged in terms of the level of desires he
pursues-his degree of rationality in promoting the Common Good of the
society, hence his own self-realization.
The function of the state maices it possible for men to realize their
highest potentialities; the state is the highest realization because of
its degree of comprehensiveness. (One might wonder why a conception of
a "universal brotherhood" was not superior for Green. There are some
suggestions that it might be, but his own time was organized according
to states.) The process began at lower levels of organization, in
primary and secondary groupings. It is the function of the state through
legislation, the concrete embodiment of the Common Good, to set the
Sh
conditions for the telos of the individual, his self-realization. The
law could only set the conditions as a contribution to the fulfillment
of self, moral development; it could do no more than that.
The role of the citizen was not merely to obey the laws of his state,
therefore: "If he is to have a higher feeling of political duty, he must
53
Sabine, p. lyli. There is some question, however, as to what extent
Green's concept of self-realization had meaningful content. Dewey, for
instance, sought to be less metaphysical and sought to give it a more
concrete and practical content.
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"It is the business of the state... to maintain the conditions
without which a free exercise of the human faculties is in^DOSsible."
Quoted by Sabine (from Green's Works, 3:3714), p. 171.
take part in the work of the state." Citizenship, as the formulation of
public policy, was the important sphere of rational activity, for it was
the activity which discerned the Coramon Good as a regulative principle and
made it more and more determinate. In certain situations. Green observed,
the duty of citizenship might even require disobedience. The function of
participation was a process of developing intelligence, refining appropri-
ate concepts for legislating, and weeding away the anachronistic ideas.
Citizenship is neither a means nor an end. As Sabine says, "Full moral
participation in a social life was for Green the highest form of self-
development, and to create the possibility of such participation was the
end of liberal society." Only through this activity could a more
proximate harmony be achieved between the Ought and the Is.
On several important grounds Green shared a close and sympathetic
kinship to Rousseau—in their critiques of empiricism and utilitarian
ethics, in their theory of the state, and in their radical individualism.
Yet, Green also offered some angles to his interpretation that go a good
distance to offset some of the totalitarian aspects alleged in Rousseau.
In several ways his work helps us to extend and modify the model of
Rousseau:
1, Green, with more realism, was not constructing a version of
a Utopia but making the General Will (the Common Good) an idea applicable
to a real, imperfectly realized society. He saw society as a process to
be worked at. In this view he was also rejecting an appeal to the rapid,
uncontrollable measures of violent means as, for instance, proposed by
socialists. (Rousseau, similarly, was opposed to rapid social change.
—
George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1965 J 3rd ed.), p. 726.
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but this becomes more apparent in his essay on Poland than in the Social
Contract
.
)
2. Green makes a better case than Rousseau for participation in
local settings, seeing participation at this level of governance as an
important stage for the development of the personality. He argued that
from this experience broader experiences could be encouraged.
3. The Common Good may gain some content in Green. Its sole goal
is the fostering of all individual's self-development regardless of
class. This meant for Green the justification of state interference,
and he strongly advocated legislation that expanded widely the franchise
and secured the conditions of equal opportunity. Essential was an edu-
cational system that destroyed privilege. He sought to promote the
representation of all interests in the determination of social policy,
generally. As Holloway notes, Green's recognition was that, "Depriva-
tion was a matter of values and interests as well as jobs, wages, and
housing.... The worker as much as the 'gentleman' should be able to
participate in the cultural values of his society and to thereby build
a better character." As a reformist in theory and practice, he
affirmed liberal values in ways beyond which most liberals of his day,
including J. S. Mill, were willing to go. The vision Green charts in
these areas would not suggest the same domain of completeness, therefore,
as exercised by Rousseau's General Will. In other respects we see a
stronger liberalism: Green feared the socialization of private property
and sought to remedy the ills of inequalities here by expanding private
Harry Holloway, "Mill and Green on the Modern Welfare State,"
Western Political Quarterly, 13 (June I960): 398.
Ii7
ownership and resisting concentration. The one apparent lapse in the
guarantees of Uberties was occasioned by his frustrations with drunken
workers, when he advocated temperance. Still, Green, perhaps, «ght
have done ^ore with making a case for the protection of a domain for
private life.
h. Perhaps important, finally, was the spirit of hopefulness even
in the face of misfortune that Green's own political involvement and
his writings exhibit.
Ii8
John Devzey's Contribution to a Participatory Model
Like Rousseau and Green, John Dewey linked participation in community
life with the growth of the self. He did so on the basis of a revision
of English Idealism, particularly as it appeared in T. H. Green. Dewey
called his philosophy "instrumentalism-. it was a method by which individ-
uals through the application of intelligence could change society. The
emphasis he placed on philosophy's task to change reality grew out of
his naturalist perspective, a view of life as an ever-changing organic
process. Life was a process, and growth was the ultimate good and the
measure of social justice.
Dewey, then, began his long philosophical and activist career by
subjecting to critical examination the concept of self-realization which
he accepted as an ideal but rejected in content in Green's formulation.
(More importantly, he rejected the metaphysical idea of an absolute
Eternal Consciousness.) A series of articles showed that the self had
57
no meaning as a presupposed or fixed schema that was to be "filled in."
Instead, he proposed the notion of a working or practical self. The
self was "a concrete specific activity;" self and realization are not
separated but identified:
To realize capacity does not mean, therefore, to act so as
to fill up some presupposed ideal self. It means to act
at the height of action, to realize its full meaning.58
John Dewey, "Green's Theory of the Moral Motive," Philosophical
Review
,
I (1892) : 593-612, and "Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal,"
Philosophical Review
,
II (1893) :652-66ii. Also, "The Philosophy of
T. H, Green," Andover Review
,
XL (l889) : 337-355; "Some Current Concep-
tions of the Term 'Self'," Mind, XV (1890):58-7U.
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"Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal," p. 659.
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What Devey was arguing for was the notion of a "working ideal" of the
self as opposed to a "fixed ideal." The problem with the later concep-
tion was that it fractured the individual's consciousness in an unnatural
way. Dewey suggested that Green's self had difficulty avoiding some
action for selfish purposes. As Dewey pointed out, any action becomes
moral only insofar as it is done for its own concrete sake. Thus, the
self must be \dewed as an active agent ;
It's not action for the self that is required (thus setting
up a. fixed self which is simply going to get something more,
wealth, pleasure, morality, or whatever), but action as the
self. To find the self in the highest and Tallest activity
possible at the time, and to perform the act in the consc^: ous-
ness of Its complete identification with self (wriich means,
I take It, with complete interest) is morality, and is
realization.
Given the opportunities, the human being is able to develop his/her
personality more and more fully. That was just the problem for Dewey
as he turned from philosophy to the social issues of his day: Where were
the opportunities for self-realization? According to his theory of
knowledge, knowledge was a social, an associational enterprise. He knew
well that the high level of industrialization was foremost a product of
sharing. Why did this not occur in regard to social ideas and social
practice?
The Public end Its Problems suggests that a disjunction occurred in
modern society between the capacities for industrial growth and in the
attitudes and institutions needed to respond to it; in other words, there
was a cultural lag. When Dewey searched for the "public," he discovered
39~
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no .ingle body, „hat he fo»d was
..uncertain and obscure,"
..confused and
eclipsed... What happened was that industrial development had acted as
a disintegrating force on the small community and made difficult the
generation of a Great Co«unity. Dewey viewed this core situation as
at the root of democracy's problems.
Many forces worked against a reorganization of publics and the
public
.
1. Effective political interests (his paradigm cases are the
criminal band, the rapacious corporation, and the self-seeking political
machine) were able to dominate the situation. For this reason the state
had to have a larger role than accorded by pluralist theory (the role of
umpire),
2. Reliance on experts, the faith in technologists, Dewey viewed
as a dangerous revival of the Platonic philosopher-king: "In the degree
in which they become a specialized class, they are shut off from knowledge
of the needs which they are supposed to serve."
3. Political apathy is, under this static and unvitalized social
structure, fostered. According to Dewey, "Political apathy, which is a
natural product of the discrepancies between actual practices and tradi-
tional machinery, ensues from inability to identify one's self with
definite issues. These are hard to find and locate in the vast complex-
62
ities of current life."
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John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Chicago: Swallow Press,
1927), chap. IV, pp. 120-12T:
"
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h. In his lecture, "Democracy and Educational Administration,"
Dewey also made note of conscious efforts to restrict participation,
pointing out as well its negative effects for the whole social body.^^
5. The situation is further aggravated when cheap amusements
shove "the political elements in the constitution of the human being,
those having to do with citizenship" to one side.^^ Our existing state
of social knowledge is inchoate: "Our Babel is not one of tongues but
of the signs and symbols without which shared experience is possible.
"^^
In Liberalism and Social_Action Dewey again affirms that there is not a
social order that has for one of its chief purposes the establishment
of conditions that will move the mass of individuals to appropriate and
66
use what is at hand,"
The need was for a "radical liberalism." "If radicalism be defined,"
he wrote, "as perception of need for radical change, then today any
67liberalism which is not also radicalism is irrelevant and doomed." This
53
^ Dewey's passage is worth reiterating: "The very fact of
exclusion from participation is a subtle form of suppression. It gives
individuals no opportunity to reflect and decide upon what is good for
them. Others who are supposed to be wiser and wno in any case have
more power decide the question for them and also decide the methods
and means by which subjects may arrive at the enjoyment of what is good
for them. This form of coercion and suppression is more subtle and more
effective than is overt intimidation and restraint. When it is habitual
arA embodied in social institutions, it seems the normal and natural state
of affairs. The mass usually become unaware that they have a claim to a
development of their own powers. Their experience is so restricted that
they are not conscious of restriction." "Democracy and Educational
Administration," School and Society
, kS (April 3, 1973):U58.
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John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: Capricorn
Books, 1963 Z1935/), pp. 52-53.
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political theor,
-^U be shared by the interpretations of Peter Bachrach
and Arnold Ka.f.an. Uisse.-faire liberal!.™ had proved ite bankruptcy;
adventitious elements had been i^osed on early liberalise which ™ade it
unresponsive to the emerging social problem, of a developing Industrialized
society.
Ways must be found to reestablish "community^, through revitalizing
the inquiry and discussion and verification process. This was first of
all an intellectual problem; but it was also a practical problem. Part
of the conditions necessary to this end are continuous, face-to-face
commun:Lcation over shared issues. Out of this interaction, shared
attitudes (based on common interests, knowledge, and purposes) can be
expected to grow and, thereby, change the life of the individual and the
community. This is the development of a social consciousness; for Dewey
this is what it meant to be "human":
To learn to be human is to develop through the give-and-take
of communication an effective sense of being an individuallydistinctive member of a community; one who understands and
appreciates its beliefs, desires and methods, and who con-
tributes to a further conversion of organic powers into
human resources and values. But this translation is never
finished.""
An account of Dewey's theory of participation should note that io
locating settings for shared associations—in which meanings may develop
and new realities form, Dewey held no institution as inherently sacrosenct.
Even in his discussions of political democracy he minimized the importance
of institutional and constitutional arrangements. Dewey, for instance,
refraraed the definition of democracy not as an emphasis on procedure but
"5B
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. 69m Its classic meaning as a way of life. Its forms, like universal
suffrage, recurrent elections, majority rule, were merely the best means
obtained so far for this end. The key was experimentation.
It is undoubtable, however, that for Dewey the public school was
the most important instrument for remaking, peacefully, society. The
purpose of schools was to enable the forming of future citizens so that
the society they create is always an improvement on the previous genera-
tion's. To this end, Dewey saw no other way than the shifting from an
authoritarian to a democratic structure: "Absence of participation tends
to produce lack of interest and concern on the part of those shut out."^^
The teachers' armui would translate itself to the students. Accordingly,
"...th^ democratic principle requires that every teacher should have
some regular and organic way in which he can, directly or through repre-
sentatives democratically chosen, participate in the formation of the
controlling aims, methods and materials of the school of which he is a
part." There is research support to Dewey's theory that now makes his
72
ideas "truly convincing." Indeed, the young student can grow, move
His definition: "The keynote of democracy as a way of life may
be expressed, it seems to me, as the necessity for the particication of
every mature human being in formation of the values that regulate the
living of men together: Which is necessary from the standpoint of both
the general social welfare and the full development of human beings as
individuals." In "Democracy and Educational Administration," p. hSl
,
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Ibid., p. U6l.
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Ibid., p. 14.60.
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Lavni'ence Kohlberg, "A Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral
Education," Humanist
, 32 (November-December 1972): 13-16. The series of
studies on which these conclusions are based is discussed in L. Kohlberg
and E. Turiel, eds.. Recent Research in Moral Development (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973). '.
from one stage of moral development to another,
.Uh procedures little
different from those available to all teachers. Kohlberg in his experi-
mental work with M. Blatt suggests the nature of his findings:
The educational implications of these experiments are thpt
o^fnaf ll\ ^'^'^ consiLr~n™fc nllicts, think about the reasoning he uses in solving suchconflicts, see inconsistencies and inadequacies in Ss wavof thinking, and find ways of resolving them....^? ^
His conclusions are that.
The classroom discussion approach should be part of a broadermore enduring involvement of students in the social and
'
moral functioning of the school. Rather than attempting toinculcate a predetermined and unquestioned set of valuesteachers should challenge students with the moral issues 'facedby the school community as problems to be solved, not merely
situations m which rules are mechanically applied. 7ii
That small success has been achieved in this area must be considered a
matter of fact. Of course, a private educational institution has an
easier time of justifying its authoritarian structure with the arguraent
that the student is free to choose his institution. The pubLic and
state-supported institutions face the problem in another way-generally
by avoiding any but the safest and most orthodox issues and tending to
value-neutral skill subjects.
There were other settings, as well, where participation should occur.
Dewey wrote in The Public and Its Problems ; "Democracy must begin at home,
and its home is the neighborly community." It could occur in the
lunity, in social and business groups. What occurred in these secondarycomm
73
Ibid., p. 16.
Ibid., p. 16.
75
The Public...
, p. 213.
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social groups was important as it had a bearing on the formation of dis-
positions and tastes, the attitudes, interests, purposes and desires of
those engaged in carrying on the activities of the group. In the broad
sense, all institutions were educational; and participation in local
settings would have a broadening effect on the understanding of the
7 A
larger national and international issues as well.
Dewey's theory of participation for the construction of a democratic
life was derived from his theory of knowledge. He had the strongest faith
that no one knew better an individual's own needs and troubles than that
indivj.dual himself. When that individual was given the respect he
deserved, through the chances and opportunities of meeting with others
like himself in the community, he and the others would enhance their
reasoning and moral capacities. For this, society itself will be much
the better off. Dewey was not so naive to believe that the mere coming
together was a situation sufficient to prompt this growth. It required
patterns of thought and practice encouraged and supported widely by all
social institutions; for instance, it required the courage to reject the
old and familiar for the new and untried. Like Rousseau, Dewey was
equally a strong critic of established, other-worldly dogmas. He was a
naturalist in the way some today would consider themselves to be ecologists.'.
While Dewey may, I believe, have underestimated the force of dominating
economic and political institutions and the depth of repressive ideologies,
he surely deserves significance for the profound appreciation he had of
the strengths and weaknesses of social institutions on the formation of
persons' chai'acter.
Ibid., p. 217.
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Conclusion
The classical vision supplies an answer to the perplexing problems
of advanced industrial society, particularly to its features as a class-
fractured society. Our society's peculiarly debilitating feature is that
it sets no limits on any sufficiently forceful promotion, including
governments. The most egregious feature of this condition is the
unnecessary repression of the human, creative personality.
Rousseau's solution would reconstruct the political society on a
moral basis. The key to his vision was the character of the individuals
that made up the society; and, this answer distinguished Rousseau, for
instance, from Marx who recommended simply a reconstruction of the economic
base. A modern society could only bring about a civilized style of life
when all members of the coramunity recognized the need to sublimate one's
natural or badly-cultivated impulses, needs, or wants. One became a
realized "self" to the extent that one was enabled to develop these re-
flective and deliberative, moral capacities about the interests of the
commumty. The most likely condition for them to blossom and flourish,
it was felt by Rousseau, Green, and Dewey, was in the participating society
where all would share in the deliberation and solution of issues that
affected their lives.
The view of knov/ledge to which the moral notion of man was connected
was especially developed by Dewey's pragmatic philosophy, and its chief
feature was the view that there is no fixed, authoritative basis for
knowledge. Knowledge and intelligence were developing processes; and
fundamental was the process of inquiry that this recognition encouraged.
Rejected was the spectator-view of knowledge of the empiricists, for
instance, in favor of a view of ^n in the world as
"agent-patient."
ft-on this philosophical perspective, it necessarily follows that the
pursuit of knowledge was not the task of elites but was a social and
democratic task. Participation in social decisions is Justified in
tenns of fund^ental hu^an rights and for the preferred consequences to
which this practice leads.
We can see in the liberal-pluralist interpretation, reviewed next,
that this essential insight-that the best civil society will be one that
is foi-med by a moral citiEenry-has been lost and needs to be regained.
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CHAPTER III
THE LIBERAL-PLURALIST INTERPRETATION:
THE THEORY OF ROBERT A. DAHL
Introduction
Realization of the self has not been a widely shared aspiration of
social scientists or philosophers of the twentieth century. For instance,
considerable attention of mainstreai.i political science has been devoted
to that anomalous abstraction after which one study was so aptly titled,
the Araerican voter. This literature of votingbehavior was in an important
way the natural evolution of government wartime studies conducted by be-
havioral psychologists and rested on a scientistic assmnption that quanti-
fication of the regularities of human behavior will lead to a body of
knowledge about political life and make possible predictability and
control. It ignored questions related to the quality of life.
The extensive research commitments of the past two decades are high-
lighted by a sequence of studies that must include: The Peoples' Choice.
The Voter Decides, Voting
,
The American Voter
. The Civic Culture
, and,
most recently. Political Participation in America
. By 1965 a literature
review was necessary to integrate the overwhelming number of periodic
1
and full-length studies and their findings.
The central point that review study made is suggestive of this
group of authors' concerns: "About one-third of the American adult
1
Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation - How and Why Do People
Get Involved in Politics? (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).
population can be characterized aa politically apathetic or passive, in
".ost cases, they are unaware, literally, of the political part of the
world around the.. Another sixty percent play largely spectator roles
in the political process; they watch, they cheer, they vote, but they do
not do battle... The correlates of voting-psychological, sociological,
and political-were cxandned in the light of this finding, and
..political
efficacy,..
..civic duty,., and similar terms supplied political science
vith a new vocabulary to explain participation rates.
The attempt, however, was not to explain in causal ways the findings.
Very few questions were raised about the quality of participation, the
effects of participation, or the question of how participation changes
over time. Finally, there was little directed attention to explaining the
phenomena of non-participation.
On one issue of fundamental importance to this study-the conclusions
drawn from the evidence of limited participation-there was some division
of opinion.
A weak wing, for instance, suggested that the low rates of partici-
pation were not of wide public concern. These low rates, when contrasted
2
Ibid., p. 21.
3
See Dale Rogers Marshall, "Who Participates in What? A Bibliographic
Essay on Individual Participation in Urban Areas," Urban Affairs Quarterly
k (December 1968) :201-223, who emphasizes the "react-ve" and "static"
character of the literature. She writes: "The literature is dominated
by attempts to support or refute theories of mass society and thus it
focuses on the question of whether or not there is participation." p. 215.
h
My introductory chapter suggested the work of Heinz Eualau, among
others, as illustrative of this trend. Also noteworthy is the work of
Edward Banfield, Daniel P. Moynihan, Norman Wengart, and James Q. Wilson.
as
more
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with the experience of so.e Western democratic systems, could be read
indicative of satisfaction with the political system. Qcamined
closely, the representatives of this wing showed a distrust of h^n
behavior and a policy-preference that key decisions be made by pro-
fessionals-by, i„ other words, an open and democratic elite. Milbrath
represents the opinion this group advanced. For instance, in his con-
cluding summary statement in PoUtlcal Participate nn he suggested!
"Moderate or low participation levels by the general public plac;e a
special burden or responsibility on political elites for the successful
functioning of constitutional democracy." The passage concludes:
If this analysis is correct, present levels and patterns
of participation in politics do not constitute a threat todemocracy; they seem, in fact, to be a realistic adjustment
?
""^ °^ society. The political processes
ol that democracy may not be close to the ideal of tne
classical theorists, but they may well be the best possible
approximation to popular control of government that can be
achieved m modern, industrialized, mobile, mass society.^
Another stronger wing, however, developed and urged the democratic
requisite of encouraging voter participation in the political process
in order to extend the democratic achievements and secure the widest
7
range of political legitimacy.
The weak case is obviously disparate from the classic democratic
5
Milbrath, p. 153.
6
Ibid., p. lSh»
7
Dahl will supply the paradigmatic example for this study. Also
representative are Alan Altschuler's Community Control - The Black Demand
for Pai-ticipation in Large, American Cities (New York: Pegasus, 1970),
and Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in Ameri ca - Political
Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).
.»del. But even if „e exaMne the stronger wing of this tradition ve
discover that it, too, ^sses any olose correspondence to the empirical
and normative theory of such classic democrats as Rousseau, Green, and
Devey. The concept of "participation" has undergone a revision in both
its criteria of application and its moral point of view, a revision
coinciding with the revision of democratic theory. Robert Dahl provides
a case in point,
I believe we can take the work of Dahl, spanning as it does two
eras-the behavioral period and the period of the post-behavioral
critics-as representative of the predominant pluralist approach and
the adjustments forced upon its paradigm by critics. Dahl-s work con-
stitutes a large literature, encompases an important range of theoretical
issues, and has not shirked the important task of making recommendations
to associates in the profession, as well as to practitioners. In this
capacity, Dahl has been the subject of appraisal as well. Dahl's work,
while attempting to respond directly to certaincriticisms, fails, none-
theless, to incorporate sensitively the relevant theoretical charges into
his perspective.
Several problems in Dahl's interpretation become apparent to the
critic:
1. He has lost the meaning enriched participation had for the
development of the personality and which the classic adherants valued.
2. He is unconcerned with and, therefore, cannot show persuasively
how his model of participation will meaningfully effect the current status
of social and economic problems in significant ways.
3. The more difficult problems of how to implement extensive patterns
£2
of participation, once they are appreciated, m a highly integrated „«S3
society is skirted altogether.
As a result, his reco„Mendation for expanding the settings of partlcipati
is only loosely anchored.
The seriousness of the underlying theoretical weaknesses of the
paradigm are magnified in the execution of the Verba and Nie study.
Political Participatlon
_in_Agerica; the meaningfulness of its empirical
data must be questioned and the study's social and political implications
exposed.
The purpose of this chapter is to exaraine the interpretation of the
stronger vring of the behavioral scientiests, for it is here that the
contrast between the Rousseauan Arision and the empirical model is most
significantly revealed. The limits of the behavioral conception of
participation will be seen to be connected to the limits of its per-
g
spective, the consensus-integration perspective that guides inquiry.
Dahl will be suggested as proto-typical of the limitations of this
perspective.
8
The characterization of the "consensus" and "conflict" perspectives
as competing frameworks for the study of society grows out of the work of
Half Dahrendorf, John Horton, and Gerhard Lenski among others. The
presumptions and expectations that make the "consensus" perspective
distinctive are indicated in William E. Connolly, "Theoretical Self-
Consciousness," Polity, 6 (Fall 1973 ) :li|-l6. Danl fits the consensus
perspective because, for instance, he attributes social and political
stability in the United States to a widespread consensus as to the
procedural norms of the society, which is sustained by multiple roles
for individuals and the encouragement of social pluralism in the
society.
63
As will be this study's general forn«t, discussion will proceed in
terms of the follovdng considerations: First, there will be an examina-
tion of the theorist's approach; secondly, there will be a characteriza-
tion of the theorist-s conception of participation and his paradigmatic
case and an explanatory account of the theorist's version of participa-
tion and non-participation. Finally, a critical assessment of the
account will be presented against the contrast model for expanded and
enriched participation which is provided by Rousseau, Green, and Dewey.
J-
-On as
in
s
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Dahl.s Approach to a Politics of Advanced Industrial Society
Dahl.s political science has been framed within the parameters of
the behavioralist approach and, with no logical inconsistency, has been
strongly committed to the recoramendation of increased participatic
-
necessary and desirable to the evolution of the democratic process
the United States and for other democratic systems as well. Perhaps,
because of these chief features, it would be helpful to see Dahl',
work as firmly rooted in Western liberalism, in harmony in at least
some ways philosophically, for instance, w:.th John Stuart Mill and probably
not widely separated from such welfare-state practitioners as Franklin D.
Roosevelt or the efforts of John F. Kennedy's Commission on Registration
and Voting Participation.
This section shall set out certain features of the theoretical
framework to which Dahl's account of participation is connected, and
which may, finally, be seen as posing certain conceptual constraints. I
shall assume that the main features of the behavioral approach are familiar,
so that what I shall endeavor to do is bring into focus those features
most subject to criticism. There are several important aspects to be
dealt with, and we shall want to focus on the shifts that Dahl makes
within these issue-areas as he responds to the theoretical pressures
from, mainly, the Left. The principal issues I plan to set out include,
first, the aims and methods of a "science" of politics and, then, the
notion of the "democratic" polity and the role of elections for it will
be considered.
Aims and methods of a "science" of politics
. Dahl's earliest
writings on the study of politics reflects a presumption as to the
desirability of a science of political behavior. For instance, with
reference to Easton's l!-MltlcaLS,sten^^
2£^2litical^cience Dahl was disturbed by Easton's concern with the
"metaphysical" question of "What is political science?" As a scientific
question, he says, it Is trivial:
"...empirical theory can be produced
only by constructing and testing propositions about the real world, not
by defining political science."' He seems never to have doubted the
possibility of a science of poUtics whose premises followed that of the
universal-generalization paradlgra. By the time that he wrote an article
American Political Science Revj.ew entitled. "The Behavioral
Approach in Political Science: An Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful
Protest," and Modern PoUtical Analysis, he was firmly committed to that
position.
Its features we need only briefly recall. In the article Dahl
indicated "wholehearted" agreement with the statement of the aims and
methods of political science set out by David Truman in a much "neglected"
essay of 1951. In his review, Dahl characterized behavioralism as a "mood"
whose purpose was science: It was an orientation which aims, citing
Truman, at stating all the phenomena of government in terms of the ob-
served and observable behavior of menj it must be systematic, growing
out of a precise statement of hypotheses and rigorous ordering of
10
evidence; it must place primary emphasis upon empirical methods.
Robert A. Dahl, "The Science of Politics: New and Old." World
Politics
, 7 (April 1955) :ii8l-U82.
10
Trujiian's essay was entitled, "The Implications of Political
Behavior Research." Dahl's article was published in American Political
Science Review
. 55 (December 1961) : 763-772 . Page references here are
from the reprint in Melanson, ed.. Knowledge, Politics and Public Policy
(Cambridge: Winthrop, 1973), pp. 50-51.
66
UndeniMng Tr^an-^ words, Dahl reminded hi. readers:
.....The ultimate
goal Of the student of political behavior is the development of a science
of the political process."
Dahl goes on to suggest that the measure of this new outlook must
be its results:
...if all of these activities do not yield exTil;,n=+n ^..e
v:r?fi:ri:f ^^'^r °' thft^are^m^'r h ^ug
• .,
xui oil.,! explanation, and more u'?pfnl fo-r
meeting the perennial problems of political Tife than fheexplanations they are intended to replace- if in sWt
irl'^'^'.t f--^^^- -tlook do not m^L^e upstandards that serious students of politics have always
a^temnt t I "^f^' confidently expect that thet p o build an empirical science of politics will lose
last!l2
^"^^ ''^''^ generation that it gained in the
A "tentative if deliberately incomplete assessment" indicates positive
results; for instance, of the research bracketed by The Peoples' Choice
and The American Voter he suggests:
It is no exaggeration to say that in less than two decades
this series of studies has significantly altered and
greatly deepened our understanding of wnat in some ways is
the most distinctive action for a citizen of democracy-
deciding how to- vote, or indeed whether to vote at all, in
a competitive national election. -^-^
Also highly regarded by his criteria are Lane's works and the work done
towards understanding the psychological characteristics of homo pollti cus :
attitudes, beliefs, predispositions, personality factors. Names cited
in this literature include Lasswell, Cantril, Lane again, McCloskey,
Adorno and associates. Almond, Stouffer, and Lipset. In 1961 Danl's
11
Idem.
12
Ibid., p. 52.
13
Idem.
m
Ibid., pp. 53-5i4.
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expectation was that the beha^doral mood would disappear as an issue,
"because it had succeeded." Behavioralism as a protest movement, he'
concluded with a few caveats that history nor speculation be spurned,
was needed to bring political science into stride with the other social
science disciplines.
This model of a science of politics also involves a logical posi-
tivist delineation which Dahl follows. He assumes the possibility of a
clear distinction between fact and value statements and that empirical
knowledge can be objectively developed. While values should not bias
empirical findings, the unimportance of values was not implied, nor was
any form of value relativism. Dahl made the assumption that the forms
of knowledge were different and that evaluations, nevertheless, are
important to make. Dahl's approach brought together consistently
epistemological individualism and the emotivist position in value non-
cognitivism.
To achieve objectivi.ty it is very important to be clear about one's
words. While this proposition can hardly be disagreed with, the recom-
mendation Dahl follows is problematic. His goal, shared by other be-
havioralists and notable for the persistence with which it is held, is
to "operationalize" key concepts in the propositions one is testing.
The concern to eliminate the multiple meanings of political terms is
profound. In Modern Political Analysis Dahl writes, with his own
standpoint objectified:
15
For this discussion see Dahl's Modern Political Analysis
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963;, pp. 101-107-
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Probably most Empirical Theorists would argue that theordinary language of politics does pose serious p^ob^emsbecause many political terms in ordinary usage have amultxplxcity of meanings even a^ong poUtical scilntists.l^
In Polyarchy Dahl again presses the point:
The problem of terminology is formidable, since it seemsimpossible to find terms already in use (hat do not carryvjth them a large freight of ambiguity and surplus meaning.The reader should remnd himself that the terms used hereare employed throughout the book, to the best of my
paragrajhs^i?
'''' '''' "'""""^^ '^^'^"^^^ preoe^ng
The concern is carried, for example, deeply into his treatment of demo-
cratic theory and construction of a model of democracy befitting the
contemporary industrialized society. The substitute for democracy and
its historically overladen meanings is "polyarchy:"
Some readers will doubtless resist the term polyarchy as
an alternative to the word democracy, but it is important
to maintain the distinction between democracy as an ideal
system and the institutional arrangements that have come
to be regarded as a kind of imperfect approximation of an
Ideal, and experience shows, I believe that when the same
term is used for both, needless confusion and essentially
irrelevant semantic arguments get in the way of analysis.
For similar reasons Dahl rejected ajiother terra of central importance
to the vocabulary of contemporary political inquiry, "elite." This term
has been transmitted through the vocabulary of Mosca, Pareto, and Michels
down to both a conservative and a radical tradition in contemporary
16
Modern Political Analysis
, p. 105.
17
Dahl's Polyarchy - Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1971}, Fn. U, p. 9.
18
Idem. It ought to be pointed out that when Dahl co-authored Size
and Democracy with Edward R. Tufte (California: Stanford University
Press, 1973), he reverted to the more "loose" phrase of "democracy."
See pp. 25-27 for the explanation.
in-
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political thought. Dahl has directly rejected the application of "elitis."
as a description of his own work, and he has cited the importance-again
for rational, scientific discourse-of a more neutral term, of terms
"rather more descriptive and discriminating."^^ His own formulation
supplies the term "leaders" and the key dichotomy in politics of
dustrialized society is the one between "leader and supporter.
"
The effort to escape the rich meanings of our ordinary language
appears to be pursued to the extreme in Dahl's later works which are
largely bereft of the narrative that tempered the New Haven study. From
merely the point of view of literature, the contemporary empiricist
style is rarefied and empty. The reader is invited to follow the mean-
ings of concepts whose criteria are apparently closely and narrowly
stipulated—and yet the terms remain vague and have little essential
reference to everyday life, our shared public world. Another problem
is that the language is non-dialectical. This representational view of
language will be critically inspected for its implications in concluding
conanents.
To meet the charge that the empirical theorists "smuggle their own
values into their theories," Dahl suggests that these theorists do con-
20
cede support for democracy and open inquiry. Since Dahl is consistently
19
See Dahl's "Further Reflections on 'The Elitist Theory of
Democracy,*" American Political Science Review
, 60 (June 1966), Fn. 7,
p. 298: "I suggest that this difference in tne choice of words is more
than a mere taste or distaste for certain labels. It also reflects a
conviction on the part of Key, Truman, myself and others that 'elitist'
interpretations of American political life are inadequate both empirically
and normatively.
"
20
Modern Political Analysis » pp. 106-10?.
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Pledged to the advocacy and promotion of "democratic values," it will be
important to see just what he means by them in the next section. The
point to be made here is that the nature and Action of normative theory
for Dahl is essentially different and unscientific and succeeds empirical
analysis. It is, from the point of view of that position interesting to
note that KodeHLPoli^^ while clearly staking out a place
for values in political inquiry never suggests how they are to be deter-
mined or may be reasoned about. Nor^is conduct of this discussion to be
found anywhere else in his writings.'' At best, his Preface to Democratic
Theory promises this sort of discussion when it sets out the Madisonian
and populist models as the limits of democratic possibility. But even
here the position that is developed follows from a linguistic slide
which amounts to "claiming facts may refute ideals.
"^^
Both ideal models
are to be rejected and replaced by a more "realistic" model, polyarchy.'^
Dahl's confusion is representative of the behavioralists ' misunderstanding
21
This is because Dahl and others who share his perspective miscon-
ceive the nature of moral' argument
. They maintain that ultimately moralIdeals and commitments must rest on subjective and irrational grounds
and do not recognize that "good-reasons" can be given for value preferences,See discussion of Kai Nielsen, "History of Ethics," Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, 3:110-112. ' '
22
This argument is suggested by Graeme Duncan and Steven Lukes in
"The New Democracy," in McCoy and Playford, eds.. Apolitical Politics
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1967), p. 168. They suggest that "it needs
to be shown exactly how and why the ideal is rendered improbable or im-
possible of attainment. This has nowhere been done." p. 171. See also
Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy,"
American Political Science Review
, 60 (June 1966:288-289, where he
emphasizes the shift from the prescriptive element in classical theory
to apology.
23
It should be noted that Dahl's claim to "realism" throughout his
work trades on the assumption that his readers share that "reality" with
him. Philosophically speaking, Dahl's community of reality" bears,
however, further examinati.on than Dahl would want to give it.
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of political science
-s co^ection to political theory and political phil-
osophy. A3 has been persuasively argued, the logical positivlsts fail
to appreciate the differences between ^^the^atical and logical questions
(to which they^erroneously reduce social science questions) and philo-
sophical ones.
This misunderstai^ding is expressed in Dahl's cynical attitude to
claims made on behalf of the relevance of classical ideals for conditions
of advanced industrial society. For Dahl, not much worthwhile knowledge
can be expected from reviewing the classical political theorists because
social and historical conditions have changed. Conceptions of democracy
are regarded as "nostalgic" and "utopian" and are seen as inducements to
26
cynicism rather than as spurs to action. This attitude is portrayed by
Dahl as one of "realism,"
The significance of Dahl's approach is that he is consigned to a
narrower theoiy of democracy, and this view weakens the case Dahl is able
to make on behalf of expanding the settings of participation and opens it
to charges of being "cooptive" and even "repressive,"
25
—
For a positive view of what this connection must be see Connolly
op. cit., pp. 3h-3S*
25
The argument is made by John Wisdom, "A Feature of Wittgenstein's
Technique," in Fann, ed., Ludwig Wittgenst ein; The Man and His Philosophy
(New York: Delta, 1567), pp. 353-365. ^
26
For his castigation of classical theory see, for instance, A Preface
to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. Ij
After the Revolution? Authority in A Good Society (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1970), pp» 2k, 59, 52; and Size and Democracy
, p.
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The v^ision of democratic_the^ Dahl's two studies. After the
S?I2lution? and Size_and_De2^ be regarded as counter-responses
to the recent efforts of pluralist critics who have endeavored to re-
assert the applicability of the classical democratic vision/^ Danl's
analysis in the first citation and his empirical model in the second
should be seen as efforts to reconcile the contrasting propositions of
the classical democratic theory and the facts and realities of political
experience. A characterization of the Rousseauan model pro^^des Dahl
with an explicit contrast model for arguing his viewpoint.
First, let us consider the matter of how Dahl perceives the argu-
ment of classical democratic theory. A brief review of Dahl's inter-
pretation of Rousseau's ideas, which he mainly takes from The Social
Contract, will suggest that Rousseau's model of a democracy of partici-
pation is incompletely perceived and, in part, misconstrued. Dahl
sketches most forthrightly the paradigm of Rousseau in the following
passage and it is from this sketch that the particular accent Dahl gives
to his interpretation can be discovered:
A democratic polity must be completely autonomous, because
otherwise its citizens could not be fully self-governing:
Some of their decisions would be limited by the power or
authority of individuals or groups outside the citizen
body. A democratic polity must have so few citizens that all
of them could meet frequently in the popular assembly to
listen, to vote, perhaps even to speak. Smallness, it was
27
The relevance of the Rousseauan argument was suggested by Walker,
op. cit.; Duncan and Lukes, op. cit.; Peter Bachrach in The Theory of
Democratic Elitism - A Critique (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); Robert J,
Pranger in The Kclipse of Citizenship (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1965); and see W. E. Connolly, "The Challenge to Pluralist
Theory," in Bias of Pluralism (New York: Atherton, 1969), pp. 22-2k.
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contSI^?'^^''^'^
opportunities for participation in androl of the government in many ways. For examole in !
en'bi'L^tTL^'r^^" ^^^^^ ^ ^'^^ ™^of\'eingChos n by lot at least once in his lifetime to sit on one of
^o^.th^
administrative bodies. Smallness made i?p ssible for every citizen to know every other, to estimatehis qualities to understand his problems, to de^el^rfrLndWfeelings toward him, to analyze and discuss with com^rehen-sion the problems facing the polity. To be sure, i?^a demo-cratic polity was to be both small and completely autonomousthere was a price to be paid: The citizen body must be seS:sufficient and life must be frugal. But frugality was con-sidered a virtue in a. democracy, since it helped to reduceinequalities and jealousies among citizens and to toughen themfor the rigors of military life, which all must exi.er!encefrom time to time if autonomy was to be maintained'. 2
8
In this sketch the accent is on the efficaciousness of "size." The
accent is not on the requirements placed on a community of individuals
to act in socially responsible and principled ways, which Rousseau viewed
smallness of size as supporting. It is from this perspective that Dahl
misunderstands Rousseau's criticism of representative processes of demo-
cracy for not encouraging the development of these cognitive and
29
affective capacities. Indeed, Dahl makes a mockery of Rousseau. This
distorted interpretation constitutes the basis for Rousseau's dismissal:
"For in founding authority on personal choices Rousseau was as modern as
2^^
Size and Democracy
, pp. 5-6.
29
Dahl makes the suggestion that Rousseau did not even take his own
ideas seriously: "In fact, it was the impossibility of arriving at all
the conditions necessary for direct democracy, including the impossibility
of keeping the people constantly assembled m order to decide public
affairs, that led Rousseau to conclude that 'democracy,' in his sense, had
never existed and never would." See "Further Reflections...," pp. 296-297.
ve
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yesterdays existentialist
= It was only in limiting the legitir,acy of
authority to the city-state that he locked hi^elf into the prison of
the past,"
Several obvious historical developments, according to Dahl, had
^de the idealization of the small city-state anachronistic; mainly these
were the development of the nation-state, the emergence of representati
legislatures, and the philosophic and ideologic adaptations of democrati
theory to this grander scale. Simply, the shifts in the historical sit-
uation and in the response of the theorists was so commanding as not to
require further serious consideration. From the critical perspective,
however, Dahl-s was a false historicism which never viewed classes and
human beings and their language and symbolism as having a constitutive
effect on the world.
In recognition of the more complex conditions of a mass bureaucrat!zed
and industrialized society, Dahl suggests that no one principle can be
evoked to make a case for the single best structure for democracy as, it
is alleged, Rousseau thought. Rousseau's concept of "general will" is
effaced by Dahl's imposition of a Lockean notion of authority. The
relationship individuals have towards the "general will"—one that seeks
to identify it and act according to it—is transformed into an authority
relationship of five types: Committee democracy, primary democracy,
referendum democracy, representative democracy, and several forms of
32
delegated authority. The argument is that we need associations of
30
After the Revolution?
, p. 80.
31";
Size and Democracy
,
p. 8.
32
See After the Revolution?, chap. 2.
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different dimensions for different purposes; all necessitate organization
by authority. This proposition reinvites DahLs appeal to the
.etaphor
of the Chinese boxes suggestive of multiple settings for varied stylos
of participation. The problem is not that the argu^nent for varied
settings is wrong, but that it is incomplete, for Dahl fails to give
recognition to the fuller insight Rousseau, Green, and Dewey had about
the nature of democratic participation. Obligation, under the classical
model, was obtained less by coercive authority than by a certain kind of
choice; this choice necessarily involved sublimation, but it was per-
sonally not institutionally derived; it was necessarily moral choice.
The concept of self had disappeared in Dahl-s democratic theory.
Like many other political scientists Dahl had followed Schumpeter's
critique of democratic ideology and his revision of democratic theory
along non-substantive, procedural lines. We need only recall Dahl's
substitution for democracy in practice, polyarchy, to make this point.
"Polyarchies" were defined as "systems with broad electorates, extensive
opportunities to oppose the government and contest it in elections,
competitive political parties, peaseful displacement of officials de-
feated in honestly conducted elections, and so on." For Dahl, the
pluralist, the keynote of democracy was the opportunities of choice that
33
After the Revolution?
, pp. 88-89; and see Dahl's "City in the
Future of Democracy," American Political Science Review, 61 (196? ): 953-970,
3h
This general argument is made, for instance, by Bachrach in Tneory
of Democratic Llitism
, pp. 17-19.
IB
After the Revolution?
, p. 78; also. Preface. .
.
, p. 8Ij; and
Polyarchy
, pp. 7^
ons
occurred ror
.he voter, u„aer oondUions or .oUUc^
competing candidates for public office and competing pro.ra^s. F,lecti
were decisive for three reasons: Because they had finality, because
they vastly increased the si.e, number, and variety of
.tnorities whose
preference
.ust be talcen into account by leaders in ^a.ing policy choices,
and because elections occur within a social process, "for politicians
subject to elections must operate within the limits sot both by their own
values, as indoctrinated members of the society, and by their expectation,
about what policies they can adopt and still be reelected.-.^' Tne electoral
process held the possibility of accountability and responsibility through
final control, having the "last say."
In suinmary, two chief aspects of Rousseau's model were overlooked or
too easily dismissed: (1) The moral development of the person that demo-
cracy promoted, and (2) the conditions requisite for its nurture, which
smallness of community facilitated but by itself was insufficient.
There were other conditions as important: Social equality, respect for
persons, opportunities for solitude and reflection which would nurture
dialogue. Voting in the classical scheme was more than simply a checking
or vetoing-type of process. As Duncan and Lukes point out: "To the l8th
and 19th century democratic theorists, voting was perhaps the citizen's
most important act, in which the people as a whole were to reveal their
political energy and virtue. It was to be the culmination of long,
37thoughtful, and fair consideration of the relevant issues." The norm-
ative character of Rousseau's model, which Kant had recognized and which
~3r-
Preface..., pp. 132, 12$,
37
Duncan and Lukes, p. 165.
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Cassirer had endeavored to capture in his interpretation, slips out of the
grasp of the positivist/consensus paradigm which forces the prescriptive
theory to fit a much tighter empirical mold. In orxier to clean up the
contentious features of appraisive concepts, the empirical theorists
had to destroy the moral point of view by which "democracy," for example,
obtains its valued, but controversial, meaning. Thus, for instance, Dahl
is induced to protray Rousseau's Social Contract as a charming Utopia
which would be unacceptable to any "reasonable" or "realistic" person.
This effort, however, can only be viewed as successful within the
language-game of which it is a part. Another important implication is
to be noticed as well. The constraints placed on the democratic model
by Dahl's perspective must have theoretical implications for the concept
38
of participation that he employs, encourages, and defends.
IB
The argument for the contextual nature of certain kinds of concepts
is set out William E. Connolly, "Essentially Contested Concepts in Politics"
(Paper presented at American Political Science Convention, September ii-8,
1973), pp. 1-19.
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Dahl and the Pluralist Account of Participation
There are a number of questions to which a theory of participation
-St supply answers and according to which I will elucidate and appraise
Dahl. Significantly, differing interpretations will place emphasis on
these questions in differing ways, and, indeed, so.e questions n.y see.
to be overemphasized. Other questions not cited .ay receive consideration
as well. I propose this set as possessing sufficient range to apply to
the interpretations under consideration in this study initially:
Who participates? Why? What are the doMnant and limiting forms
of the legitimized participation? What impact do these forms of parti-
cipation have on the policies affecting society, for the rules of the
system, for the lives of the participants? Who should participate? How?
Who doesn't participate? Why? What is the impact of non-participation
for public and private policies, for the rules of the game, for the non-
participants when there is no meaningful role for them? What factors
in the society exist to induce expanded participation? What factors
prevail to discourage it? What is the net effect? That is, from the
viewpoint of classical democratic theory, what is the trend with regard
to the widely shared practices and attitudes towards participation in the
society? I shall try to show how Dahl's account supplies answers to
39
The Verba and Nie study suggests a more limited set of questions
because of the authors' view that certain questions cannot be examined
empirically. Thus, it dismisses as "endless" the debate set out by
the critics, Walker and Bachrach, and bring quite sizeable research
commitments to bear on the old question of rates of participation, a
topic "more amenable to study." See pp. 5-6.
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these otters and shall show by way of contrast that by what it neglects,
disoom^ts, or overrides with other considerations it is subject to
critical measure.
The starting point of Dahl's inquiry is fi^ed by the perspective he
brings to inquiry. By adopting the emergent political science framework
of the 193'0's, the consensus perspective, he has selected for hmself
useful phenomena for attention, and these he embraces with a particular
attitude and holds in focus in specific ways.
Notably, the conduct of Dahl-s empirical research (e.g.. Size and
Democracy) is deteimned by the familiar "systems" model. This model
also serves the purposes of Verba and Nie's Political Participation in
America. This analytic construct, the systems model, sets up a flow chart
of key political relationships which are schematized as inputs, conversion
procecesses, and outputs. Significantly, the model as typically diagrammed
presupposes the initiating natur-e of the individual. And, the individual
is regarded in a selective way, in his role as a voter with congealed
interests.
The potential impact of the individual on public policy is treated
through the aggregation process. "Voluntary" and "special interest"
groups and the major political parties provide the essential intervening
sets of social institutions (with political functions). They serve to
coalesce individuals' interests. Parties are chief agents in modern
democratic society for "institutionalizing" and resolving conflict.
The relationships between these aggregating institutions as they press their
claims on to the institutions of the governmental arena is defined and
tained by the "support" structures of the society. The political ethossus
80
and the constitutional fra^ewor. provide theae supports, but even apathy
might be considered positively in this regard.
Dahl-s interpretation of the systems model would view the conversion
processes of government as the decisive
...rena" for controlling decisions:
p»erm"* In ""m"' relativelyow ful. a wide variety of situations, in a contestbetween governmeatal controls and other controls ?hegovernmental controls will probably prove mo^e decrs^vethan competing controls.... It is'^reasonable to asfui:i/aat in a wide variety of situati ons whoever mnt-rnTcgovernmental decisions will have significantly Seatercontrol oyer policy than individuals who do not Controlgovernmental decisions.^0 " ''"^ contr
In this arena the process of negotiating, bargaining, and compromise takes
place, and this process ultimately yields official decisions and practices
concerning a wide range of issues. These decisions are regarded as re-
sultants of social vectoring-an equivalent to the "public interest" if
the term is applied^at all. Mainly, it is a goal-less system, or a
random-goal system. Stability is promoted by the smoothly functioning
(predictable) process, and individuals can begin to aggregate their
interests anew. The model is recognized as simplistic by its practi-
tioners, for this is recognized as the problem of all ideal models. But
its serious distorting effects on the conduct of empirical research are
not recognized.
Advisedly, some of these distorting effects should be pointed out.
For one thing, the systems diagram has a built in bias by regarding tne
individual's demands as pure inputs (based on abstractly defined needs.
ho
Preface.
.
.
, pp. US-ii?.
hi
This abstract goal, set by the framers of the systems model,
nonetheless conceals certain commitments, certain interests.
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wants, purposes). It is to be observed that no compensation is ^de by
also regarding the individuals as conditioned political entities, not
only as purely needs-satisfying individuals. Deeper than this, then, is
the abstract nature of the
.odel-that is, the political syste. is nit
portrayed in ter.s of any fundamental connection to the economy and its
tendencies. Finally, by avoiding the constellation of questions that
arise when treating the system in terms of political economy, the
problem of the
. conunercial stimulation of pseudo-needs is neatly avoided,
as is the construction of the whole system of rationality that holds the
economy together as a system of practice.
In addressing the systems model we are, in fact, addressing the
core metaphor of the dominant conceptual paradigm of political scientists
The core metaphor is mechanical and may be symbolized by the clock, or
perhaps as well by a motor. The clock exemplifies a closed, finite
energy system according to which the energy input is totally accountable
in the output. The clock is the symbol of Newton's mechanistic universe.
It stands to be argued, however, the extent to which this core metaphor
is applicable to the human world.
Immediately, we can show that this hidden metaphor invites certain
presumptions. In particular, let us look at the presumption it sets for
participation.
The systems model screens out the multi-faceted and interconnected
—
See also Thomas Landon Thorson, Biopolitics (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1970) who suggests the metaphor of a thermostat,
p. 76.
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roles Of the individual and the social pressures on the individual as well.
It focuses on the conventionally ascribed role of the individual; it re-
veals the individual in his single (abstracted) role as a chooser between
two alternative leadership groups. Sinply put, it is an image of a
political actor of rather reduced dimension. And the bulk of the popu-
lation is viewed in this way, falling some place on a one-dimensional
continuum extending from apathetic to frantic activist. Most of the
population are seen to fall into the broad middle voting segment. Simi-
larly, Verba and Nie construct a range of the following sort: The in-
actives (22^), the voting specialists (21^), the parochial participai^ts
(l40^), the communalists (20^), the campaigners 03%), and the complete
activists (11^). ' Although Verba and Nie's continuum suggests a larger
number of activists, both Dahl's and their ranges are closely similar
to the one proposed by Milbrath. The paradigmatic case of participation
in pluralist theory is voting, according to the rational econom.Lc model.
Self-interest may impel one to further participation in campaign or special
activity. Dahl has closely allied himself with this position.^^ Where
he has diverged in his recent years is on the policy recommendation to
After the Revolution?
, p. U7.
Political Participation...^ pp. 118-119; Cf. Milbrath, pp. 16-22.
US
See After the Revolution?
, where his criterion of economy imposes
limits on the kinds and levels of activity of a participant and Size and
Democracy
, pp. iiU-US; see also Verba and Nie, pp. 2-3, which emphasizes
"the acts that aim at influenci ng the government, either by affecting the
choice of government personnel or by affecting the choices made by govern-
ment personnel;" and Altschuler, p. vii, wMch includes "the right to be
consulted at one end of the spectrum to near absolute community control
of vital public functions at the other."
the question. I. the leveX of participation a p.oble.. The a„.„e. to t^his
thought
.
First, during the 1950's Dahl followed the findings of the early
voting studies wMch showed that the level of participation-voting
turnout-fell far shorter than was expected by the researchers. These
findings led Dahl, like Eulau, Hilbrath and others, to draw the conclusion
that a democratic system did not need high levels of voter participation.
In his 1955 essay, "The Problem of Participation," Dahl extended the
political findings to develop their implications in ter:.. of the following
h^othesis: "The proportion of individuals who will avail themselves of
^
normal opportunities to participate in decision-nuking, at least in the
United^States, will be relatively sn^ll in all forms of social organiza-
tion." This suspicion led Dahl to propose several tentative conclusions
at that time. For the democratic process to function properly several
conditions were necessary; they were not dissimilar to Milbrath's conclu-
sions: (1) Reliance on the competitiveness between leaders was crucial,
(2) an opportunity for non-leaders to switch from one set of leaders to
another was needed, (3) the classic assumptions about the need for total
participation were, at the very least, to be viewed as inadequate, and
(li) bargaining between other leaders inside and outside the system became
important as checks. This adaptation was widely shared by political
scientists, as was the conclusion: "...What we call 'democracy'—that
B
Robert A. Dahl, "The Problem of Participation," reprinted in
Williams and Press, eds.. Democracy in Urban America (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1961 ), p. k07 ,
—
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a sy.te. of deciaion-^„g i„ „hich leaders are
.ore or lesa re-
sponsive to the preferences of non-leaders-does see. to operate with a
low level of citizen participation. Hence it is inacc«-ate to say that
one Of the necessary conditions for
.democracy, is extensive citizen
participation. It would be .ore reasonable simply to insist that some
-ninin.1 participation
.s required, even though we cannot specify with
any precision what this minimvm must be."
A second period, inaugurated by A Preface to Democratic Theory ,
may be viewed as bringing into detail some of the problems out of focus
in the early assessment. The Preface outlines the task for much of
Dahl's later work toward developing a defensible model of the possible
levels of political activity and the proper mix of poUtical roles in
the optimal system.
In this study the limits of democratic possibility are posed by
the Madisonian model at one extreme and the populist-Jeffersonian model
at the other. Dahl examined these models from the viewpoint of the
critical-realist, asking the question. What is possible given the con-
straints of the real world of advanced industrial society and individuals
who have many different pursuits to occupy their time? Briefly, his
answer is supplied by his critique of the two models. The problem with
the Madisonian model is that it fears too much majority's tyranny of the
minority. For Dahl, Madison's analysis does not make good political
science, though it made good ideology. It is not constitutional struc-
ture, but man's "social" nature, his willingness to form a consensus.
H7
Ibid., p. 1;08.
that Urdts tyranny. The populist model Is objected to on the grounds
of its Singleness of purpose,- the goal of political equality and popular
sovereignty is not balanced against other warrantable goals. As Dahl says:
"For most of us-and this may be particularly true in countries that have
managed to operate democracies over long periods of time-the costs of
pursuing any one or two goals at the expense of others are thought to be
excessive. Most of us are marginalists." Dahl's case, of cour-se,
rests on the unargued assumption of a widely held diversity of interests,
all worthy of pursuit:
Political equality and popular sovereignty are not absolutegoals; we must ask ourselves how much leisure, privacy
consensus stability, income, security, progress, status,
e.nd probably many other goals we are prepared to foregofor an additional increment of political equality. It is
an observable fact that almost no one regards political
equality and popular sovereignty as worth an unlimited
sacrifice of these other goals.50
Behind this critique lies the image of the citizen as "rational economic
man," whose values are bour-geois.
By following the Aristotelian rule of moderation in all things, Dahl
resolves the tensions between the two democratic (and axiomatic) models
by proposing a compromise solution, an optimal model, which he proposes
to speak of as "polyarchy." He finds, not surprisingly, that the
American case fills these minimal conditions. The chief character of
polyarchy, and the American case, is the extent to which the operations
of such societies cannot be described in terms of contrasts between
majorities and minorities:
IT-
Preface . .
.
,
chap. 1, esp. pp. 30-32,
h9
Ibid., chap. 2, esp. pp. 50-51.
50
Ibid., p. 51.
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We expect elections to reveal the "will" n-r ^ ^
of a majority on a set of issues! S s is one tH 'T'"'tions rarely do, except in an aLs^ trittal fasSonPite this limitation the election process is one o? kofundai>iental methods of social control which, operati^P
lelderr^h^?'?^
^"'""'^^ ^'^^^'^
-
responsT^e to non-
torsMn
^^^^,^^\^^^^^"^tion between democracy and dicta-rship still makes sense. The other method of social controlIS continuous political competition among individuals partiesor both, elections and political competUion 1^ not r^lake for
'
v^Iuv inLe^
majorities m any very significan? w^y, tu tneyastl;y crease the size, number and variety of minoritieswhose preferences must be taken into account by ^aSe^s .nmking policy choices. I am inclined to think'^that it isin this characteristic of elections - not minority rule but
ITflll""""
"
'^f "^"^^ tLe essentialdi ferences between dictatorships and democracies.51
Dahl is aware that the constitutional structure, for instance, has lead
to the over-representation and under-representation of specific groups
.^^
V.'hat I ara concerned to show is the, disputable, meaning that he draws
from this recognition. Dahl recognizes that not everyone has equal
control. Even though it appears to be a creaking structure-for instance,
in arriving at foreign policy-the system has the virtue of its vices.
Dahl asserts:
With all its defects, it does nonetheless provide a high
probability that any active and legitimate group will
mke itself heard effectively at some stage in the process
of decision. This is no mean thing in a political system.53
The conclusion ignores structural biases that favor the organized as
against the unorgarized groups in society; as well, it pretends that
"being heard" is equivalent to having political impact. The task that
Dahl saw, at one point briefly, as important for political science is
Ibid., pp. 131-132.
52
Ibid., p. li;5.
53
Ibid., p. 150. •
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not that one addressed in the Preface's conclusion. ' Where is his
recoirunendation for maximizing political equality for the disenfranchised
.groups he identifies-Negroes, sharecroppers, migrant workers?^ Instead,
the study ends uncritically on a passifying statement of conviction.
And that conviction must be questioned. It is problematic whether
the system is "decentralized" as Dahl claims or whether it should be,
more correctly, viewed as a system of fractured power. Perhaps, it is
a veto-system that protects some interests against other interests?
There is another problem as well. Just because a majority is found not
to rule, to conclude that it is a system of minorities, rather than a
decisive minority, that rules is fallacious. Obviously, that was the
point of the New Haven study—to confirm by the key decision method that
different individuals made decisions in different issue areas. But the
study's method failed to show adeqioately, as Bachrach and Baratz con-
tended, the "mobilization of bias" in the community. These matters are
significant themes in the interpretations of all the critics to follow
in this study.
The third phase marks a more decisive departure for Dahl in terms
of his recommendations for participation; yet, his mode of analysis is
scarcely altered. Central to our attention is After the Revolution?
Authority in A Good Society
,
which apparently is conceived as a liberal-
pluralist answer to the disturbances of the 1960's and the New Left
5h
See Preface. .
.
, p. 83, where Dahl states: "For what we desperately
want to know (if we are concerned with political equality) is what we
may do to maximize it in some actual situation, given existing conditions."
If I read Dahl correctly, what he does is say this is a problem and then
discovers that extension of the franchise has been an evolutionary
(apparently "natural") process so that no particular attention is required.
Even the 1970 's studies are not concerned with extending participation to
the lower classes.
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critiques of that period. The New Left is not taken seriously as
offering any theoretically coherent analysis or any specially developed,
.
systematic and constructive program. This is a typical Dahl-ian bias,
which suggests he is either truly unaware of the literature or simply
does not want to be aware of it.
After the Revolution?, along with Polyarchy and Size and Democracy ,
proposes for consideration ways to extend participation—that is, to
identify settings in which participation could be encouraged. The meta-
phor of the Chinese boxes is reappropriated to suggest the need to find
units which would encompass the principle of affected interests and at
the same time not be too small so that rule becomes inconsequential. It
is now recognized that polyarchy has a fatal flaw: The remoteness of the
government from the citizen. Dahl invites us to consider four recommenda-
tions for deiiiocratizing polyarchy:
1. He proposes that we consider the corporation as the unit most
satisfying the problem of size and affected interests, and he recommends
"self-management" as an appropriate parti cipator::>^ solution. Alternatives
55
Ibid., p. 117; see Table 3.
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After the Revolution? is best regarded as a polemic. Its style
is assertive; its reasoning is not tight j and tksa title itself is in-
applicable to the contents as well as presumptimas. The criteria offered
for authority to become legitimate—that decisLmis correspond to personal
choice, are infonned by special competence, and. economize on the citizen's
time, attention and energy—are a priori. See p,. 8 and chap. 1. The socis
injustices of our time - racism, poverty, milit«G.!rism - are dismissed with
the most simplistic ad hoc explanation—the Ame.iri'can people are to blame.
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This naivete is expressed, for instance,, iin his discussion of the
private corporation: "Yet Americans have all buA abandoned any serious
challenge to the appropriation of public authority by private rulers
that is the essence of the giant firm." Ibid.,, jx. 115. He continues:
"Why are Americans half colorblind when they loeSk at economic enterprise?
An important reason is that our history has left: lus without a socialist
tradition." Ibid., p. 119.
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of "interest-group" management and "bureaucratic sociaUsm" are rejected/^
The self-inanagement model of industrial democracy that Dahl makes reference
.to is the Yugoslav3.an one, which occurs within a setting of economic and
governmental controls. For the first time, Dahl challenges the private
property ethic. The limitation Dahl senses with regard to this proposal
is that the workers probably will not want to spend the time or hold the
responsibility that this practice requires. (He does not see t hat t^iis
is a cultivated attitude, not a necessary one.) Dahl suggests that the
impetus for participation in the corporation would likely come from the
white-collar employees, technicians, and executives therriselves
. (But he
does not suggest that there may be resistances from the major ownership
of the corporation.) Dahl would recommend expansion of industrial demo-
cracy to the political parties, trade unions, and universities as well.
2. Dahl also proposes considering restoring the ancient device of
lot-selection as a method for choosing advisory councils to every elected
official of the giant polyarchy—mayors of large cities, state governors,
60
members of the U. S. Senate and House, and even the President,
3. Of more limited practicality would be participation in neighbor-
hood corporations, he says; reference is to the model characterized by
Milton Kotler in Neighborhood Government . Participation should be
Ibid., pp. 130-lUO.
59
After the Revolution?
, pp. 121-129, after a non-socialist model
of "industrial democracy."
60
Ibid., pp. m9-l53.
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encouraged here, but Dahl suggests the reservation that its limited scope
of decision-making would make it less attractive.
h. The optimal unit for participation, according to Dahl will be the
middle-sized city, which ranges from 50,000 to several hundred thousand in
population. Dahl comments: "Within this range the decisions (or non-
decisions) of the city government cut pretty deeply into the lives of the
62
inhabitants, and they could cut deeper still,
Dahl's recent writing on the subject of participation reflects an
attempt to construct a more responsive point of view within his basic con-
ceptual framework. Dahl begins to see the opening up of varied settings
for participation (loosely conceived) as both a continued extension of
the democratic process and appropriate to sustaining a pluralist social
process in face of the growth of large governmental and corporate units.
But Dahl does not go much beyond asking his readers to consider his
recommendations,
Dahl, for instance, would appear close to the participatory model in
terms of his advocacy of expanded settings for participation. But his
account remains deficient in the extent to which he fails to take note
of the particular requirements Rousseau, Green, and Dewey place on the
individual, the realizing self. He has not noticed the extent to which
social and political arrangements must be consciously regulated on behalf
of a teleological principle, the community, and that this will require the
limiting of certain individual behavior and institutional practices.
Because he does not recognize the specific moral feature of the Rousseauan
^1
Ibid., pp. 159-160. (I would disagree with his assessment here.)
62
Ibid., pp. 160-165.
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vision, Dahl's interpretation is vulnerable to the charge of being
"cooptive," a charge made by both the constitutional republicans and
radical-liberals, and the charge of being "repressive," Marcuse's claim.
This inadequacy in Dahl's account ma.y be attributed to some interre-
lated theoretical problems which are not re-assessed in the latest phase
of Dahl's writing. They are, first, the problems associated with the
rational economic model of the voter and, secondly, the analytic problems
associated with liberal-pluralist explanations of non-participation.
Why participate (vote)? The answer to this question is viewed as a
matter of rational choice, a decision left up to the individual. The
principle motivation, according to this ethic, is the degree to which
one's self-interest is maximized. For as Dahl reflects: "I cannot
satisfactorily gain my own ends unless I allow others an opportunity to
63
pursue their ends on an equal basis." For Dahl, political equality
6h
means "the personal choices of others have equal dignity with my own."
The problem with this conception, for a Rousseauan, develops when the
individuals do not mutually share the same interest, of determining and
acting within the common good. And that is not what the rational economic
model requires, whatever else its conception of self-interest may be.
Note, for example, the six conditions that would make one more likely
to value and, therefore, choose to participate:
1. The more you enjoy taking part...
2« The more important to you the matters the association is
concerned with...
33
After the Revolution?
,
p. 12.
6ii
'
Ibid., p. 26.
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3. The greater the differences in the alternatives at stake in
the decisions of the association...
h. The more likely it is that by participating you wi.ll change the
outcome in the direction of your choice...
5. The more likely it is that the outcome win turn out badly if
you do not participate...
6. The more competent you are with respect to the subject at hand.
If the value of participation is derived from the meaning it has for the
maximization of an individual's goals, then, conversely, when none of
these advantages accrue to individuals, it is "rational" for them not to
participate. Dahl, thus, accepts as rational the non-participation of
the working class and even drav;s the conclusion that its members could only
with difficulty be induced to participate, given the opportunity:
...affluent American workers, like affluent workers in many
advanced countries and the middle class everywhere, tend
to be consumption-oriented, acquisitive, privatistic, and
family-centered. This orientation has little place for a
passionate aspiration toward effective citizenship in the
enterprise (or perhaps even in the state! )66
The cultural and structurally-related aspects of a consumptive living
style is unrecognized. Substantive rationality is not Dahl's concern,
for this would require attention to the quality of human life. Participa-
tion is an instrumental activity; it has extrinsic value for an individual
67
(notably, for individuals of a certain class), not intrinsic worth.
—5r~
Ibid., pp. U6-Li7. This model is more con^iletely articulated in
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and
Row, 1957); in the work of W. H. Riker; in Brian Barry, Sociologists
,
Economists and Democracy (London: Collier Macmillan, 1970); and in
William C. Kiitchell, Why Vote? (Chicago: Markhara, 1971).
66
Ibid., p. 135.
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After the Revolution?, p. 100. See also Verba and Nie where this
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There are several difficulties with this conception of the way the
voter should go about considerations involved in voting.
First, by structuring the choice open to the average individual in
terms of preferences to be maximized, Dahl begs the question of whether
the alternatives are real ones. In other words, it veils the class
interests at play in society. The bias in the way issues are framed,
the way the agenda is set, makes it irrational for members outside the
consensus (usually, members of the lower class, minorities, women) to
participate. But Dahl cannot see that, say, for blacks, in a largely black
ward of Baltimore to go out and elect a white businessman for city council
usually makes little sense. Moreover, "having the last say" is neither sig-
nificant nor, indeed, real since elections do not act like vetoes. In a
winner-take-all, two-party system, in a contest between two crooks, the
electorate must expect one of them to be victor.
The notion of rationality as an accountant's balance sheet with
debits and credits columns is a most primitive way of determining broad
choices for public policy, anyway. Are all problems reducible to a
profit-loss statement? Thus, should deterrainat-L.on of a school bond
proposal hinge on whether I have a child who can make use of the new
school? What opportunity does Dahl's theory allow for other considerations
is explicit, p. 5> and inter alia . Also, they state more clearly than
perhaps Dahl does, their commitments on how the participant arrives at
choices. Rejecting the classic view, they assert: "A more modern view
is that participation can lead to better public policy even if citizens
bring their own narrow and selfish interests into politics. Through
such "selfish" participation, the government is informed of these interests
and pressured to respond. In this way it produces public goods more
closely attuned to citizen needs than it would if there were no partici-
pation." p. 11. The authors note Lowi's critique of this version of
interest-group liberalism but refrain from dealing with it.
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in the determination of issues-such other considerations as biological
and environmental ones, social ones, ethical ones, aesthetic ones? And
if these other considerations are not given favor, does the model too not
encourage segmental and short-run determinations over comprehensive and
long-term ones? Dahl's criteria, it appears to me, are non-existent.
Finally, there is the problem facing the individual of coordinating
his or her conduct in everyday life so that some consistency is obtained.
The paradigm of voting according to the rational economic model, however,
does not endeavor to embrace the several roles an individual holds in a
coordinated way, nor does it indicate ways to bring about a mental resolve
when matters are in contention. The individual may sense the discordancy
of the role as producer and the role as consumer and the role as voter,
nonetheless. Is this discordancy best resolved by non-voting? Do not
the consequences of one's activity, aside from voting, also have im-
plications of a political sort? Does not one's role, say, as producer
have profound political implications that ought to be integrated as well?
I am suggesting there are areas of activity in individuals' lives that
Dahl's paradigm of participation does not make coherent.
Dahl's treatment, it seems to me, obscures the interests that are in
contest in the American polity, and it obscures the way interests are
formed and how they come to prevail or even dominate, and it obscures the
fact that an individual can be a reflection and embodiment of these con-
tradictions. This can be attributed to the failure to acknowledge human
"agency." To make the point I shall quote from a passage suggestive of
a growing insight among some analytic philosophers and held, as well, by
Dewey: "No matter how difficult it may be to specify criteria for what
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is to count as agency, and granted that there are many difficult border-
line cases—where it is unclear whether X did something or something
happened to X—the concept of agency is basic to what sort of creature
00
man is."
The way the class interests for framing choices is concealed by
Dahl's analysis is disclosed in his explanation of non-participation.
This is explained as non-class related.
According to Dahl, the restraints on participation are mainly
legalistic and relatively easily alterable economic ones. The main
causes are identifiable and capable of being mitigated, Dahl claims:
Many of these, and certainly the most unjust ones
—
registration and voting lav;s and practices that make
participation unnecessarily difficult; discriminatory
laws and practices 3 severe lack of education; inadequate
organization and mobilization; apathy produced by poverty
or a group history of subjection and defeat—can be
elimj.nated or at the very least greatly reduced. Greater
equality in political resources. . .would reduce gross
differences in opportunities for participating in decisions.
°°
V/here economic constraints intervene, they are not seen as especially
significant in the way social scientists who follow the "power elite"
formulation view them. The reason is Dahl's presumption that there is
an overriding tendency in advanced industrial societies to soften the
tendencies for cumulative advantage. Dahl does not need to refer to the
evidence on the distribution of inequalities as he argues in the following
way:
5B
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Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis and Action - Contemporary Philosophies
of Human Activity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971),
p. 269.
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To be sure, advantages and handicaps tend to be cumulativein all societies. However, in advanced industrial or post-industrial societies, particularly if they are governedby polyarchies, this general tendency is somewhat softenedby another. Extreme deprivation is attentuated by government
policies and rising incomes, while the inequalities that
remain tend to become somewhat less cumulative and more
dispersed. By dispersed I mean that persons who are poorer
^RJ:^J:^^^^^. ^^c^ as wealth and status often (not al^^
)
have access to others sucn as the ballot, their sheer numhp'r.s,
their soliaarity, their special knowledge, and even some
amoant of collective economic weight to throw around.
(Emphasis added.
)
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The reasoning is a familiar one. The argument, typically, is addressed
to the Marxist critique of political economy. Particularly, it belongs
to a set of arguments that attacks Marx's account of the development of
72
social classes m modern capitalist societies. If we follow Bottomore'!
analysis, however, it becomes evident that "the changes which have taken
73
place are still open to various interpretations." For, the evidence is
by no means conclusive, and some aspects of the working class have been
hardly studied at all (e.g., the extent to which manual workers have
acquired a new outlook and new standards of behavior which resemble those
7ii
of the middle class).
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Ibid., p. 109, and see entire passage.
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This is the usual argument of businessmen, for instance, who want
to make a persuasive case for closer connections between government and
business. Dahl expresses the association more directly in his essay,
"Business and Politics: A Critical Appraisal of Political Science," in
Dahl, Haire, and Lazarsfeld, eds,. Social Science Research on Business :
Product and Potential (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 1
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See T. B. Bottomore, Classes in Modern Society (New York: Vintage
1966), pp. 22-30.
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Ibid., p. 30.
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My interpretation would suggest that the sanguine terms of Dahl's
analysis are inappropriate. Dahl's account, first, rejects the notion
of a politically-significant, biased pattern-one that has design to
it—in the distribution of burdens and benefits. Secondly, he rejects
out of hand the view that there is a consensus formulated in terms of
the dominant class interests. He says, in sum, that there is "no a
priori reason for supposing that the rich will display more unity than
the poor; and even if they do, it does not follow that the combined
resources of the well-off strata will inevitably exceed the combined
75
resources of the badly-off strata." The importance of this point is
that these processes affect opportunities for lingui.stic and cognitive
development. The greatest obstacle to democratization and reducing
inequalities is not the bugbear of the New Left, an elite of wealthy men,
but, he asserts, "for the want of a more appropriate term, the American
76
people." He goes on to repeat himself: "...Americans are curiously
tolerant of the inequalities in opportunities, freedom, and influence
77
that inherited wealth create." In the face of all the disturbances of
the 1960's, Dahl resorts to a most elastic category for his explanation.
Dahl maintains that political equality will reduce the economic
inequalities in American society, and he points to the historical trend
toward the expansion of the franchise as an example of this possibility.
Dahl does not notice how a position of power is more likely to accrue to
itself further advantages so as to protect its position, so as to prevent
"75
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, p. llU.
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Ibid., p. 110.
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Ibid., p. 113.
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the expansion of political equality in a meaningful sense. Some of the
advantages that accrue to the dominant class are suggested by Domhoff and
include those of political recruitment; political resources (as for instance,
incuinbancy allows); elaborate channels of intra-class and power elite
communications; personal participation in historic issue decisions; and
Irequoncy and ease of access to decision centers. The opportunities
available to the dorrdnant class by virtue of its position of wealth,
education and technical resources for develop: ng aiid elaborating its own
ideology, and control of information, are also ample. As Rousseau, how-
ever, framed the matter, the relationship between economic equality and
political equality was fundamental.
In addition, class structuring and the forces that perpetuate it
are basic factors for disadvantaging some individuals more than others.
Thus, to treat the disadvantaged as advantaged in terms of more numbers,
capable of some force when aggregated, does no credit to the complex
nature of the problem—as the history of mass and other social movements,
rightist or leftists, attest. The interacting factors that make the
social world quite a different reality than ttiat of a mecharasm is just
what the systems model is incapable of suggesting. In a mechanical
system the energy is clearly definable and accountable by the inputs.
In social processes, however, the energy level is not definable in
this same way and cannot be limited to the visible and measurable factors;
the less-easily quantified forces of belief systems must be considered
as well.
tb—
From G. William Domhoff, The Higher Circles - The Governing Class
in America (New York: Vintage, 1970), p. 105.
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Yet, Dahl's account has no place for this examination. Dahl is
uncritical of the rules and practices of the consensus, or of the very
nature of that consensus, in the United States. Indeed, he depicts
American politics as ideology-free and, therefore, static. Dahl simply
does not treat the human being as having unique capacities capable of
development and as, simultaneously a member of a class or group pressured
to conform according to the class's or group's needs and goals. It is
this nature of social existence that requires critical examination in
terms of the extent to v/hich it contributes to and frustrates human
development. Class differences arise from differing relations to the
social structure and language capacity (in other words, level of con-
ceptual development) may appropriately be hypothesized as a root struc-
turing factor in advanced industrial society. This consideration merits
at least some cursory attention and not disdain.
The reapportionment formula of "one man, one vote" as the expression
of political equality can be viewed as illusory unless the disadvantaging
factors—economic and linguistic limitations—are attended to for bring-
ing individuals to something like the same starting line. As Bayard
Rustin recognized by the mid-1960 's, the civil rights movement could not
merely be a voting rights movement if it was going to be successful; it
had to become a human rights movement as well.
In summary, the analysis has endeavored to show that the concept of
participation which Dahl proposes falls short of the classical version.
It also falls short in terms of being a scientific approach. In pro-
posing a form of argument and then arguing in favor of (justifying) its
propositions, the attitude is that of a promoter. A scientific attitude
would involve a listing of the limits of possibility, with consequences
and derivatives.
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The argument on which the case for Dahl's narrowed conception of
participation rests misses the normative aspects of the concept, set
out in the first chapter, of Rousseau, Green, and Dewey. This leads to
a false emphasis on the importance of size of community and setting and
a misplaced rejection of Rousseau. Dahl, proceeds, nevertheless, to make
a case for expanding participation, at least in terms of its number of
settings. The argument is that the sense of legitimate authority in
polyarchy can be further secured in this way. But if the causes of non-
participation are not correctly identified, even that sense of legiti-
macy may not necessarily develop.
Dahl asserts that this is a non-Rousseauan model which he proposes,
which it is for the wrong reasons. As my first chapter suggested,
Rousseau, Green, and Dewey afford a cogent argument for the multiple
settings for participation, governmental as well as non-governmental.
Rousseau in his practical writings makes clear his relevance to the
small setting 3 Dewey develops the case more strongly. Other studies
have similarly made this claim that Rousseau is applicable to a case for
79
participation in the small setting. The chief contribution of Rousseau,
then, was not any focus on the necessity of a small all-embracing polity
but the ethical character of citizenship,
"Participation" was a moral notion. It implied that an individual
would have adopted a moral point of view by which to act as a (privileged)
member of a group, community, nation. In other words, one's actions
developed out of a process of identifying the "general will" or "common
79
For example, see Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic
Theory (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970}.
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good." Of necessity, the varied roles of the individual had "political"
implications, and it made little sense to treat them segmentally, ana-
lytically, after the fashion of the rational economic model. The weak-
ness of Dahl's case is that it is unassimilated to a theory of human
development; the effects of participation are to get people wliat they
want, what they have already been encouraged to want, not to promote a
growth in the distinctively "hujrtan" capacities which develop when
individuals are encouraged to act for social reasons, principled reasons.
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A Critical Assessment
In important ways the perspective a student of politics brings to
inquiry sets the problems for examination, the relationships explored,
and, finally, limits possible recommendations offered as guides to action.
If a "science" is at all possible in political and social inquiry, it
has surely not been realized to the present by the political behavioralist
paradigm, for so much that is a feature of politics is left out by it.
A theorist's perspective is, therefore, an appropriate subject to
address. On the surface, the behavioralists, Dahl among them, seem to have
fashioned a system of thought so protected that the challenges to it seem,
on purely logical grounds, to be virtually impenetrable. The basic char-
acter of this paradigm remains significantly untouched by the serious
criticisms raised in the literature in the past decade. While there are
gestures toward counter-argument, Dahl's most recent three studies hardly
signify a real comprehension of the philosophic and linguistic issues.
Or, for another matter, the work scarcely reveals a sensitivity to the
stakes that these philosophic issues, at the political level, imply.
For, to assert a certain picture of reality plays some part in also con-
80
stituting it. The details of Dahl's interpretation, not unlike other
interpretations, truly frames a language-game in the Wittgensteinian
sense.
My claim is not that Dahl's, or the behavioralists', interpretation
does not succeed in some matters. Under limited conditions it succeeds
all too well. For instance, quantitative political science is all too
"Bo
—
"Theoretical Self-Consciousness," op. cit., pp. 12-lli, 26-31.
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successful in the way it has been able to support a technology-industry
of electioneering, its claim to impartiality not withstanding. For,
predictability and control is possible under limited conditions of time
and space. It is at the level of social and political theory that the
paradigm fails and fails abysmally.
Well-developed arguments have been presented elsewhere and, for my
81
purposes in this study, it is not necessary to become detailed about them.
A few general points should suffice by way of offering objections to the
behavioral model. Many others, in more detail, will follow in the chapters
to come. I vjant to offer some comments first on style and then on the
problem of the systems model; and, finally, I want to comment on the
ideological aspects of Dahl's interpretation.
First, Basil's style is assertive rather than discursive or per-
suasive; it is not freely hypothetical. This means that one criterion of
adequacy of Yils theory must be the completeness of cases that can be ex-
plained by it. Unfortunately, from my point of view, there are many
issues that cannot be rigorously dealt with by the theory so that the
style itself becomes illicit. One can note how Dahl establishes himself
as an authority in controlling the meanings of words--a process which,
anthropologically, is social. Many of Dahl's terms are drawn at a high
BI
For the case against abstracted empiricism see 0. Wright Mills,
Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 19^9), chap.
3} also Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudo-Politics: A Critical Evalua-
tion of Some Behavioral Literature," American Political Science Review ,
59 (March 1965): 39-51 J and for a lengthy critical essay of Basil's approach
see Peter Euben, "Political Science and Political Silence," in Green and
Levinson, eds.. Power and Community - Bissenting Essays in Political
Science (New York: Vintage, 1969), pp. 3-58.
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level of generality. Note that making "choices" (the electorate's
prerogative) and making "decisions" (the elected officials, prerogative)
•is not quite the same occupation; Dahl's language would not have us recog-
nize the significant political differences. This level of generality
also leads to equivocation. To illustrate, let me quote Dahl: '-By
dravdng on the resources they do have, the less advantageous can often
(not always) acquire leverage and bargaining power.
"^^
Also, the
vocabulary is so neutralized by attempts to "operationalize" that
language's connections to human problems have been stripped away. The
result is an esoteric language system, not unlike some forms of sociological
83
explanation which Ralf Dahrendorf likened to Utopias.
The sciences and the social sciences at their lim:.ts seem to need to
work with metaphor. I have tried to show what the core metaphor of Dahl's
analysis has been. But metaphors are also circumspect, and, finally,
they tend to call for replacement. As I. A. Richards has observed:
"What we have to do is to watch metaphors at work tricking us and our
fellows into supposing matters to be alternatively much simpler and much
more complex than they are." In the case of the behavioralist its core
metaphor, expressed by the systems model as a self-regulating mechanism,
is brought into considerable doubt by the paradigm shift that has
occurred in the natural sciences of the twentieth century. Perhaps this
can be captured representationally in the Heisenberg Principle of
82
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Ralf Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia - Toward A Reorientation of
Sociological Analysis," in his Zssays in the Theory of Society (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. IO7-I2BI
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Uncertainty, which suggests that the object of research is not any more
nature as such but nature as exposed to human questioning. Research focuses
on the netv;ork of relations between man and nature. The question pre-
senting itself is whether empiricist epistemology and its mechamstic
model of reality is applicable to the natural and human world, when a
chief feature of the contemporary outlook seems to be the assuredness
of the inconclusiveness of sense experience as opposed to earlier con-
fidence in its conclusiveness. The philosophic task as Wittgenstein had
come to see it was one of human self
-understanding, and the t ask was
ok
linguistic.
But the practitioners of the systems model have no doubts that they
can conduct their research and develop their considerations "scientifically,
outside and apart from the study of man. They are able to assert the claim
with some amount of persuasiveness because the case they make (e.g., Verba
and Nie) proceeds by the development of small issues. Participation In
America amounts to being a case of very skillfully developed detail.
This style in art is, not without reason, called "trompe I'oeil."
Important specific and distributive features are omitted by the
systems model. An observation of Toulmin helps to suggest the source
of the inadequacy of the systemic metaphor. Toulmin writes:
For human affairs—notoriously, in Descartes own view
—
lack precisely the kind of tight and self-correcting, or
"systemic," organization typical of physiological systems
in organisms. The "organization" of entire societies is
BIT"
This is the interpretation of Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin in
Wittgenstein's Vienna (New York: Simon and Schuster, 197h) , chap. ?•
106
something less than organic; the behavioral "codog" ofhuman groups are only very partially codifi.bJe theso-called "social System" is a good deal less thansystenac. (And Toul.dn adds in a note: "I?Lr yearsof loose talk about "ecosystems," many leadir^g ecol ovistsare now shying away from the term, for similar reasonsThe phenomenon so referred to /food-chains, etcj a^so*lack the staW.e, self-restoring character of physiological
JeTe'lJs
^^^^ "systemic." If^oVthey
The chief feature of the human species, consciousness and susceptibility
to symbolism, means society must be viewed as an open-energy process, and
this will have historical specificity. The chief feature of the systcirdc
view, of the positi.-ist philosophy of science, is its closedness. Piaget
brings this out clearly:
Positivism is chiefly a philosophy of science whichforbids science to cross certain barriers and which
consequently, prejudges the future. In anathemas
'
and prophecies (all subsequently denied in the course
of history) from Auguste Comte to the "propositions
without significance" of the neo-positivisra character-
istic of the Vienna Circle, ppsitivism is presented
chiefly as a closed doctrine,
Indeed, it may well be that the systems model, as a theoretical framework
for generating hypotheses, excludes more than it encompasses.
As unsystematic normative discourse, the analysis of Dahl can be
seen to reflect some unexamined commitments. Specifically, the case for
expanding the arenas of participation, without attention to developing
competences and conduct, continues and reinforces the social trend away
from indi.vidual autonomy, self-respect, and social responsibility
—
against, in other words, the humanization of civilization and in the
85
—
Stephen Toulmin, "A Biology of Russian Dolls," New York Review of
Books
,
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direction of the further techrdcalization of it. That, I believe, is
the certain implication when individuals are encouraged to act on the
utilitarian grounds Dahl encourages, given the present culture. Further-
more, Dahl himself exhibits little awareness of the frustrated efforts
of some groups to gain the franchise and meanilngful participatory power;
in this his own work does not seem to show "respect for persons." But,
still further, he also fails to be concerned about, objectively, these
persons' need to develop their capacities in matters that, at a mini.mmn,
directly affect their lives.
By now it should be sufficiently clear that his analysis does not
consider the bias of the ground rules and the bias of the political
culture in the United States. As a consequence, he serves to reinforce
the American myth that voting is a meaningful right and duty for the
mj.ddle class, when the conditions are such that voting becomes a highly
questionable activity for a wide segment of the population. For those of
whom this myth remains inoperative, the political process continues to
remain illegitimate, and it may be infelicitous to characterize them as
"uninterested,"
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CHAPTER IV
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLICAN INTERPRETATION:
THE THEORIES OF GRANT McCONNELL AND THEODORE J. LOWI
Introduction
Both participation in the classical sense and participation in the
constricted pluralist sense seriously misrepresent the aims and processes
of the constitutional republic. This is the claim of an interpretation
that constructs a critique of the dominant explanatory theory of the
political processes in contemporary American society. It is a critique
that traces its roots to the theory of factions of Madison, the fears of
majority tyi-anny of DeTocqueville, and the idea of the rule of law of
F. A. Hayek. The common bond of this perspective is the idealization of
an extreme individualism. In this chapter I shall endeavor to show how
this perspective leads to an account of participation that, on the one
hand, correctly perceived the condition under which participation can
become cooptive, but that, on the other hand, in assimilating a generally
low estimate of human potentiality, dismisses the individual and social
advantage obtained through expanded opportunities for participation.
Grant McConnell and Theodore J. Lowi are familiar enough in the
political science literature, they have explicitly addressed themselves
to developing a theoretical perspective, and taken together they nicely
supplement one another—historically and in the cases they survey—to
warrant their selection as contemporary exponents of the constitutional
1
republican interpretation. Both McConnell's Private Government and
1
One political theorist writing from another perspective considers
Lowi's work, for instance, "to be one of the very few expressions today
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^51£li£-Ce^^ and Leva's Th^d_oLLiber^ which are the main
studies I shall draw upon, are framed in terms of a first part which
critically analyses the limits of liberalism and a later part that
illustrates these limits in the formulation and implementation of
selected public policies. McConnell's attention, for instance, is dir-
ected to the illustration of the problems of the delegation of power at
the state level; the indistinct roles of private and public agencies in-
volved in the determination of land and water policy; and in the, partic-
ularly^administrative, problems of functional autonomy of business and
labor. Lowi traces the determination of policy in foreign issues; in
the cities-the problems which are interconnected of political juris-
diction, housing, schools, race; and in "old" and "new" welfare.
The task ahead necessitates, first, a sketch of the critique
McConnell and Lowi provide of the liberal-pluralist system as it has
evolved. It is a critique that rests on some incompletely detailed dis-
crepancies—discrepancies such as exist between liberal rhetoric and
practice and between such practice and the ideal of the rule of law.
Following this sketch, it will be possible to suggest how and why parti-
cipation is identified, from the point of view of the constitutional
of a major intellectual tradition whose insight and failures both can
contribute to an adequate theory and strategy of change." See David
Kettler, "Beyond Republicanism: The Socialist Critique of Political
Idealism," in Surkin and Wolfe, eds.. An End to PoUtical Science -
The Caucus Papers (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 1|8.
2
Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York:
Vintage, 1966).
3
Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism - Ideology, Policy, and
the Crisis of Public Authority (New York: W7 W. Norton, 1969).
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repubHcan, as a hortatory word in the Hberal lexicon. Our appraisal
of this formulation «ill be guided by these questions: How are
MoConnell and Lowi correct in their interpretation in suggesting the
distorted nature of much of contemporary participation? And, why, In
ter^s of their strategy for realizing a set of wider, public interests,
are they mistaken that participation cannot be a valued goal in an ad-
vanced industrial society that aspires to be democratic?
Ill
The Theory of Interest Group Liberalism
The contemporary liberal's model of power portrays a system of
relatively harmonious social equilibrium maintained by the integrating
process of the voluntary association and by the process of negotiation,
compromise, and bargaining that occurs in the political arena between
economic, social, and political groups. The function of the state is
the mediation of the conflicting sets of claims that emerge before its
agencies. Out of this process policy reflective of the general interest
is expected to issue. And, the individual, as J. S. Mill would say, is
left a realjn of freedom of action so long as it does not harm others.
Social problems of a wide variety—the racial disturbances of the
1960's, as well as other issues of equity, the difficulties of obtaining
regulatory policy in areas such as pollution that would serve the widest
public interest, increasingly technocratic institutions of learrdng just
suggest a few of them
—
give rise to McConnell's and Lowi's suspicions
that the proper function of the state has not been realized. Properly,
they suggested, against the liberal's "public philosophy," there was a
crisis of legitimacy, a crisis of public authority.
"Interest-group liberalism" is the liberals post-1937 ideology for
accounting to the public the actions of government. As Lovd formulates
it:
It may be called liberalism because it expects to use
goverrjnent in a positive and expansive role, it is
motivated by the highest sentiments, and it possesses
strong faith that what is good for government is good
for the society. It is "interest-group liberalism"
because it sees as both necessary and good that the
policy agenda and the public interest be defined in
terms of the organized interests in society.^
n
Ibid, p. 71.
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The main consequence of the historical developments that crystallized in
the New Deal was the delegation of power, the exercise of governmental
power by what might otherwise be considered private groups, and, con-
comittantly, government's incapacity to achieve justice/ This delega-
tion of power takes many forms->for instance, increased Congressional
reliance on administrative departments' discretion, the increasing use
of the executive agreement and executive order, and in the regulatory
commissions, where there was little other directive than the admonition
to follow the "public interest," McConnell suggests, the commissioners
were "forced into a search for accommodation, and accommodation shifted
6
imperceptivly into corruption."
McConnell and Lowi are clearly stressing the shifting of the general
rule-making function out of the hands of duly elected and appointed bodies
into private and quasi-private associations in the society. So, while
they are rejecting the characterization of the group process as described
and appreciated by the pluralists, they also do not embrace the portrayal
provided in the "power elite" model of C. Wright Mills, for instance,
5
McConnell' s normative concept is "the public interest j" Lowi's
is "justice." In The End of Liberalism Lowi has a passage that suggests
the nature of the ideal they hope to approach: "Considerations of the
justice in or achieved by an action cannot be made unless a deliberate
and conscious attempt was made by the actor to derive his action from a
general rule or moral principle governing such a class of acts. One can
speak personally of good rules and bad rules, but a homily or a sentiment,
like liberal legislation, is not a rule at all. The best rule is one
which is relevant to the decision or action in question and is general in
the sense that those involved with it have no direct control over its
operation. A general rule is, hence, a priori ." p. 290,
6
Private Power and American Democracy, p. 50.
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either. For, that model is stressing the combination of interests that
occurs between top economic and top political decision-makers, a combin-
ation which constitutes a class consciousness/ For McConnell and Lowi
the accent is placed on the diffusion of power that has occurred in the
political process. The function of government has come to be the provi-
sion of system maintenance for the organized groups in society rather
8
than for the society at large.
How, according to this interpretation, did the distinction between
the public and the private spheres of authority become blurred? The
answer may be suggested in the following brief sketch.
By the end of the nineteenth century the historical forces of
industrialization and urbanization had bureaucratized and rationalized
most types of organizations, the state being only one among many of themj
and neither was it, given the realities of capitalism and the laissez-faire
7
While the power elite model is considered more correct than the
pluralist version in that it recognizes not all coalitions are equivalent,
Lowi finds the power elite model unacceptable because it "wrongly assumes
a simple relation between status and power." According to Lowi, both the
social stratification school and the power elite school "mistake the
resources of power for power itself, and escape the analytic and empir-
ical problems by the route of definition." See "American Business, Public
Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory," World Politics
, 16 (July
196Ij):679. And, see McConnell 's Private Power and American Democracy
,
chap. 10, esp. pp. 337-338. Lowi, and McConnell, prefer the model of
power characterized in the work of E. E. Schattschneider, which was
erroneously received as a pluralist account. "His political arena was
decentralized and multi-centered, but relationships among participants
were based upon 'mutual non-interference' among uncommon interests.
The 'power structure' was stabilized toward the 'coramand posts '..., not
because the officials were above pressure groups, but because the pattern
of access led to supportive relations between pressure groups and
officials." p. 680.
8
Lowi uses this formulation to characterize the main theme of his
study, The Politics of Disorder (New York: Basic Books, 1971).
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ethos, the most advanced in that direction. The process, in Lewi's
account, did not follow the Marxist theory of a revolutionary stratifi-
cation along class lines but rather evolved in the direction "where the
addition and mu3.tiplication of classes tendsto wipe out the very notion
of class stratification." This is McConnell's point as well. Lowi
makes two observations: (l) That in the modern pluralist systems, modern
developments have brought about a discontinuity between that which is
socioeconomic and that which is political, and (2) that in a pluralist
society there is always a discontinuity between politics and government."'''^
It might be helpful, for the purposes of future argument to see that this
interpretation has placed emphasis on the multiplicity and diversity of
interests developing in huraan society. It is a conception of interests
which has connections to the existing modes of production and consump-
tion and, yet, is also tied to claims for universal values—liberty,
12
justice, morality.
McConiiell's account is useful in providing a history of some of the
9
End of Liberalism
, pp. 33-Ul.
10
Ibid., p. ii2.
11
Ibid., pp. i;5, U8.
12
I draw this conclusion from McConnell's own characterization:
"Another difficulty derives from the fact that no individual has a
single interest, opinion, or characteristic. He may have a very clear
and dominant interest as a producer, but he will inevitably also be a
consumer. He may also be a Catholic, a fisherman, and a stamp collector.
Inescapably, people differ in many ways and there are many dimensions of
social difference." Private Power and American Democracy
,
p. 101. See
also Kettler's comparison of Lowi to Hegel on this point, "Beyond
Republicanism," pp. h9-50.
115
ideas instrumental in defending the evolving group process. McConnell,
for one, attributed significant responsibility to the Progressive move-
ment's response. One of the irom.es of American politics, for him, was
that the most viable political movement to attack the corruptions of
private power turned out to be a "justification and acceptance of the
ends it set out to destroy." The Progressives took the power out of
politics (in their non-partisan reforms, for instance), and they unifittingly
failed to question the power of private groups and the use of power in the
decentralized political locale. Furthermore, they lent an assist to the
creation of administering agencies which were unguided by any clear
standards of the public interest.
The accretion of public power by the private sphere was supported
and defended in many ways. Business 's main doctrine against the concen-
tration of governmental power banked on the model of cooperation between
government and corporation worked out during the war and under the theory
of administrative decentralization of Herbert Hoover; it took the forms
of voluntary cooperation, voluntary self-regulation, and the idea of the
lU
trusteeship. Agriculture found rationalizations for the decentralized
structure that evolved out of the farm bureau movement by appealing to
the long-standing, and rhapsodized Jeffersonian tradition that identified
IS
the small, local political unit with democracy. Labor>" anti-statist and
seeking its own economic autonomy, appealed to the slogan, coined by
16
Gompers, of "voluntarism." A shared attitude to government was common
13
Private Power and American Democracy
, p. 32.
11;
Ibid., pp. 50-70.
15
Ibid., pp. 70-79.
16
Ibid., pp. 79-88.
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to all these groups. It composed three doctrines. First, was "a very
loud and persistent appeal for liberty" (which was a view of liberty
represented as the absence of compulsion, mainly, by the state); secondly,
"a belief in small units of association as the essence of democracy," and
17thirdly, "a dislike of law and formal authority."
The historical perspective on the relationship between government and
private groups is brought up to date in Lowi's The End of Liberalism
. The
New Deal fixed the old conservative-liberal dialogue about positive govern-
ment by establishing the mechanism of politics by administration in 1937.
Rule of law gave way to rule by adraini.stration; legislation of integrity,
such as the Social Security Act of 1935, gave way to public policy by
non-law, such as the Economic Opportunities Act of 1961;, Issues of moral-
ity such as civil rights gave way to problems of equity and the legisla-
tion of payoffs. Formalism and impersonality, seeming to imply compulsion
and inflexibiUty to the "faint-hearted" liberal, gave way to discretion-
ary and arbitrary practices. The characteristic feature was the avoidance
of standards; the public interest, lacking precise and absolute criteria,
became little more than a cliche, and found easy ratification by a
political science profession made up of group theorists for whom value-
free science might even require the denial of a public interest.
The new public philosophy, "interest-group literalism," was bought
at a price. While it made the state an acceptable source of power and
justified positive government for the twentieth century, and while it
also helped to disprove the Marxian notion of solidarity of classes and
class dominated government, its costs ran high:
But the zeal of pluralism for the group and its belief
in a natural harmony of group conpetitiasi tended to
break down the very ethic of government by reducing
the essential conception of government t© nothing more
117
than another set of mere interest groups.-'-^
More than this group-view of the state was wrong about the pluralist
interpretation, however. McConnell and Lowi take issue on two points of
the characterization. First, their examination of the internal dyiiamics
of groups suggests that the small group was far from the essence of
democracy that was claimed for it. And secondly, they argued, in follow-
ing Schattschneider's analysis of the "scope of conflict," that the group
19
process is biased in favor of some groups and against others.
The common feature of the private association and the small unit of
government was its oligarchic character. Several points can make this
evident. For one thing, the case is not entirely clear that all individ-
uals are entirely free to join and leave an association as they will.
But even if they were, McConnell 's case suggests, the internal structure
is not likely to be such that it imposes no limits on the freedom of the
individual. Membership usually involves an homogeneity of interest and
belief. The internal systems of governance are not regulated by demo-
cratic principles or by a bill of individual rights, and, not only are
the private associations capable of in^osing a wide range of sanctions,
they are even able to "call down the action of public authority over which
they have established a strong degree of influence." The pressure for
conformi.ty reigns in the small group. Furthermore, the values that the
private association supports publicly are not always those associated
IS
The End of Liberalism
,
p. US,
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The following account draws mainly on McConnell' s discussion in
"The Public Values of the Private Association," in Pennock and Chapman,
eds.. Voluntary Associations: Nomos XI (New York: Atherton Press,
1969), "pp. ili7-l60. See also Private Power and American Democracy ,
chap. Sy and Lowi's Politics of Disorder , chap. 3.
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with liberty and are more likely opposed to it; they tend to be the
values of order and stability. Too frequently their orjy goal is the
achievement and protection of privilege.
In inter-group arrangements, some groups are favored by access to
particular resources or relationsliips. Others, completely unorganized,
stand in a noncompetitive position, and it is euphemistic to speak of
them as "potential interest groups," For instance, farm migrant workers,
Negroes, and the urban poor are not included in the celebrated pluralist
system. With each group geared for achieving its own particular partial
interests, group interaction tends to the realization of narrow-range
economic interests rather than the values which are preeminently public.
Thus, in the fragmented political system of virtually autonomous small
groups the values of clean water and air, the conservation of areas of
scenic beauty, and competent public education are unlikely to be empha-
sized. The group process, in the end, trades the values of stability and
order for limitations on liberty, equality, and numerous other public
values.
McConnell's charge is then that "organization of political life by
small constituencies tends to enforce conformity, to discriminate in favor
of elites, and to eliminate public values from effective political con-
20
sideration." The republican interpretation, therefore, maintains that
how the nation is organized is exceedingly iiqjortant. The size of the
constituency matters:
Quite different results may be obtained with the same
distribution of interests depending on whether the
context they are placed in is centralized or decentra-
lized. ^1
20
Private Power and American Democracy
,
p. 6*
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Ibid., pp. 91-92.
119
If the causes of faction cannot be removed, one must address the effect
of faction. Madison's solution of centralizing power in a national con-
stituency would provide^the basis for an answer. It was "very simply,
large political units." Diversity of interests in the large consti-
tuency is what makes possible the achievement of the wider, more diffuse
23
and abstract public values.
The argument rests on its peculiar conception of "interests," which
assumes that any aggregate of individuals will seek to achieve, in the
most economical way, its self-interest. The argument is developed in
Mancur Olsen's The Logic of Collective Action and assumes a mathematical
model. There is a sense in which a functional interest in a small and
familiar setting is able to secure any and all of the social and political
forces necessary for its own dominance. As the conditions are altered by
the increase in numbers of competing interests—the shift from a condition
of homogeneity to heterogeneity of interests, the tendency (which might
be represented as a "law of interests") is for the more general, abstract,
2U
and diffuse interests to prevail. The argument rests on a view, un-
supported by the evidence of the American political process, that the
22
Madison's is regarded by McConnell as "the most illuminating
treatment of the problem we have." Ibid,, p. 103. An excellent logical
and theoretical critique of the Madisonian model is provided by George D,
Beam, Usual Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), chap. h.
23
Private Power and American Democracy
, pp. lOU-lO?.
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The principle is axiomatic for McConnell and Lowi. In responding
to Dahl's argument against Madison on this point, McConnell argues that
DaJril "passes over the great differences among the values served by
majorities drawn from constituencies of different sizes." Private Power
and American Democracy , Note 18, p. 397. He concedes, however, that
there may be no way to demonstrate the claim that large constituencies
will lead to "better" majorities—at least, for determined skeptics.
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decisions reached in the large unit can escape the forces that act on
the small ones, that "size" is the crucial variable. The conception of
interests that ties McConnell andW to the large constituency finds,
then, at best, only superficial correspondence with Rousseau's notion of
the General Will as I have characterized its conditions and features.
For, what is important to Rousseau is the effort to form good moral
character by all directly sharing in the processes of deliberation; for
McConnell and Lowi how character is to be nurtured is beside the point.
Tracing out the logic of their position, McConnell and Lowi (and
Schattschneider) recommend in their poUtical strategy attention to the
expansion of the political arena and to the distinct separation of the
public order from the private. The specific objective is to encourage
the important rule-making authority to be centralized in the largest
political ujiit—namely the national level of government. Especially
important would be the reassertion of the powers of Congress, albeit its
"localist" aspect, and the proper functions of the President. At the
time of his writing, McConnell seemed to advocate this strengthening of
the President as a valid and useful trend: "The constituency of this
majestic office is all the people. The prestige of its occupant is so
great that when his power is husbanded and skillfully used he can make
innovations of policy in the interest of those who are outside the
25
pluralist scheme of rule." With the escalation of the Vietnam War a
few years later Lowi expressed some reservations. Also, the work of the
Supreme Court, as best exemplified in the 1935 Schechter rule that
Private Power and American Democracy
, p. 351. And see his The
Modern Presidency (New York; St. Martin's Press, 196 ).
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abrogated Executive powers in regulation, is regarded as fulfilling the
requirement of the rule of law. McConnell would have us believe that
26
Its constituency is the whole nation. Return to the original constitu-
tional principles may necessitate a strengthening of the unplanned for
party system, as the process by which to determine the legitimate regime.
The state governiaents are viewed as important loci of governmental powers
in some particular, functional areas. But, as the federal arrangements
of the U. S. Constitution provide, there is and should be no rule-making
27
authority for local units of government, cities, or towns.
Lowi's phrase "juridical democracy" is only another way of speaking
for the same shared political objectives. His paradigm of "juridical
democracy" would call for the implementation of the following proposals:
(l) The restoration of the rxae of law, which would regard statutory law
as the essence of government; (2) the establishment of rule of law by
administrative formal:.ty; (3) the development of a truly independent and
integrated administrative class, a Senior Civil Service; (U) the restora-
tion of regional (state) government; (5) the replacement of subsidy-type
policies with "genuine" fiscal policies; and (6) to insure an organic
28
constitution, adoption of a tenure of statutes act. Implementation of
juridical democracy must rest on the persuasiveness of the republicans'
appeal to "fit" men and women to seek public office and the exhortation
to Congressmen and women and other public officials to following a priori
rules
.
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The Constitutional Republican Account of Participation
as a
The constitutional republicans' dismissal of the small unit
setting for citizen participation is involved with their projection of
public virtue onto the large constituency. The dismissal of the small
unit upon wlxich this projection rests, cannot be viewed, however, as
logically and theoretically required. I shall try to show the particular
formulation of the problem of decentralization and what participation comes
to mean for the interpretation of McConnell and Lowi in order to suggest
some of the difficulties vath it.
Both McConnell 's and Lowi's attention is focused on the meaning, for
the legitimacy of public policy, of the devolution of public power: (1)
To the local political unit and its subunits, (2) to the quasi-public
units such as the regulatory agencies, and (2) to the private association
such as the trade association and the trade union which are characterized
by their intimate connections to public officials and agencies. Their
focus, then, is on the structure and ideology of "decentralization;" it
is not specifically or directly a theory of citizen participation.
Indeed, following the defeat of the 1972 Democratic Presidential candidate,
Lowi argues the case for "abstentionisin,"
To the constitutional republicans the urge to decentralize can be
discovered in divergent sources. One of the main forces, however, has
been the historical yet mythical association between the small agrarian
unit and democracy. There is "a conception of the small geographic
29
community as the repository of social virtue," For McConnell, but Lowi
29
Private Power and American Democracy, p. 93
•
123
can be seen to share the view as well, the connection is more an idealized
one than a closely examined consideration:
The view of the small community as the natural home offreedom has been much more a direct perception than a
general theory. If the community is autonomous, it is
free; self-government itself is freedom—this has been
the equation seen by small communities and new nations
for most of history and asserted today as vigorously
as ever (and almost invariably without elaboration),
as though a self-evident truth. 30
The claims made on behalf of increased participation in various local
settings, governmental or non-governmental, are from McConnell's and
Lowi's standpoint, to be viewed as ideological or misconceived or both.
Their targets are not, unfortunately, very clearly identified; but they
do single out the positions of the liberal-pluralists, the New Left, and
the Guild Socialists. Perceiving these models as more approximate to
attitudes than well-reasoned theoretical conceptions, both McConnell and
Lowi fail to treat seriously some of the more important claims made for
participation by them. This failure, for instance, leads them to liken
indiscriminately the Rousseauist claim to citizen participation with
other sorts of claims for' decentralization. All of the following are
equated: Pluralism, countervailing power, creative federalism, partner-
ship, maximum feasible participation, grassroots democracy, participatory
31
democracy. They are all equated, because they are all regarded as
slogans. For the real meaning of participation is taken to be "politics
behind closed doors," "politics in smoke-filled rooms." Those would be
30
Ibid., pp. 72, 9h.
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, pp. 8^, 95, 293 J Private Power and American
Democracy
,
p. 122.
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the paradigmatic cases of participation for McConnell and Lowi.
We can see from the foregoing that this interpretation seeks to
circumscribe the role for participation in various localized settings in
a democratic society: In local government, in the neighborhood, in the
town meeting, in trade associations, in the union, at the workplace. The
republican interpretation rests on discrediting local participation by
claiming to demonstrate the political effects of decentralization: That
32
some elements of the public get "shut out." For, the goal is to shove
the whole process of the formulation, discussion, and deliberation of
policy affecting the public to the one overriding constituency—the
national government. What role is left for the citizen is more con-
strained then that espoused by the pluralist or that recommended by the
radical-liberal. The role of the citizen would seem to be that of be-
coming involved in the party nominating and election processes which have
as their function the establishment of a legitimate regime—for the state
or for the nation. The limits of citizen involvement in the McConnell-
Lowi scheme, however, I cannot find anywhere suggested. It would seem,
probably, to be quite limited to the determination of representatives
if the programmatic function of the party is as circumscribed as it
33
appears to be for Lowi. This view may have changed in recent years.
32
End of Liberalism
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From my reading of the following article I do not gather that
Lowi looks too favorably upon the programmatic-responsible party model
of many European systems and seems to find acceptable the contemporary
American party pattern. He concludes his essay: "The United States
possesses as many of the conditions of instability or of mobilization
as France and Germany do, but with the major difference that our
irresponsible parties have jaanaged to keep legitimac/ and policy
separated. This is a peculiar but important type of differentiation.
Given the contemporary world tendency for legitimacy to become inter-
twined with policies and for constitutions to fall over issues, it is
remarkable that American parties manage to maintain this particular kind
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Lowi seems to read the defeat of the 1972 Democratic Presidential candi-
date as confirmation of the impossibility of citizen politics; what began
as an issue-campaign ended by merely seeking, under the guile of the
pollsters, conquest. Lowi's conclusion was that the m.ilitant commitment
to conventional politics proved as useless as earlier forms of protest
against the establishment. Perhaps, he recommends, the only untried
route is "abstentionism" or actual participation by refusing, on publicly
expressed principle, to participate. Abstentionism would withhold from
the politicians much needed public consent.
A brief review of several selected cases may show in closer detail
the structure of participation that McConnell and Lo;vl perceive occurring
in the decentralized setting. The four I have selected seem to indicate
that McConnell and Lorn, have addressed themselves to a wide range of sit-
uations for which participation has been sought and given shape but not
the widest possible range.
1. Participation in the Urban Setting: One of the most important
concerns to students of public policy must be the complex pathology of
America's metropolitan areas and the seeming inability of government
—
national, state or local—to deal with it in any satisfactory degree.
No Presidential explanation has grappled with the most crucial fact of
the problem—that in reacting to the urban area's problems government
of differentiation at all. The salient fact is that they do, "Party,
Policy, and Constitution in America," in Chambers and Burnham, eds,.
The American Party Systems - Stages of Political Development (New York:
Oxford, 1967), p. 27^
3h
Theodore J. Lowi, "A 'Critical' Election Misfires," Nation
,
December 18, 1972.
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imdertook to find solutions by political subdivision. From the 1930-
s
onward most metropolitan areas were parceled so that the true socio-
economic entity of New York or Chicago, which the older method of
annexation allowed, is not even sustained as a legal fiction. To the
point, Lowi notes Robert Wood's study of New York's l,iiOO governments.
"Fear found a means, through government ," according to Lowi, "to divide
the individible unit into an incapacitated marketplace of publics. There
35
are now many publics, but there is no polity." The stratification of
society was legally sanctioned by establishing the independent constitu-
encies of various socio-economic groups. The political expediency of
subdivision, for festering social conflicts could be more easily avoided
and suppressed in this way, made possible and achieved all too frequently
abandonment of the city's gravest human problems, while its physical
structure was used by day but not maintained except in the barest ways.
The mayor, not even empowered to control his own tax base and budget,
under the interest-group process was caught up in the process of bar-
gaining which was unguided by any principle or standard. The mayor's
political base was so carved up in terms of bureaucratic fiefdoms that
Lowi suggests they are best characterized as "islands of functional
power," sanctioned and sustained by federal law and practice. The
arrangement, obviously, negates any possibility of coordinated and
comprehensive, long-term programming that would adequately address the
city's needs. Lowi and McConnell are so opposed to the results of these
enclaves of localized powers that they would abrogate citizenship at the
local level altogether (i.e., the election of local public officials).
35
End of Liberalism, p. 197.
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2. Maximum Feasible Participation: The War on Poverty program was
an expression of interest>group liberalism par excellence. Delegation of
power was the order of the day in this statute. To the extent the statute
is end-oriented, its dj.rectives are better viewed as sentiments than
specific standards. It was process-oriented non-law. Several problems
are identified from the formulation of this program: (l) A system of
justice, under which poverty appears randomly but apparently not, less
frequently cannot be achieved by programs that merely indemnify the poor.
For, the cause of poverty is not poverty but the injustices caused by
racism. (2) The dominant interests continue their dominance. In New York
City where politics was originally fragmented, the participation-clause
furthered the structure of fragmentation; in Chicago, where power was
already controlled by a machine, it was further consolidated. (3) The
programs were paternalistic. (U) This was a paternalism, furthermore,
that demoralized, because it deprived "the disappointed something to
shoot against," it "took the heat off" the real moral issues. (5) Official
recognition of some groups and representatives tended to mitigate the
emergence of others. (6) The program in its totality of ineffectualness
36
encouraged a cynicism toward public objects.
3. Community Control of the Schools: For Lowi as for many others,
public education is probably the most crucial opportunity by which the
structure of racism can be destroyed. Yet, the public school has
succumbed to interest-group liberalism as well. By the manner in which
36
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they are districted and controlled, in flagrant disregard for any publicly
meaningful scheme, schools have become the proprietary rights of various
contending groups-parents, PTA-s, the uni.ons, professional educators, and
so forth, until finally the black separatists too sought to establish
their claims. For Lowi, the separatists have no more superior claim,
because of their suffering, to establishing a private system of education
than the other groups that press weak and illegal reasons to fight off
integration through busing experjjaents. Not community control of public
school education but "public" control is what is needed; schools are not
37
the proper domain of cities.
h» Participation in Trade Associations: One of the well-touted
claims of interest-group liberals, according to Lowi, is their contention
that the trade association be treated as a form of interest group, that
it could be regarded as "merely a means of efficient representation of
38
certain economic interests." This view could not be further from the
truth in the republican analysis; as suggested above, both McConnell and
Lowi are skeptical of the presumption for democratic procedures internally
and their service to democratic values in general. And not only trade
associations but a multitude of others should be regarded in the same way.
Many of these, for instance, the government has established itself or
become dependent upon for information, regulation, and administrative
services. Lowi suggests that this relationship leads to the favoring of
some groups over others: "Decentralization through delegation of power
37
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to lower levels aLnost always results in unequal access and group domin-
ation of the public situation.
. .
. Formal recognition of groups and their
representatives for purposes of such participatory democracy convBrts
each group so honored into an official component of government. Such
recognition converts what is already an oligarchic situation into an
39
involuntary situation," Lowi is lead to the conclusion that the situ-
ation is little different between a Chicago gang called the Blackstone
Rangers which forces teenagers to become members and the community
organizer who will say, "Join onr organization or you vri.ll have very
little say in community policy-making."
The central criticism of the McConnell-Lowi interpretation is the
inability of decentralization, in the forms that they review, to achieve
"justice," but the concept of distributive justice they recommend is not
very clear. The four illustrations are tied together by a demonstration
of participation as a group process which gives more weight to some than
others in the formation of policy decisions and which does not encompass
all the persons affected by the decisions. And, this is an important
and compelling complaint. In all cases participation has become an
incantation, a halo word, a hortatory word^ the slogan is substituted
for programs firmly defined by legal and moral criteria and vigorously
executed by authorized use of power. The shared point in these illu-
strations is that when public authority is widely and irregularly
dispersed, two purposes are in evidence: The first, the hope to avoid
the problems of law and, secondly, the effort merely to ameliorate
conditions, not rout them out.
39
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McConnell and Lowi, therefore, are undoubtedly correct, at least in
terms of their cases, as identifying some forms of participation as coop-
tive. Neither the radical-liberal, Bachrach, nor a radical like Tom
Hayden or Herbert Marcuse, would disagree. Hayden's article, "Welfare
Liberalism and Social Change," for instance, may more dramatically and
closely portray the situation from the point of view of the poor, but
the indictment remains the same: The poverty program seeks to be a
substitute parent more than a meal ticket, an agency of socialization
more than of welfare; the definition of objectives is middle class;
control is by elites; the Southern black movement is more liberating
with real legal targets to fight than the liberal Negro machine of the
ho
North.
But Hayden is also aware of some other features that the constitu-
tional republican interpretation fails to take into account. The point
about "cooptive" participation is that certain features are present
that may lend the appearance of participation but others, which would
give it a reality fitting the classical model, are not. The key feature
is the pattern of authority relations between the participants; in the
cooptive situation it is a vertical one; the class-c model suggests only
under conditions of mutual respect and autonoiiQr, which requires not only
political equality but social equality as well, can the individual be
expected to act morally. Thus, "citizen participation" as a bureaucratic
ideology is intended to increase the acceptability of the agency's action
to the influenced public. As Krause shows with two examples, participation
Co—
Tom Hayden, "Welfare Liberalism and Social Change," in Gettleman
and Mermelstein, eds., The Great Society Reader (New York: Vintage, 1967),
pp. I;?6-^01.
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is directed at target groups. When the proponent is the local urban
renewal agency, the primary clientele group is the irdddle and upper class
and the primary target of the ideology is the poor neighborhood and its
residents. In the community action program, the clientele and the
target group are the same. Where cooperation is obtained, or in the case
of the urban renewal agency, the benefits more frequently accrued to the
clientele group than the poor. When the situation was conflict-ridden,
as in the case of the CAP agency, federal offices put pressure on the
agency to "cool it," using the leverage from appropriations.^"^
McConnell and Lowi fail to suggest any distinction between such
features, while the radical case must, for those other features may be
theoretically, if not politically, possible. The radical-liberal and
the radical want to make them politically achievable. McConnell' s and
Lowi's interpretation is helpful in showing the conditions of a cooptive
or manipulative participation, but they overgeneralize from their cases
to suggest that participation in any local setting is not conducive to
the public interest and social justice.
Hi
Elliott A. Krause, "Functions of a Bureaucratic Ideology: 'Citizen
Participation,'" Social Problems
, 16 (1968) :136-llil. Krause's conclusion
is; "Thus the citizen participation ideology, from the point of view
of the target group, is an irrelevant or empty phraseology. From the
functional point of view, it appears in most cases to be either detri-
mental to or ineffective for the target group, if they accept it or act
on it, in the present social context." p. liil.
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A Critical Assessment
The critique of the McConnell-Lovi interpretation and their account
of participation would be facilitated if some of the key features of their
model of politics, in which their concept of participation may be seen to
be embedded, is suiriinarized. The folWng points, I hope, will be found
suggestive:
1. The lack of participation (as, for instance, measured even
minimally by voting turnout, roll-off, and drop-off) is not considered
a problem for the McConnell-Lovri. interpretation. They do not ask, What
will encourage more people to engage intelligently in the electoral
processes? Or even, V/ho participates? Who does not participate? Why?
For them, it is the call to participation, even when it would encourage
excluded groups to translate troubles into public issues, that is ques-
tioned and challenged,
2. Their political model appears to accept public apathy and other
anomic featuires of a mass, technocratic society. The concept of man
that McConnell and Lowi adopt is the least explicitly reasoned aspect
of their perspective. If, as seems the case, they have assimilated the
view of man shared by Madison, Schumpeter, and Lippman, theirs is a
conception of "abstract individualism." Lukes offers a helpful charac-
terization of this view:
According to this conception, individuals are pictured
abstractly as given, with given interests, wants, purposes,
needs, etc.; while society and the state are pictured as
sets of actual or possible social arrangements which re-
spond more or less adequately to those individuals' re-
quirements. Social and political rules and institutions
are, on this view, regarded collectively as an artifice,
a modifiable instrument, a means of fulfilling independently
133
given individual objectives; the means and the end aredistinct. The crucial point about this conception is thatthe relevant features of individuals determining the ends
which social arrangements are held (actually or ideally)
to fulfill, whether these features are called instincts,
faculties, needs, desires, rights, etc., are assumed asgiven, independently of a social context. This givenness
of fixed and invariant human psychological features leads
to an abstract conception of the individual who is seen
as merely the bearer of those features, which determine
his behaviour, and specify his interests, needs and rights. ^2
This view of man, and the epistemology to which it is connected, should
be regarded as a perspectival choice which precludes examining the
possibility of participation in local settings, when reformed, for
achieving the values they seek.
3. "Politics" is defined narrowly as an activity engaged in by
officially elected representatives. There is a sense in which the con-
stitutional republican analysis, I feel, envisions that society's cor-
porate associations can be "cleansed" of their "political" influence,
h, McConnell and Lowi share with Hayek the view that the State
and the people are separate and distinct entities. This is a view that
stands in opposition to the theory of sovereignty of Rousseau, which
rejects the unnatural bifurcation of an individual into two beings, a
man and a citizen.
5« The State must stand somewhere above any of the corporate
associations in the society and regulate the terms in which those
associations operate.
6. The State can reasonably be expected to assume a moral intent
when it acts.
C2
Steven Lukes, Individualism (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973),
p. 73.
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7. There is a role for the citizen. Civic duty involves the
necessary involvement in the party processes to nominate and select
worthy representatives in the federal system. This version of citizen-
ship would seem to emphasize the side of obligation to obey the civic
order, to fulfill such civic roles of sacrifice as are demanded, for
instance, in time of war.
8. Political education is the work of a central authority, the
State, and not of diverse social groups that are narrowly directed by
their self-interests. Lowi's image is not of "mass education" but of
a national educational system as the only possible system that could
achieve the universal values of justice that he is committed to; he
expresses it as "the gigantic task of reeducation toward the universa-
lization of the values concerning the human relations of Americans."
Can we accept the explanatory theory of McConnel and Lowi? Con-
temporary republicanism begins by attacking the rationale by which the
pluralist ideologists claim the political process follows and which
McConnell and Lowi also take to be the reality of that process. While
McConnell and Lowi are somewhat equivocal on this point, it would seem
to be pertinent to suggest that they reject a Marxist definition of
"ideology," as a justification for a practice which may in some important
ways distort the reality of the process. Lowi sees interest-group liber-
alism more as faulty rationalization than as a smokescreen behind which
economic and political interests can collaborate.
I think it is important to pose the question,, however, the extent
to which the ideology of the group process adequately represents the
113
Kettler's essay "Beyond Republicanism" has been very helpful to
me in drafting this swrimary. The quote is from Lowi's End of Liberalism ,-
p. 269.
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use of power in the American system. Are McConnell and Lowi correct
that political and legitimate power is diffuse—in other words, that
C. Wright Mills is fundamentally wi-ong and not merely in error in minor
ways? I want to argue the position that McConnell and Lowi are only
half correct in their view of the distribution of power. The lines of
conflict may not be dravm around two integrated and opposing classes,
but it is not very correct to say that the lines around which interests
are formed are not coordinated at all. If this is the case, it does not
make too much sense to draw the centralization-decentralization dichotomy.
One way to suggest the nature of this argument is by reexamining
their selection of case studies. To what extent do their cases mirror
the important cases of power? Their examples are national farm, labor
and business policy; the problems of state and local government; vrelfare
policy; and to a lesser extent the conduct of foreign policy. They fail
to examine two policy areas in which the central government, and mainly
the President, has increasingly expanded the use of its authority. In
economic matters, the President has exercised executive powers to effect
the economy in crucial ways, which often puts the U. S. Government in a
favored position; these have been powers used to go off the gold standard;
to do deficit-spending; to control, through the Council of Economic
Advisors and Treasury Department, monetary flow; to compete with private
banks; and with the assistance of Congress to fail to develop a satis-
factory and equitable progressive tax structure. And in the other area,
the filling of elite positions, the game of musical chairs between top
decision-makers of the Pentagon and the defense industry, as well as the
military's commanding share of the national budget, and its role in
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in propaganda, seem to me compelling reasons to suggest that centralized
tendencies, in which political and economic interests converge, not de-
centraUzing tendencies, give the determinate character to the American
hk
political scene.
Within this framework, why cannot an insufficient, decentralized
welfare program be seen as the minimal cost necessary to buy off dissent
in order to continue the g eneral scheme of things? To this extent,
McConnell and Lowi may be correct. What is suggested by their cases is
that groups with particularist claims can be deferred to when their claims
do not conflict with the broad governing principle, the established and
secured consensus. Such groups can even be useful in reproducing it.
McConnell and Lowi may even be correct that some economic associations
exert more political influence than the national government itself j such
seems to be the development of the multi-national corporation in the past
twenty years. Finally, McConnell and Lowi' may be correct that participation
in the local setting will never, as a structure of power, break the lock-
hold these associations have.
But, there are also other forces of centralization in society to
which McConnell and Lowi never attribute significance. These are the
forces involved in the creation and reproduction of power relations in
society. The only target is the "small group," of which no analytic dis-
tinctions are made. In sum, Lowi may have swallowed too much of the
liberal ideology in failing to characterize for himself the consequences
—
for the life of the individual, for the shape of the internal and external
IT
Here I am drawing on the work, generally, of John Kenneth Galbraith,
Economics and the Public Purpose (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).
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relations of groups; for the chance of a principles legal system-of
these system-wide forces for conformity, of these other "socializing
forces." In the same way, they neglect the political parties as a
factor in the integration into a narrow political consensus.
Is there evidence to confute the generalization McConnell and Lowi
make that all groups, as a matter of sociological tendency, lead to un-
just, and, therefore, illegitimate political effects? Again, their
cases do not examine those where the merits of participation are upheld.
They select the weakest cases, overlooking the developed cases for neigh-
borhood control, community control, workers'; councils, as well as other
similar experiments. They suggest some of the groups (e.g., League of
Women Voters) are public-interest oriented, but these get lost in the
shuffle (both in reality and in their theory). McConnell and Lowi con-
flate the "synthetic" group of industrial sociology with the town meeting
and the Quaker meeting, not reaD-izing that the conditions and the results
may be quite different. There is no attention to the effect partici-
pation in small settings may have for the development of the human per-
sonality.
U5
Such proposals are worked out, for instance, in the writings of
Milton Kotler, Marilyn Gittell, and Andre Gorz among many others. Lowi's
heedless attitude is reflected, for instance, in this statement which fails
to credit the New Left, a cicumlocution which avoids identifying anyone,
with any coherent theoretical statements: "The renewed and intensified
cries for decentralization in the past decade—this time by the senti-
mental left rather than the right
—
provides further testimony to growing
distrust of duly constituted authorities. But they provide no construc-
tive direction for new uses of authority or new structures of authority."
End of Liberalism
,
p. 268. We might also note, incidentally, Lowi's con-
flation of the right and left has parallels in Hayeks' conflation of
fascism and socialism. F. A. Hayek, Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 19Uii), p. 113 and inter all.a .
ii6
See Private Power and American Democracy, pp. 9$-96.
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The social organizations of a society, hov^ever, are not abstract crea-
tions but mediating institutions between the society and the individual,
and this fact is not taken into account in the analysis. In this, they
are cultural formations, and as such they are transmutable. McConnell
and Lowi. uncautiously and unnecessarily dismiss all participation in
local settings. As Peter Bachrach contends: "There is no denying the
force of McConnell' s thesis that small units conducive to popular parti-
cipation are also vulnerable to elite manipulation and domination. How-
ever, this danger can be avoided, at least to a considerable degree, if
the membership of the small unit is not also horaop-eneous and congenial
to elite control."
In rushing (with Madison, who Beam argues had good reason to be
more concerned with political expediency than logical and conceptual
issues) to the judgment that only an indirect, representative process
will serve the interests of individual rights and liberties, McConnell and
Lowi hasten to sanctify the loss of the one element the opponents of the
Constitution were so fearful, and justifiably, of losing. This was a
Ct
—
Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, Aspects of Sociology
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), chap. IV, "The Group." This point of
view proposed that, "If one really wants to do justice to the raediative
character of the social formation which is contained in the term group,
then one cannot proceed from a concept of group which is unequivocally
fixed for all time." p. 65. And, "The relation of the individual to
society itself underlies these social dynamics." p. 66. They term many
of the newly differentiated groups as "synthetic" wnen "they are them-
selves planned from above, as cushions between the anonymous collectives
and the individual. Such types as company or factory associations belong
to this type...." p. 68.
U8
Peter Bachrach, "Corporate Authority and Democratic Theory," in
David Spitz, ed., Political Theory and Social Change (New York: Atherton,
1967), p. 269.
Bean, pp. 66-70. This theory is argued in Jackson Turner Main,
The Anti-Federalists - Critics of the Constitution, 1781-1788 (Chicago:
Quadrangle, 1961).
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loss which they sought to prevent through struggle and, finally achieved
only as a partial concession in the Bill of Rights. The claims for more
popular and local government failed, but they wanted the right of self-
detemination in matters that directly affected their lives (most
certainly, in economic matters) in the face of the growth of a propertied,
elite class with aristocratic pretensions.
To wliat extent is the contemporary republican interpretation anymore
concerned with the securing of individual liberty for all than was the
original doctrine? The grounds on which the argument rests is not very
compelling. As Lukes suggests for Hayek, there is a basis for suspicion:
"The prescription of economic individualism, while appealing to the
50
values of equality and liberty, in fact amounts to their denial." If
the pluralists were providing rationales for an indirect democratic
process in advanced industrial society, the contemporary constitutional
republicans took the next step, a regressive one, to seal its fate.
The role left for the individual in the constitutional republican
order where public and private realms were separate and distinct was
clearly minimal. McConnell's and Lowi's writings are poverty-stricken
as sociology. The theory remains formidably silent on the activities of
the individual and his relationship to the society at large. It lacks
50
Lukes, p. 15U. To this point, Hayek's claim on behalf of the Rule
If Law is revealing: "It cannot be denied that the Rule of Law produces
economic inequality—all that can be claimed for xt is that this in-
equality is not designed to affect particular people in a particular
way." Road to Serfdom
,
p. 79.
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the "sociological apperception," which "reveals society as irreducibly
constitutive of or built into the individual in crucial and profound
ways." The role viz-a-viz the state is essentially passive, resting
as it does on a theory of law which relegates claims on behalf of human
needs, purposes, and aspirations to the dumpheep of ideas in favor of an
^ P^^°^^ construct. (But that the notion of an a priori is closer to dated,
religious preconceptions would seem apparent to me.) Thus, in the case
studies we find it is not desirable to have blacks, poor, workers commun-
icate their needs and grievances to others within society's established
institutional arrangements. The paradox of the theory is that it is
52
acceptable for these claims to be asserted in social movements.
The difficulties of the interpretation on these points is traceable
to the republicans' abstract conception of the individual, a conception
which I regard as generally inappropriate and unfruitful for a contemporary
53
democratic theory. The notion of the dignity of man and the ideal
autonomy are missing from their account, for instance, Lowi, in persist-
ing to equate (erroneously) participatory democracy or community control
with interest-group liberalism fails to perceive the very important
grievances, the conditions of non-freedom, the powerlessness of sectors
51
Lukes, pp. 150-151.
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See, Politics of Disorder
,
shap. 2,
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Lukes provides two arguments for this conception's inadequacy:
"First, because it in fact forms the basis for a particular ideological
view of a certain sort of society and its social relations, and second,
because it represents a primitive and a- or pre-sociological view of
the nature of the individual." p. 152,
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of the population. As Dewey tried to put it in everyday language, only
the wearer knows where the shoe pinches.
Decentralization has several arguments to its advantage: (l) It can
allow the expression of suppressed needs, wants, and aspirations; (2) it
can afford opportunities to develop a capacity for defining these personal
troubles and translating them into public issues; (3) it can develop the
human capacities and the self-respect that only comes when an individual
acts as an agent in breaking out of his or her own alienating condition.
This capacity, this sense of autonomy, cannot be derived when others
claim to take on the task, especially when they may continue to be
part of the problem in other serious ways. As Philip Green suggests,
the answer to conflicts in decentralized units, such as were exhibited in
the New York School Strike of 1968, may be more decentralization, not
less. The presumption of this view is that there are some merits to
encouraging social and cultural diversity in face of arguments for
majoritarianism of a large constituency or against the centralization
recommended by some collectivist-socialist interpretations, Dewey again
is to the point: The problem of democracy is more democracy.
The critique of groups proposed by the republican interpretation of
McConnell and Lowi, then is only partially appropriate; it dramatizes one
feature correctly, the conformist nature of many group arrangements.
—
Philip Green, "Decentralization, Community Control, and Revolution:
Reflection on Ocean Hill- Brownsville," in Green and Levinson, eds..
Power and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science (New York:
Vintage, 1970), p. 270. He writes: "If initial efforts at decentraliza-
tion fail to eliminate all the problems of majority tyranny, then surely
we desire not less decentralization, but more."
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But, it is insensitive to another possible feature, the values it has for
promoting the development of the human personality and the positive
effects this may have on the society.
Once we realize this problem in the republican interpretation—
a
problem which is ultimately characterized as its lack of responsiveness
to human needs, wants, and aspirations, we are in a better position to
appraise its strategy for change. Agreeing that standards of justice,
principles governance, is an ideal to which a theory and practice of
politics should aspire, will the contemporary constitutional republican
version approach it any better than the older one did? There are several
reasons to suggest the ideal they aspire to cannot (and should not) be
achieved by the strategy they suggest.
Constitutional republicanism rests on a coercive principle, which
McConnell and Lowi admit to holding. All governance may require coercion,
but a political theory that does not examine it requires a great amount
of faith on the part of its adherents. This is just the price Lowi
would exact from us. The scope and extent of coercion and whether the
price is too high is not questioned in this interpretation; yet, it is
an important one, if some of the coercion (for some segments of the
society at any rate) is unnecessary, as Marcuse's conception of "surplus
repression" hypothesizes. That argument goes further than any other
to suggest that not only are groups conformist but the whole society is
repressive in ways that raise the issue of whether any social force can
be formed sufficient to countermand the existing structures of repression.
If any are, it will have to be directed at the very levels of human
consciousness; that is what any schema of social change must require.
Iii3
To yield to coercion at the apex of power but not at its lower
levels raises the prospect of some form of elite. Lowi concedes as
much, but the elite has to be more virtuous than the common lot. The
appeal runs on the judgments that another sort of democrat, a Rousseauan,
for instance, would not want to chance-the problems of responsiveness to
the public. What will induce elected officials, under all the pressures
of the present electoral proces?, to act more like statesmen than the
cunning politicians they seem to be? Wiat power will the citizenry have
over their leaders? The important point is that there is no energy-
principle to give the constitution new life (even if we concede that the
two hundred year old document and its separation of powers, checks and
balance principle is still viable, that the basis of representation
secured by the party system is fair, and that a tenure of statutes act
makes sense, which I am reluctant to do).
And there are many social forces working against its instauration,
suggesting the theory as a strategy of change will never succeed in
practice. Kettler shows the persuasive argument Marx lodged against
Hegel's model of the state, important features of which the republican
theory of state and law share. The nub of Marx's criticism rested on
the insight of an irresolvable contradiction in the constitutional
republican theory. According to Kettler, Marx argued
that the constitutional state portrayed by Hegel recognizes
genuine republican principles only when it is at war or in
crisis, and that the operating principles of that order
under normal conditions are the destructive principles of
greed and lust for power. 55
Central to understanding this criticism is the fallacious assumption that
^
"Beyond Republicanism," p. 60.
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the political state is and can be kept separate from the economic domain,
and this is an anachronistic principle that Lowi is as faithful to as
Hegel seemed to be. Lowi writes, for instance: "The juridical principle
can convert a consumer economy into a just society without altering in any
56
way the virtue of consumption or the freedom to consume." Two arguments
must be asserted against this sort of statement, which, depending on one's
viewpoint, could be seen as naive or as manipulative. First, from the
ecologists', it is evident that resources are not unlimited nor is the
earth's tolerance for wastes j while the society of the nineteenth century
might have been able to afford a wanton attitude towards its resources,
the present scale of populations and consumption of energy may not
find nature so obliging. A regulative principle here would be something
that the Lowi notion of "juridical democracy" does not seem to entail.
Secondly, the radical argument is that the capitalist and welfare-state
solutions badly distribute resources and wealth. Confronting social
inequalities, both material and linguistic (derived from class position),
and the productive structures to which they are tied, that create class
divisiveness is essential and ancillary to the just and free society.
Men and women are social beings; they are historically constituted. And,
old or new constitutional republican theory does not resolve the problems
of alienation arising in a commercial society, just as its contemporary
variant nowhere takes into account the massive pressures to conform
according to one's class and status position in the consumer society.
Kettler sets out the overriding contradiction Mars: perceived:
3^"
End of Liberalism, p. 312.
In the classical langiiage so important to Marx and to the
republican tradition out of which he sprang, it may be
said that he came to deny the possibility of a political
sphere removed from and superceding the economic relations—
those of the household between master and slave, and those
generated by that all-pervasive economic preoccupation which
Aristotle himself had called ciirematistik and considered
antithetical to the formation of a genuine polis. Marx's
constant reference to slavery should not be seen as hyper-
bole: it expresses his conviction that the normal operation
of economic life has everywhere required that some men at
least meet the conditions which define a slave for Aristotle:
they are by their nature (i.e., their social destiny, for
Marx) not their own man, but another's; although men, they
are ai-ticles of property, which means that they are instru-
ments intended for the purpose of action. They do not
project; they do not shape their lives j they are resources
in the plans of others. If the realm characterized by these
relationships dominates the formally political realm, then
the promises and strategies of the republican constitutional
tradition must be adjudged irrelevant, on the authority of
its founder, Aristotle .57
Against McConnell and Lowi--yet appreciating their importance for drawing
out some of the hypocrisy of induced or synthetic participation, I believe
it can be concluded that their strategy by no means promises the sought
for social change.
The contemporary variant updates the classical constitutional
republican interpretation in interesting ways, but it fails short of
being a root explanation of the crisis of authority in the American
system, because it is a narrowly political and legalistic approach to
problems which may be deeper and sociological. Both fail to appreciate
the important connection between social equality and political equality,
and this is where they misconstrue the grounds of the radical case the
most. Those whose effort it is to promote participation in its classic
sense are not seeking to encourage mere political activism but to develop
57
"Beyond Republicanism," p. 66
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a style of moral action, a fomation of a moral consensus that can only
develop among equals. Participation in the formation of this law mil
make it less alien and more likely to be respected when it conflicts
directly with one's personal interests. The view is expressed by R. P.
Wolfe in his critique of J
.
S. Mill's utilitarian view of liberty:
Insofar as our enterprises are inherently social, the
public-private, interference-noninterference mode] of
human relations breaks dovrn. The central problem ceases
to be the regulation of each person's infringement on
the sphere of other person's actions, and becomes
instead the coordination of the several actions and
the choice of collective goals. 5°
But this is not totalitariarD.sm, should such a change be advanced.
The dilemmas of the republican interpretation are a matter of the
internal ordering of the perspective. The focus on the rule of law,
whether expressed as the "public interest" or "juridical democracy" and
v/hich was patterned after the model of Madison, DeTocqueville, and
Hayek, mitigated against any recognition of the distributive principle
at work in society and its effect of the quality of human life and,
thereby, on law. This set in motion an interpretation that, given its
premises is logical, but if we call them into doubt, find the account of
participation is weakened at several points, as is its strategy for
social change.
In advanced industrial society the individual is not an abstraction
apart from the social fabric, but a particular, historically specific
human being. Particularly, the individual is a member of many different
forms of hiiraan association. The moral character that is formed in this
process of interaction between social arrangements and personality is
—w~
Robert Paul Wolfe, Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press,
1968), p. 50.
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what must be called into view and critically examined and, if necessary,
prescriptions made towards a reestablishment of human relations along
other lines. Denying the human being's most basic social patterning to
talk, work, and Dive together-its political meaning would hardly seem the
way to begin this instauration. It would hardly seem desirable to deny
the rich mediatinr. functions that language, would seem to hold out, and
yet that is just what McConnell.and Lowi must do by limiting the settings
and features of democratic participation. Without attention to the
supporting conditions for the cognitive and affective and moral growth of
all members of society, only a few may enjoy those broader opportuni.ties
that a democracy can more abundantly afford.
li;8
Conclusion
The constitutional republicans in their interpretation of the
American political and social system offer a critical step forv;ard
towards the explication of a theory of participation. They have shown
us a facet in contemporary society to which the liberal-pluralists
appear to be insensitive: The set of conditions under which participa-
tion among political unequals is not and cannot be realized. By drawing
the contrasts between the promises of participation, the realities under
the present organization of wealth, power, and prestige, and the shabby
results for the public interest, McConnell and Lowi suggest that parti-
cipation and decentralization to which it has been linked are hortatory
words in the lexicon of the liberal ideology. Our thesis has been that
the constitutional republican interpretation is, therefore, useful in
showing the distortions that may accrue to any important t erm in the
vocabulary of democracy.
But ju^t because the conditions to which a meaningful participation
is connected have not been widely satisfied, this is not a sufficient
reason to suggest, as McConnell and Lowi do, that the possibility for
meaningful participation, and participation that will have a positive
effect for the realization of universal values, is invalidated or is
unwarranted. That the liberal-pluralist practice and ideology have
seemed to weaken the meaning and practice of participation in the fuller
classical sense does not necessitate it being done in altogether. As
Arnold Kaufman in his case for participation in various settings has
suggested: "...the effort to achieve a possible good (sometimes)
depends on our belief in the possibility of that achievement—the very
11»9
nerve of our effort to^achleve a good may be out by premature admission
of its impossibility."
Our next, set of critics of the pluralist ideology, the radical-
liberals, attempt to examine this side of the question more closely.
The follovdng questions will help to guide our inquiry: Can a case be
made for participation in local settings as having positive consequences
for the rule of law and principles governance? Can a case be made that
participation is instrumental to freedom? The radical-liberals offer a
positive response.
^
"Human Nature and Participatory Democracy," in Bias of Pluralism
,
p. 195.
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CHAPTER V
THE RADICAL-LIBERAL INTERPRETATION:
THE THEORIES OF PETER BACHRACH AND ARNOLD S. KAUFMAN
Introduction
Contemporary political theorizing has been largely bereft of
humanistic influences. But such concerns of Rousseau and Dewey, for
instance, were not entirely effaced and in the 1960's the classical
vision of man had a renaissance. Efforts to revitalize the American
political process—through the civil rights, disarmament, and anti-
war movements and the 1968 Presidential campaign—required an enriched
theory and strategies for change. The emergent perspective was identi-
fied by C. Wright Mills and characterized as the "New Left." Perhaps,
most symbolically, it was represented by the I962 "Port Huron Statement"
and its conception of human beings, human relationships and social
systems: "The goal of man and society should be human independence: A
concern not with image of popularity but with finding a meaning in life
that is personally authentic; a quality of mind not compulsively driven
by a sense of powerlessness, nor one which unthinkingly adopts status
values, nor one which represses all threats to its habits, but one which
has full, spontaneous access to present and past experiences, one which
easily unites the fragmented parts of personal history, one which openly
faces problems which are troubling and unresolved; one with an intuitive
awareness of possibilities, an active sense of curiosity, an ability
1
and willingness to learn." Subsequent papers by such individuals as
_
My source here is Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, The New Radicals -
A Report with Documents (New York: Vintage, 1966) and Cnristopher Lasch,
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Tom Hayden, Richard Flacks, and Staughton Lyrid and many others began to
work out the analyses that would guide action. Much of the impetus for
this recrudescence came from the humanistic traditions of Rousseau and
Marx and the American pragmatism of Dewey and others.
By the end of the 1960's, the lines for distinguishing theoretical
orientations among the new humanist critics of pluralist ideology had
more clearly formed around certain issues. Most crucial was the issue
of whether social change was possible by working within the established
political structure. Events of 1968 seemed to provide sufficient reason
for the formation of judgments on the matter. While I have no desire to
reduce to a few categories the many well-articulated and distinguishable
arguments on the issue, I do want to demarcate the position of one of
the more moderating, non-socialist and non-militant perspectives to
emerge on this crucial issue of social and political change.
That is the perspective of the radical-liberal. Dewey's phrase,
"radical-liberal," had been reinvoked, chiefly by Arnold Kaufman in his
book by that title, to suggest that the liberal or good society is "one
in which each person possesses the resources of materials, mind, and
spirit, as well as the opportunities to carve out a career in conformity
2
to that person's own nature and reasoned choice." To be a radical-
liberal meant to hold a deep-rooted commitment to the values of a liberal
society.
The Agony of the American Left (New York: Vintage, 1969), chap. 5 and
Postscript. For anotner point of view, there is William L. O'Neill,
Coming Apart - An Iniormal History of America in the 1960's (New York:
Quadrangle, 1971). The quote is from "The Port Huron Statement"
excerpted in Jacobs and Landau, pp. 15i;-l55.
2
Arnold S. Kaufman, The Radical Liberal - The New Politics: Theory
and Practice (New York: Clarion, 1970, 196b), p 6.
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Radical-liberals began with a critique of the American pluralist
interpretation, emphasizing its failure to hold true to classical
liberal-democratic theory in practice. It had jettisoned its faith
and support for the person, for self
-development
, when it needed it
most. Radical-liberals thus shared the common purpose of bringing alive
participation, to foster enlightened participation in a broad-ranging set
of social, political, and economic institutions. This account differed
from Dahl's, for instance, in that the concern was not with getting
people what they have already been encouraged to want but in trying
to find ways of creating conditions such that individuals would be
able to act reasonably and with some sense of autonomy. It was essen-
tially, however, a reformist-liberal position. Its expressive forms
included the Presidential can^^aign strategies and political platforms
of Eugene McCarthy in 1968 and of George McGovern in 1972. The basic
economic structure that undergirded class relations was not conspicuously
threatened.
I have selected for my consideration here two exponents of radical-
liberal thought who might be regarded as complementary, Peter Bachrach
and Arnold Kaufman. They are not widely familiar outside the political
science profession and perhaps not too widely known within it, but I
feel that they are the best representatives of this Dewey-ian position
presently available. The meaningfulness of this interpretation derives
not from the fact of popularity or familiarity then, but from the fact
that it offers a warranted alternative to pressures for a narrowing con-
ception of participation and avoids some of the more drastic requirements
of some Marxist interpretations.
153
The work of Peter Bachrach is useful and suggestive for its incep-
tion of a rather original critique of American plural-elite theory. The
questions Bachrach posed, with Baratz, and the argument they made in two
critical essays on decision-making have become central to the debate in
the methodology of community power and pose a significant challenge
3directly to the assumptions Dahl, for instance, makes. In The Theory
ol_Democratic Elitism
- A Critique Bachrach cogently points out the
mj_scasting of democratic theory from Schumpter to Dahl in its derivation
h
from early elite theory. Unfortunately, the perspective Bachrach is
attemption to construct has not been held consistently, and in his study
of power in Baltimore (co-authored with Baratz), Power and Poverty, he
incompletely and unsuccessfully makes the case for increased citizen
5
participation. Bachrach' s work is, then, not without some theoretical
problems, and the crucial one is its failure to hold consistently to the
original conception of participation. It is hoped that by examining
Bachrach 's account it can be shown where the case for expanded and en-
riched participation requires further attention and elaboration.
3
See, for instance, Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "The Two
Faces of Power," American Political Science Review
, 56 (December 1962):9U7
9^2; and "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytic Framework," American
Political Science Review, 57 (Jione 1963 ) :6Ul-65l.
Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism - A Critique
(Boston: Little, Brown, 196?}.
Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory
and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).
Kaufman's witing represents a mindful orientation toward integrating
problems of philosophy, theory, and practice. I believe this work offers
a more closely argued case for participation in terms of a self-development
model than Baclnrach's and is, as well, a judiciously considered assessment
of the prospects for participation. Given his goal. The Radical Liberal
and essays in Dissent are determined efforts at working out a feasible
strategy for change within the constraints of the American party system
6
and its structure of power. Generally, Kaufman proposes a realignment
of the party system through a national coalition-building program; the
Democratic Party would provide the political base. His case is such that
a coalition, representative of groups from moderate to left, could be
united around a synthesis of individual goals and collective need, and
this would radically transform social arrangements and political priori-
ties. Such a transformation would be directed toward establishing the
life conditions necessary for the dignity of all.
Together, Bachrach and Kaufman offer a provocative and fairly-well
delineated model of power and possibility in the United States. It is
one which asserts the positive goal of participation, not simply because
participation may offer clearly better decisions. It may not even do
that. It is offered because a democracy of participation is that practice
that most realizes the dignity and capacities of all individuals in
society. Therefore, the conditions by which this practice can be best
furthered out to be promoted actively.
1
Kaufman published diversely; I will make reference to these mainly:
"A Call to Radicalism: Where Shall Liberals Go?", Dissent , 13 (September-
October 1966) :53'5-62ii; "Opposition Politics Is More Important," Dissent ,
15 (January-February 1968):21-25; "Strategies for a New Politics: New
Party or New Democratic Coalition," Dissent , I6 (January-February 1969):
13-13; and "A Political Strategy for Radical Uberals," Dissent , I8
(July-August 1971)082-393.
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The radical-liberal's interpretation is most forcefully challenged
from the left. What about the evidence that social forces are so strong
that they conspire against the possibility of some class of individuals
participating meaningfully in the present state of affairs? The radical-
liberals do, perhaps, realert us to the original meaning of participation
in classical democratic theory. But to what extent do they adequately
explore the distinction between .the conditions necessary for the encour-
agement of participation as self
-development and those which now prevail
and which are largely coercive? Do they misjudge the possibilities? Are
the radical-liberals prepared to meet the more radical challenge, in
short, which suggests that the structural and cognitive restraints to
meaningful participation run deeper than any of the pluralist critics
suggest?
The argument is a formidable challenge to the case for expanded
participation. The constitutional republicans and the radical-liberals
make clear objections to the pluralist case, so that we are now aware of
the need to strengthen the individual's autonomy and dignity against m.ulti-
farous social pressures. What grounds can we suggest that the Bachrach-
Kaufman case makes such a model of citizen participation realizable? I
want to suggest that the confrontation of the radical-liberal and radical
perspectives will point us in the direction for working out a balanced
and steadied conception of an enriched participation for an advanced in-
dustrial society such as our own.
So, I will turn now to examine the account of participation for the
radical-liberals. I will first give some attention to the roots of their
perspective and then set out their respective accounts of participation.
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Finally, I will take up some objections and seek to offer an assessment
of this account. My final concluding chapter will try to develop those
considerations necessary for bringing the radical-Uberal and radical
cases into balance.
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The Radical-Liberal Perspective
Central to the inadequacy of the approach liberal-pluralist s like
Dahl took to the analysis of the American political process, I suggested
in an earlier chapter, was the presumption of a widely-shared consensus
as to the political norms and practices in the society. This presumption
has the serious problem of directing attention away from the sources and
pressures that cause personal discontent, and such discontent is viewed
more likely as pathological than indicative of failures in the social
structure.
Central to the radical-liberal perspective is the presumption that
7
at the root of politics is conflict. The conflict perspective of the
radical-liberal is American generically and not essentially Marxist. The
drafting of this model in a classic form may be attributed to E. E.
Schattaschneider. The concept of a "mobilization of bias," Schattschneider
term, is fundamental to Bachrach's developing interpretation and can also
be seen to lie behind the considerations of Kaufman, so that I want to be-
gin by sketching Schattschneider ' s conflict model of the American polity
briefly,
Schattschneider' s study, The Semi -Sovereign People
,
was, as he says,
an attempt to work out a theory about the relation between organization
and conflict, the relation between political organization and democracy,
8
and the organizational alternatives open to the American people. Basic
7
For characteristic presumptions of the conflict perspective see
William E. Connolly, "Theoretical Self-Consciousness," Polity , 6 (Fall
1973): 16-17.
8
E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People - A Realist's View
of Democracy in America (New York: Holt, Rmehart and Winston, I960);
and also Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 19U2).
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to our understanding of politics is the contagiousness of conflict.
Since a conflict always consists of two parties-the individuals who are
actively engaged in a dispute and the audience that is attracted to the
scene, central to the determination of the outcome is the scope of its
contagion. Strategy becomes important to the outcome, and the role of
the bystanders is the strategic target. The basic struggle revealed by
the political literature is "between the conflicting tendencies toward
the privatization and socialization of conflict ,
"
Examination of the political pressure system and the party system
in the United States reveals that the scope of conflict has been fairly-
well set since the realignment of 1932 and that these systems both operate
with a class bias. Schattschneider
' s examination of the pressure system
requires a distinction between "public" interests and "special" interests,
a distinction interest-group theorists fail to make. It is a distinction
that the constitutional republicans made and which radical-liberals must
make, as I shall try to show later. Organized groups by definition have
a mobilization of bias—that is, the interests it favors—and as a result,
it is possible to consider it as also possessing scope . That scope in
American politics is small. Schattschneider has often been quoted on the
point he makes: "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly
chorus sings with a strong upperclass accent. Probably about ninety per-
10
cent of the people cannot get into the pressure system."
The scope has been limited in the party system, as well. Generally,
one-third of the electorate do not participate in national elections and
9
Semi-Sovereign People
,
p. 7 and chap. 1.
10
Ibid., p. 35.
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even fewer participate in state elections; still fewer on the average in
local ones. The reason, for Schattschneider
-s explanation, was not so
much acceptance of the system as recognition that the lower class was
excluded from the process: "Nonvoting is related to the contradiction,
imbedded in the political system, between (l) the movement to universalize
suffrage and (2) the attempt to make the vote neamingless. He con-
tinued: "It has been assumed that only legal barriers inhibited the
disenfranchised. We know better now. The exclusion of people by extra-
legal processes, by social processes, by the way the political system is
organized and structure may be far more effective tiian the law."
All divisions in the community are maintained at a cost: "The
existence of a large body of dissociated people is part of the price we
pay for the dominance of the cleavage between government and business.
This cleavage had tended to freeze the stakes of politics at a point that
13
has never involved the whole community." The costs were the inability
for some to have their needs and wants translated into public policy; the
cost was, ultimately, one of constitutional legitimacy.
The study of politics, according to Schattschneider, then ought to
be the study of the structures which go toward sustaining the existing
bias and scope of conflict. Organization is the mobilization of bias.
Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out.
And, "Anyone who finds out how to involve the forty million in American
lii
politics will run the country for a generation."
11
Ibid.., p. 103.
12
Ibid., p. 111.
13
Ibid., pp. 109-110.
Hi
Ibid., p. 103.
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The work of Schattschneider does not take us very far towards an
enriched concept of participation. Schattschneider himself views repre-
sentation as a basic version of participation. In his definition of
democracy he maintains a conception very close to Schumpeter »s; it is
"a competitive political system in which competing leaders and orgaaiza-
tions define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the
public can participate in the decision-making process." The problem
of Dahl's concept is thus manJ.fest here, too—i.e., Schattschneider is
not concerned with the effects of participation. His weakness is that
he lim.its pai'ticipation to demands, what people already want, and remains
unconcerned with development of the fullest capacities of the human being.
Significantly, then, his theory is unassimilated to a theory of human
development. And that v;as the task that Bachrach seemed to set out to
do, but it was better fulfilled, as we shall see, in the work of Kaufman.
lb
Ibid., p. 15.
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Bachrach's Account of Participation
Bachrach took up the t ask outlined by SchattSchneider, to give
attention to the mobilization of bias in the political system; he began
with a critical examination of the underlying assumptions and methodology
of the community power analyses. The formulation was expressed as both
a critique of the "power elite" approach (e.g., Hunder's) and of the
pluralists (e.g., Dahl«s and Polsby's). In "The Two Faces of Power"
Bachrach and Baratz argued that the pluralist objections to the elitist
16
arg-ujnent were "effectively exposed." Mainly, they rejected any notion
of an "ordered system of power." Against the other side, they maintained
that the pluralist confinement to only "safe" and always "important" or
"key" issues in the study of who has power meant the researchers over-
looked "the chance that some person or association could limit decision-
making to relatively non-controversial matters, by influencing cominunity
values and political procedures and rituals, notwithstanding that there
17
are in the community serious but latent power conflicts." Study of
decision-making calls first for the study of the organization of bias,
for study of not only the visible but the invisible face of power. Only
after that is done can the analysis of participation in decision-making
in concrete issues begin.
Objection to this presumably "subjective" domain for political inquiry
was anticipated, and so a paper developing the innovative concept of
16
—
PYom "Two Faces of Power" reprinted in Bias of Pluralism (New York:
Atherton, 1969), pp. 52-53.
17
Ibid., p. 55.
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nondecision-making proposed in the first article followed. "Nondecision-
making" was the method used to sustain the mobilization of bias. It was
"a set of predominant values, beliefs, and constitutional procedures
("rules of the game") that operate systematically and consistently to
18the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others."
This is their definition as developed later in Power and Poverty :
A nondecision...is a decision that results in suppression
or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the
values or interests of the decision-maker. To be more
nearly explicit, nondecision-making is a means by which
demands forchange in the existing allocation of benefits
and privileges in the community can be suffocated before
they are even voicedj or kept covert; or killed before
they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena;
or, failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the
decision-implementing stage of the policy process. 19
Examples of nondecision-making are provided in the case of Senator Joseph
McCarthy and his supporters, when in the early 1950's their exploitation
of anti-communist sentiments effectively blocked access to the decision-
making arena demands for social reform, and in the case of Baltimore when
the value of equal opportunity for blacks had been used in a way to isolate
20
advocates of Black Power.' Other cases are offered in Power and Poverty
as well, but these are suggestive,
"Nondecision-making" was a provocative and controversial concept for
21
most political scientists. iMainly the difficulty of operationalizing
IB
—
Power and Poverty
, p. U3.
19
Ibid., p. hh»
20
"Communications," American Political Science Review , 62 (December
1968) :1268-1269. See John H. Schaar's essay, "Equality of Opportunity,
and Beyond" for an excellent examination of the conservative implications
of the "equal opportunity" slogan. In Pennock and Chapman, eds.. Equality:
Nomos IX (New York: Atherton, 1967), pp. 228-2U9.
21
It was criticized by Richard Merelman, "On the Neo-Elitist Critique
of Community Power," American Political Science Review , 62 (June 1968):U5l-
163
it for empirical research provided the chief objection. The concept has
22
however, been applied in at least one study.
Perhaps nondecision-making (and non-issues) is more appropriately
viewed not as an empirical concept but as a heuristic one, one which
enables us to focus on structures of forces not readily observed. For
instance, nondecision-making (in the form, "not to decide is to decide")
suggests that nonparticipation cannot be explained completely at any rate
by apathy or by satisfaction witn the ongoing system. The concept, I
suggest, was unexplicitly an Magellan or dialectical concept and ought to
be regarded in this light. Thus, nondecision-making only has meaning
against an ideal which a decision does not obtain, against some criteria
by which a practice may be compared. The ideal is only implicit in
Bachrach's theory and, therefore, the concept remains a^ibiguous. Implicit
in his concept, nevertheless, is a standard or ideal. An essential part
of its meaning is the status of the distribution of benefits (and burdens)
23
to different persons and groups in a political system or subsystem.
This was the intuition of Schattschneider as well. Toward the conclusion
of Semi-Sovereign People Schattschneider very sketchily demarcated an
i;60j and an exchange of views is to be found in the sam.e Review
,
62
(December 1968) :1268-1269. An expanded argument is developed in the same
Review
, 65 (December 1971), between Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Nondecisions
and the Study of Local Politics," pp. 1063-1080, and Frederick W. Frey,
"Comment: On Issues and Non-Issues in the Study of Power," pp. 1081-
1101 j Wolfinger offers a rejoinder, pp. 1102-llOU.
22
Matthew A, Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution - A Study
of Non-Decisionmaking in the Cities (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1971).
23
See, for instance. Power and Poverty
, p. 106, where the distributive
principle is apparent. Some conception of equality, such as Schaar, 0£. cit .
,
suggests might more adequately provide the normative principle.
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alternative to the utilitarian ethics that undergirded pluralist politics.
Very suggestively, he had hinted that possible a "wholly new calculus"
should be considered for the conduct of public policy in the new interna-
224
tional world. Unfortunately, Bachrach did not draw on this insight to
develop his approach in a more explicit way. Bachrach and Earatz sub-
sequently tried to argue that the focus for study of nondecision-niaking
should be on "latent and covert grievances of differential groups in the
community." which weakened the criteria, and contended that problems of
false consciousness were problems for the philosopher. This was, as
Balbus points out, probably an unnecessary concession for tneir interpre-
tation.
The detectable shift from the model of Schattschneider to tiie radical-
liberal perspective and emphasis on development of the personality is
observable in Bachrach 's The Theory of Democratic Elitism - A Critique
.
Mainly, in Serai-Sovereign People the attention is on organizational
structure, for explaining the bias of the pressure group and party
processes. Bachrach 's analysis here begins to subject to critical
examination the ideological revision of classical elite theorists by the
"2II
Semi -Sovereign People
,
p. 111. Schattschneider suggested the need
to shift from a politics of distribution (the who gets what, when, and
how of politics) to tlie politics of apportionment of bui'dens. He wrote,
"Today our view of politics is greatly modified by the fact that the
United States is involved in a titanic struggle for sm^vival. Burdens
that were inconceivable a few years ago seem to have become a permanent
part of the public function. The primacy of foreign policy calls for a
new kind of politics involving a wholly new calculus. The government
now needs above everything else the steady support of the public, and the
support cannot be had without a new scale of public involvement in public
life." p. 112.
25
See Power and Poverty, p. h9; and Isaac D. Balbus, "The Concept
of Interest m Pluralist and Marxian Analysis," Politics and Society ,
1 (February 1971) : 151-177.
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contemporary democratic theorists. Bachrach shows the separation of
liberalism and democracy and reveals the transformation that took place
in democratic thinking since .Schumpeter
' s attempt, in I9J42, to minimize
the role of the common man in the political process. The impetus for
theorists to limit confidence in the ordinary man and woman, according to
Bachrach, is associated with the rise of the totalitarian movements,
fascism and communism, and later with the rise of McCarthyism in the
United States. This assuiaption seemed to be easily buttressed by public
opinion research (e.g., Stouffer's and Lipset's), which indicated the
mass' lack of knowledge of democratic values. It is Bachrach's intention
to reject tlriis tendency to put the guardianship of democracy in the hands
of elites and to emasculate the person as contrary to the classical vision
of the purposes of democracy.
I have summsTized below the main lines of argument Bachrach builds
to defeat the elitist theory. He has directed his attention to some of
the chief points the democratic elitists use to construct their positive
case for a narrowed conception of democracy and participation. Bachrach's
response will be indicated.
1, A chief line of argument, as we saw in the discussion of Dahl,
was the effort to transform democracy from a substantive meaning to a
procedural meaning. This argument had its principal source in Schumpeter 's
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy . Bachrach is here concerned to argue,
and I believe correctly, that the fundamental disadvantage of this approach
is that it gives the political theorist no basis for judging whether the
26
system is becoming more democratic or more elitist in nature.
2. Another facet of the democratic elite argument, especially as
~26
—
Theory of Democratic Elitism, pp. 21-25.
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reflected in the work of Bernard Berelson and his colleagues, has been
the concern to discover how social stability can be secured rather than
studying what happens to various individuaDs under the system. Thus,
political passivity of the great majority of the people is not regarded
as an element of democratic malfunctioning, but on the contrary, as a
necessary condition for allowing the creative functioning of the elite.
What is^wrong with this is that it assumes the body politic is an end in
itself.
3. Related to view (2.), Bachrach suggests, is the implicit notion
that an apparently thriving democratic system is boiJiid to provide a wide
degree of freedom to all its citizens. Just because a system supplies
stability, it is mistaken to imp]y that it also adequately provides for
the growth and well-being of individuals. (J think t^ds becomes clearer
as an argument when Bachrach discusses manipulation; Bachrach 's argument
allows, but does not say, that elite consensus can, in Kaufman's phrasing
26
"winnow and shape" demands.)
ii. Other democratic elite theorists, Plamenatz among them, assume
the pressur'e system offers opportunities for countervailing power to a
wide range of groups in the society. As we have already seen,
Schattschneider 's analysis, which Bachrach calls upon here, refutes this
29
assumption easily and persuasively,
5. Kornhauser, along with other social pluralists, holds a faith
in the automatic control of social voluntary associations for separating
27
Ibid., pp. 32-35.
28
Ibid., pp. 3ii-33'.
29
Ibid., pp. 35-39.
167
mass and elites. Bachrach suggests this faith is insufficient, partly
because it does not explain how masses can be made to join more organi-
30
zations without being mobilized behind charismatic-type leaders.
6. The necessity and feasibility of reaching a "consensus of elites"
on fundamental procedures is the chief concern of Truman, Berle, and Mills,
Bachrach says. And, he suggests that the requirements may be considerably
greater than Trumn, for instance, anticipates. But mainly, Bachrach 's
point is to raise the question, What will keep the self-conscious elites
within constitutional bounds? None of the elite theorists provide a con-
31
vincing answer to the skeptic.
7. Finally, Bachrach drav;s, importantly, attention to the concept
of "politics" that the democratic elitists work vrLth. It is a concept
that is unwisely, for the interests of political science, limited to
governmental structures. "Politics" must be broadly defined to recognize
the impact that agencies other than governmental ones have for the al].oca-
tion of values. There seems to be sufficient warrant, for instance, to
suggest heads of corporations are political elites; the only chief dis-
tinction is their lack of accountability. Bachrach suggests that Dahl's
definition recognizes the public impact of corporations but that his
political analysis fails to give practical effect to the point, and this
32
affects his analysis for participation.
The democratic revisionists also lodged a negative argument against
an ideal of democracy. We can recall Dahl's dismissal of ideals as
breeding cynicism and his call to "realism." Bachrach 's contention was
30
Ibid., pp. ii2-l46.
31
Ibid., pp. 50-62.
32
Ibid., pp. 85-91.
168
that the essence of classical theory was its ideal, the chief function
of democracy being what it did to promote self-development. Bachrach
was clearly not entrapped by the mystique of logical positivism and
contended that ideals operated as "a valuable guj.de and spur to a more
human society."
The problem then is this: What participation can be expected and
fostered, practically, under the conditions of advanced industrial
society? This is Bachrach' s consideration, and it sounds pretty much
like Dahl's, excepting Bachrach 's expressed concern that participation
allow self-development. Like Dahl, Bachrach felt classical theory fell
short, in underscoring the importance of widespread participation in
political decision-making, by offering no realistic guidelines as to how
33
its prescription is to be filled in large urban societies. Also,
Bachrach will take into account the apparent necessity for some decisions
to be made by technical and professional officials at the central level
33
Ibid., p. 99. It is relevant to note here the large qualification
Bachrach builds into iiis case when he fairly conclusively agrees with the
democratic elite theorists argument: "The main thrust of the elitist
argument is incontestable. However, although participation in key
political decisions on the national level must remain extremely limited,
is there any sound reason, within the context of democratic theory, why
participation in political decisions by the constituencies of "private"
bureaucratic institutions of power could not be widely extended on
those issues which primarily affect their lives within these institu-
tions?" p. 95. Dewey's argument was that participation locally would
enable the individual to see broader issues more intelligently, in more
coherent ways by the experience of participation, and, therefore, it
could reasonably be expected that voting decisions on wider issues would
be more considered and judicious. Bachrach is not responsive to the
force of this argument.
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of government. Bachrach's solution to his problem of participation is
the encouraKement of varied forms of participation in the local setting:
The crucial issue of democracy is not the; composition of
the elite..., Iniitead the issue is whether democracy-
can diffuse power sufficiently throup;hout society to
inculcate among people of all walJcs of life a justifiable
feelinp; that they have the power to participate in
decisions which affect themselves and the common life of
the community, especially the immediate community in
whi.ch they v/ork and spend most of their waking hours and
energy. Of course, "key governmental decisions" must be
made by a few, but this is no reason why we should settle
for a criterion for democracy which provides no guide-
lines to combat a rapid concentration of power outside
this narrow sphere of decision-making,^'^
The cliief features of Bachrach's case for par'ticipati.on can be
suggested as follows:
1. Hi.s theory of a democracy of participation embodies a concept
oi' "interest-in-the-proct-ss"— tiiat is, it entails, a self-development
concept. Baohrach is concerned with the effects of participation ior
individuals. That it is valued and works, ho points out, is the
evidence of psychology. His references ai'e to the wor'ks of Kurt Lf;win,
Erie Fromm, and A. H. Maslow among others. He contends that it was
this feature that was central to the idea of democracy in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, as it was maintained as the buttress to the
corruptibility of political, economi.c, and social institutions.
2. It embodies a concept of "interest-in-end-results . " Bachrach's
claim here is that the society which is participatory will more likely
be the stabilized society by strengthening the mental capacities of all
36
indi.viduals and, therefore, have a positive efftct in shaping conduct.
•
—3ir~
Ibid., p. 92.
Ibid., pp. 98-99.
36
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This, to me, is a strong argument that is overlooked by the democratic
elite theorists.
3. It is a "decentralized" notion of participation-that is, it
recommends expanding participation to subsystems in the society. Where
it once occurrec in places like the New England town meeting, participa-
tion would now develop in places like the corporation, the factory, the
office, the enterprise, the trade union, the ch-orch, the school, and so
forth-places close to the everyday life of the majority of individuals.^"^
On this point, Dahl in merJhe_Reyo]^^ has shifted to a position of
some agreement with Bachrach. (In aside, it should be pointed out that
Bachrach does not suggest what sort of relationship would prevail between
centralized corporations and centralized government, aiid this is a domin
of inquiry that an adequate social theory cannot ignore.)
ii. Participation will involve people in "those issues wldch primarily
affect their lives." In making it possible for people to become involved
in issues that they can relate to, the indifference of the lower class
that Dahl's theory concedes to can be overcome. Bachrach expresses his
thoughts in this passage:
For many individuals political issues and elections appear
either trivial or remote and beyond the reach of their
influence. Of a different magnitude are issues which
directly affect them in their place of work, issues which
are comparatively trivial, yet are overlaid vrLth tensions
and emotions that often infuriate and try men's souls.
It is here—despite the legitimizing effects of bureau-
cratic forms—that the ugliness of man's domination of
man is fully revealed, and it is here, consequently, tnat
democracy must become established and put to use. I am
not suggesting that the average worker, for example, if
given the opportunity to share in the making of factory
decisions, would be magically transformed, m the fasrdon
37
Ibid., p. 96.
38
Ibid., p. 95'.
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of Rousseau's coimnon man, from an unimaginative, oarochial
selfish human being to a broadminded, intelligent', public-'
spirited citizen. I am saying that political education is
most effective
_on_a
_ley_el which challen^ es theTKdUidu,^
l2.-££iS?ll£_^oPiiat3^el^ in_the_ solution^'of concfete~^bIems
affecting himself and his immediate co.7iraunity. (Emphasis
—
added.
)
This is a particularly characteristic arguraent of the radical-liberal
perspective,
5. Bachrach does not explore the problems that would arise in
reorganizing the internal structure of the workplace, for instance, or,
more broadly, the political problems that would arise from a public
policy proposal for this objective. Bachrach suffices with reference
to the British experiences in nationalizing industry and believes they
ho
indicate the possibility of such reorganization.
6. Bachrach, further, recognizes "that participation vjill not
hi
necessarily in all cases lead to salutary results," He has most clearly
in mind the possibility of instances of manipulation and pressures toward
conformity, instances that would subvert the meaningfulness of the partic-
ipatory form. This possibility does not undermine the value of partici-
pation but does call for, he contends, careful consideration and empirical
research on two questions: (l) Under what concrete conditions will man's
capacities be developed and under what conditions will development be
frustrated? (2) How will democratic theory provide the developmental
conditions?
39
Ibid., p. 103.
i;0
Ibid., p. 96,
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Ibid., p. 101, the note,
h2
Ibid,, p. 101. Tentatively, he suggests "that beneficial results
from participation can best be assured if two conditions are present:
(1) That the participants are roughly equal in the power they are capable
of exerting in the decision-making process, (b) that diverse interests
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One argument, I beUeve, Bachraoh r^.aes is the feature of decen-
tralized participation which Dewey compelUngly argued and which I
have previo^ly noted. That is, that in participating in areas close
to one-s life experience a transfer effect can be expected in terms of
one's ability to see wider problems in more ordered, comprehensive, and
complex ways. Central to Rousseau's, Green's, and Dewey's concept of
self Is the notion of interests that the participating individual develops-
that the person more reflectively deliberates about his own interests in
terms of the interests of the whole society.
Power_a£d_Poyert2 retreated from the concept of developmental
participation set out in Tl,e Theory of Democrali^JVH^. An essay in
1971, however, "Interest, Participation and Democratic Theory," suggested
a reconsideration of the conception that emerged in Power and Povertv
^2
—~ —
and some of his reservations about it. I shall try to suggest the
forms of participation that Power and Povertjr defined, point out particu-
larly the problem of cooptive participation that the authors took note of,
and then indicate his subsequent revisions expressed in the 1971 paper.
Power and Poverty is a case study of participation in Baltimore,
Maryland, for the years 1965 to 1968, particularly as it formed under
the impact of the federal War on Poverty program. Part I of the study
derives a model for political analysis from the concept of nondecision-
making. This model assumes dichotomous groupings in a community:
are represented vathin the participating group. These are probably in-
sufficient, however.
Peter Bachrach, "Interest, Participation and Democratic Theory,"
prepared for delivery to American Society for Political and Legal
Philosophy, December 1971, New York City.
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(1) Persons and groups co^itted to existing values and (2) persons and
groups seeking a reallocation of values. Both groups are a ss^^ed to
have variable sources of power to draw upon; these were classified as:
(1) Resources (status, assets, members, organization, ideology, interest),
(2) priority (time preference, costs), (3) strategy (decisions and non-
decisions), (U) interaction (alliance, cooperation, conflict). Part II
reviewed the status of blacks in Baltimore to 1965 and, then, evaluated
the political changes in their status as a result of events and organi-
zational efforts (by governmental agencies and by moderating and militant
black leaders, and by the poor black population at large. Some conclusions
should be indicated briefly; first, importance was given to the role of
federal programs and funding for bringing blacks into sharing in policy-
making; the "mobilization of bias" was shifted out of nondecision-making
arenas into the open decision-making arenas; and an important part of the
program was the "doctrine of legitimacy" that the "maximum feasible
participation" clause provided the poor. Problems, nevertheless,
remained in Baltimore, and were expressed in the forms of racism, internal
divisions among blacks, and cutbacks in federal programming with the
beginning of the Nixon Administration.
The interesting aspect of the study for our purposes is the foms of
participation that that work identifies. The authors suggest at least
three typical meanings for citizen participation, according to conven-
tional federal legislative and administrative usage: (1) Grass roots
democracy, (2) collaboration (the implication here is that the poor take
an active part in decisions about the types and characteristics of the
inr
Power and Poverty
,
pp. 100-102,
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services made), and (3) involvement in the delivery of services for the
poor. The authors of the background paper that provide tMs definition
suggest that how widely the concept should be construed "will hinge upon
the goals that citizen participation is intended to achieve.^^ Participa-
tion becomes, according to this account, a form of political action. Its
function is to reallocate values, and it is distinguished by being action
of ordinary individuals, not of
-officials or elites. Its sco£e would be
more than merely a few citizens employed in delivery of services or
sitting as representatives on a policy-making board. It might also in-
clude voting, petitioning for a redress of grievances, demonstrating, and
participation in the formulation and implementation of policies v/ithin
political groups and organizations.
The term "participation" has in the paradigm cases suggested here
lost its self-developmental criteria and becomes so loose that practically
any form of political behavior can be entailed by it. The explanation, I
believe, must be seen as part of the lack of clarity in the basic decision-
making/nondecision-making model Bachrach and Earatz employ. In viewing
political action in terms of its position for "allocating values," the
central problem of "interests" is lost and with it the notion that an
individual participates not around demands, as presupposed wants or
preferences, but becomes more reflective about them. Bachrach is follow-
ing Dahl here, for participation in this model pertains to involvement
on behalf of the existing structure of interests.
hS
See Appendix E, by Peter Bachrach, Morton S. Baratz, and Margaret
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A« examination of the concept of "intere=ta" ^11 help to rrte the
point. Balbus in his article "The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and
Marian Analysis" shows the ambiguity that results because Bachrach and
Barat. fail to consider "interests" as having an "objective" (or socially,
constituted) aspect as well as a "subjective" aspect. Balbus points out
that the Bachrach-Baratz model is i»anently Marxist in that it "assumes
for heuristic purposes that society may be defined in terms of a
domination-subjection relationship and that this domination-subjection
relationship is the motor of change." But Balbus goes on to show that
even though the Mai^ist-type concept of "interests" is imbedded in the
model, it^is only suggested "briefly" and "perhaps without fully realiz-
ing it." He suggests that the criterion for class membership (i.e.,
those seeking "reallocation of values" and "those committed to existing
values") is far too vague to provide the basis for a satisfactory class
analysis. The compelling argument is that any adequate social theory
must recognize both sorts of "interests," subjective and objective.
Balbus, drawing on Flathman's The Public Interest
, provides the following
explanation:
...although everyone agrees that subjective interests will
in part determine a man's behavior, and that a focus on
subjective interests is therefore essential for behavioral
political theory, a sole focus on subjective interests
ignores the social fact which our ordinary language recog-
nizes that "it is precisely the presence of 'objective
interests' which prompts the emergence of subjective
awareness, i.e., than an individual's subjective interests
TB
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lifflt ^ detennined by the way in which his
coSlSrnr' To%T''r.'^ '''''''' Objectiveonaixio s. o rely solely on subjective interestto Ignore the prior and decisive problem of the
"conversxon;. of objective interest to subjectiveinterests, i.e., the development of consciousness aphenomeggn which any adeq^te political theory cinnot
As Professor Connolly presents the case: "Any view which anchors interest
exclusively in felt bei^vioral tendencies runs the risk of celebrating
uncritically those inclinations cultivated by dominant socialization
processes while deflecting conceptual attention from possible gratifying
modes of existence bypassed by those same processes."^' It is to neglect
the chance of discovering unarticulated but simering "troubles" beneath
the surface of public policy discussion, and it is, as Kaufman and
Karcuse suggests, therefore, necessary to identify processes which
"winnow and shape" wants.
In "Interest, Participation, and Democratic Theory" Bachrach acknowl-
edges the benefit of this critique and suggests a revised conception of
participation. The emphasis is on that aspect of participation that offers
"an essential means for the individual to discover hds wants through the
52interviewing discovery of himself as a social human being." He defines
democratic participation as "the process inwhicn persons formulate,
discuss, and decide public issues that are important to them and directly
affect their lives. It is a process that is more or less continuous,
conducted on a face to face basis in which participants have roughly an
50
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equal say in all stages, fro™ formulation of issues to the deterndnation
Of policies." But he reiterates his earlier beHef that there is no
escaping the fact that democratic participation can only function on a
«ide scale within a majoritarian representative framework. He now
regards as nonexai^ples of participation: Demonstrations, sit-ins, con-
frontations, pressure group bargaining, voting, speecnmaking, campaigning,
and such sindlar activities, for none of these allow the opportunity for
the individuals to engage in the decision-making processes on a regular
and face-to-face basis.
Before concluding this section, I want to note Bachrach's attention
to the perverted form of participation that McConnell and Lowi so clearly
identified: Cooptive participation. Bachrach defined participation as
"cooptive" in nature when the activities of non-elites in decision-making
and policy-implementation are channeled toward the preconceived goals of
higher authorities." In the case of the community action programs and
the effort to alleviate poverty and expand political roles in Baltimore,
cooptation was recognized as a major tactic of the established groups.
Kaufman sketches an analysis of the structure of cooptive participation,
and so I will consider it more critically at a later point.
The major difficulty for Bachrach in developing his approach to the
study of participation and nonparticipation in the community, I suggest,
is that it is limited to the attention of structural or organizational
tactics and material rewards and benefits. It fails to draw upon the
significant argument of the Critique which emphasized the importance of
53
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what happened to the mental capacities of the individuals for the
functioning of a democracy, and this requires attention to the formation
of a sense of "interests" by the participant that recognizes and recon-
ciles both the social "good" and individual need. As Balbus suggests,
the concept of nondecisi on-making must be expanded to include processes
by which wants are structurally determined or else Bachrach and Baratz have
taken us no further than the pluralists.
In Bachrach'
s account of participation, as it appears in the nondecision-
making approach to the analysis of power, the concept is too enlarged. Its
paradigm cases are unlimited, encompassing it would appear, most fonns of
political action for change. The argujnent for an enriched conception of
participation as it is set out in Power and Poverty
, misfires because of
conceptual difficulties in Bachr-ach's theoretical framework. My main
emphasis has been to suggest the problems with the concept of "interest."
The inadequate treatment of nondecision-making is in large measure a
function of the inadequate treatment of "interest" which underlies it,
for interest there means individual preferences, random and unstructured.
The emphasis on the subjective aspect of interests and not also its
objective aspect vri.ll necessarily have the effect of coopting efforts
at political change in the direction of established procedures, rules,
norms, and practices, and, if these undermine the development of all
individuals' capacities for growth, then a participation of self-
development is not generally realizable. I believe the inadequacy here
must be attributed to problems of epistemology, the attempt to satisfy
empirical criteria of the liberal-pluralist perspective while at the
same time also staking out a place for normative standards. One aim
can not be reconciled, in the way Bachrach sought to do it, with the other.
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There is, we discover, a need to treat "objective" interests and
hov^the^_are_shaped, because this is what will distinguish a develop-
mental form of participation from all other non-developmental forms.
The liberal-pluralists (e.g., Dahl, Verba and Nie, Wolfinger, and
Merelman) fail to recognize the role of ideology in shaping the nature
of par-ticipation. This feature Schatt Schneider • s mode], could not bring
out, and Eachrach was unsuccessful in making it coherent in his own
connections between nondecision-making and s clf
-development
. Arnold
Kaufraan, by making use of Karcuse's approach, makes explicit the
force of procesces for "winnowing and shaping" peoples' wants in con-
temporary industrial society so that certain justifiable claims are
never even thought of as matters for public policy discussion.
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Kaufman's Account of Participation
Characteristic of the radical-liberal approach is its effort to
bring into balance significant insights of both liberalism and socialism.
An important part of Kaufman's attention, philosophically, has been to
make points of convergence between J. S. Mill and Marx, Madison and
Rousseau, apparent and to resolve some outstanding conflicts. Kaufman's
interpretation proves to be a defense for a particular version of liberal
democracy that is rooted in a theory of fundamental human rights and
wMch is tied to a theory of political obligation not very dissimilar
to T, H, Green's.
The point raised in the discussion of Bachrach's interpretation was
the importance, to an adequate theory of participation, of the concept
of "interests." Mainly noticed was Eachrach's failure to incorporate
a concept of "objective" interests into his framework in an explicit way
with the result that the socialization processes could not be critically
examined for the way they shaped individual preferences in any policy
deliberation. I suggested that Kaufmn's work provides a more successful
consideration of this problem, and he does so with a theory of fundamental
human rights from which his justification of a participatory democracy is
derived. So, I would like to begin by sketching the main lines of this
argument and then note his rebuttals to objections to participation on
grounds of human nature. Finally, I will outline the general features
of his account of participation and indicate the special presumptions he
holds with regard to the participatory style for advanced industrial
society.
Kaufman's approach is the method of contrast and comparison—of seeing
how far liberalism might be pressed to meet the staridards of social justice
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that both liberalism, in certain of its exponents, and Marxism enjoin.
He shared important elements of the pragmatic perspective of Mead, James,
and Dewey. These vxould include: A confidance in the essential intelligence
of the human being, an emphasis on the social character of the individual,
the assumption of the need to make theory context
-relevant, the objective
of seeking guides to conduct, the significance of experience (will and
effort) for putting these guides into practice and for testing them, and
a belief m the self-critical community of inquirers. An important
feature of the pragmatic perspective, as Bernstein has drawn it in his
study Praxis and Action, is its rejection of dogmatism and truth systems,
that no position or point of view has an exclusive hold on the truth, for
the view of inquiry is as a self-corrective process rather than of know-
56
ledge having a basic fixed foundation. Kaufman's case for an expanded
and enriched conception of participation seems to be closely associated
with this conviction.
Kaufman was strongly critical of ma.ny contemporary forms of liberalism
in order to make clear what a morally adequate version of liberalism must
be. He thus found it helpful to follow the lines of arguments of lib-
eralism's best critics. In his essay "Democracy and the Paradox of V/ant-
Satisfaction" he began by considering some typical leftist criticisms of
liberalism's practices in the United States and Britain. These include
Some of Kaufman's assumptions are set forth in his early article
on "The Nature and Function of Political Theory," Journal of Pliilosophy ,
51 (January 1951;) :5~22, and are also briefly discussed in Richard
Rodewald and Richard Wasserstrom' s article, "The Political Philosophy
of Arnold S. Kaufman," in "Arnold Kaufman Memori.al Issue," Social Theory
and Practice, 2 (Spring 1972).
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the contentions that democracy in advanced industrial societies "far from
promoting liberty and^justice for all, absolutely impedes the struggle
for social Justice." This criticism can be identified, for example,
with Herbert Karcuse. The com^^laint, reformulated, provides a paradox:
"...democracy satisfied humn wants both too little and too much."
Kaufman's claim is that the criticisms joined in this paradox are
"compatible and valid." How is this so?
A society-indeed, a democratic society-has many devices whereby
it can give specific character to peoples' objective interests. The
analysis is carried out in terms of concepts of wants, needs, and rights.
Society has two angles of approach to obtain its given character. It
works at the level of awareness of needs and at the level of will.
"Tokenism," for instance, is the structure which presupposes aware-
^) 8
ness of the justice of unmet political demands. Payoffs, just sufficient
to insure stability, are arranged through the use of power. It is made
feasible for one side, by fears of the loss of an already meager command
of economic resources, the sense of defenselessness, and the legitimizing
consequences of the democratic process itself. Kaufman's claim is that
tokenism is an essential and not an adventitious vice of the political
system.
Democracy also undermines the will to struggle for justice through
60
the process of "cooptation. " Cooptation, as a process by which one
Ft
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person is induced through benefits to identify with the values and
programs of another, is the method that relies on draining off the
energies that would otherwise flow from a more developed self-concept
.
Kaufman sketches a common pattern of cooptation under which a very
poor person joins with others to secure what he, along with others,
regard as their right. In view of the monumental effort of the struggle
these gains become a source of symbolic satisfaction to this personj the
elation of others with less personal investment perhaps fades. Kaufman
suggests that the chief feature here is that the individual is not
broken, but adjusted. Psychic dissonance is resolved by deep internal
psychological mechanisms: "As he slips deeper into the role of political
realist, he becomes increasingly sensitive to the charge that by advo-
cating full satisfaction of the right to a decent vage he is being
irrational, ungrateful
,
an extremist
. Dissonance is resolved when all
61
semblence of sommitment to high ideals disappears." The individual's
wants have been changed in a direction away from justice.
Democracy sustains the paradox of want-satisfaction also by the way
it enables the comfortable social conscience to form, and this is the
critical argument. Kaufman's thought is that: "...the political process,
through the very efficiency by whj.ch it satisfies some demands, may help
shape and curtail peoples' wants so that many other just demands are
62
never made." He contends, briefly, that needs that seek satisfaction
have "corresponding wants." But the society also foists wants of its
5i
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process, Kaufman suggests, are two patterns of argument—the half-skew,
which unfairly devotes equal attention to the wrongs of those on both
sides of an issue, and the full-skew which carries the tendency one
step further and criticizes only the adversary, p. 20U.
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own upon individuals, and these are what Marcuse, who. Kaufman is here
following, has identified as
..false" needs. Satisfaction of these
diverts attention away fro™ the for^^tion of real needs and corresponding
wants. Thus.
.....peoples, want patterns are shaped and winnowed in ways
that Make the™ confor™ to the functional prerequisites of the existing
social structure... Policy preference, fall i„ the pernussible n.nge
Without most people ever being aware of it. The paradig™ of the person
is under these conditions, that of the
..slave.' or .'happy pig...
Kaxd-nan suggests that if the social structure is just, the con-
sensus reached is "to that extent morally sound.....Bat the fact that the
social outcome has been achieved... he writes.
..without much awareness
of deUberation-without fuller play of human intelligence-makes the
process to that extent defective." But the process must be character-
ized as "morally pernicious" to the extent that the social structui^e is
hierarchical: "Whether intentionally or, much more likely, self-deceptively,
the processes by which patterns of wants are shaped and winnowed not only
serve important interests of upper-groups, but to a significant extent
destroy the prospects for a good life for almost all people in the
society." The significant point is that this repressive process
supplants one set of human needs with another diversionary set of wants,
and needs so fimdamental in requiring satisfaction that they are also
appropriately identified as "rights" get lost in the picture. Kaufman
identifies, then, on behalf of a strengthened version of liberalism,
some of the distorting processes that give shape to "objective" interests
that permeate a specific society.
33~
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Kaufman's concern in rendering accounts of these three processes is
to show the lossage of ideals democracy was supposed to serve and which
were fundamental to democratic practice.. There is neither a will nor an
obligation on behalf of claims of social Justicej social justice is more
likely threatened not by any acts against it but by acts of omission. To
the extent that these fundamental ideals are not acted upon, policy-
preferences lose their justification. For, at their basis is the require-
ment that policy-preferences arise in a free marketplace of ideas and
that they arise among members who generally have sound moral views. This
was an essential feature of Mill's theory.
This arg-oment, critical of the processes that shape wants and will
in contemporary democracies, belongs to a theory of human rights which
Kaufman develops in his essays, "Wants, Needs and Liberalism," and "A
Sketch of a Liberal Theory of Fundamental Human Rights.
"^^
In the first
essay he sets out a case for a theory of human rights which draws upon a
convergence in Mil and Marx. To summarize: Mill was implicitly committed
by Kaufman's interpretation of On Liberty
, to a theory of human needs j Mill
was a theory of human rights grounded in a conception of vital interests.
Mara was implicitly committed to a theory of human rights as well, despite
his dislike for moral t ermj.nology. That is, for instance, the only way
his formulation "from each according to his abilities, to each according
to his needs" might be understood—in terms of some normative concept
of social justice. The interpretation sketched emphasizes the point that
Mill is closer to Marx than Bentham in his theory of needs j for later
5S
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liberalism no longer sanctioned just any wants bntJ CO d u became more reflective
a.d considered about then,. KilLs notion of autono™, or individuality
involved also the consideration that autono™, was so tasic to interests
xn living the good life that it was not enough for this right to be
guaranteed; individuals fro™ earliest childhood should be trained to
^'ant these rights.
What remained in conflict between Mill and Mane was their views of
the role of reason for bringing about the Just society. While Mill saw
reason as having a vital function at every stage in the development of a
person's distinctively human powers, he lacked the imderstanding of the
institutional causes of those social evils which he so keenly identified.
Marx, on the other hand, had a fine comprehension of the enormous extent
to w^iich social, and especially, industrial institutions shape and limit
individuals, prospects for the good life. But he seemed to suppose that
class awareness was all that was sufficient to enable a person to become
as unalienated as social development permitted. This is what Kaufman
identified elsewhere as the Principle of the Sufficiency of Unalienated
Labor; he interpreted Marx to be saying that the requisite forms of
political control would emerge naturally once the problem of alienation
67
of labor had been solved. The problem of Marx's analysis was that it
lead to a faith in the healing power of a revolutionary consciousness.
Kaufman views this as "a source of much current political self-indulgence
68
as well as of other forms of political unreason." He concludes that
the line of argument Marcuse takes in the concept of "autonomy" presciently
Arnold S. Kaufman, "On Alienation," Inquiry
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recorxUes the two issues Mill and Max. pose. Kauf„.„.s arg^ent here is
sketchy at best, for he does not attempt to explore Marcuse's analysis
even in broad terms. He simply indicates that Marcuse represents a
"broad and pervasive tendency a^ong more thoughtful contemporary Marxists,"
which include Markovic, Stonjanovic, and Kolakowski among others. Wl,at
is implied is that an autonomous person will best be able to conduct his
life as a moral agent-that is, to be self-reflective about his action in
relation to others and his community.
There was an important objection to the idea of autonomy that Marcuse
proposed, for certain Marxist's claimed that it moved away from the
commmial existence is one of the great issues of our time. His surmise
was that "only autonomous individuals are creatively competent to resolve
these tensions in ways that promote a morally sensible fit between communal
and individualistic ideals." This seemed to be Rousseau's expectation
and aspiration as well.
His "Sketch of A Liberal Theory of Fundamental Human Rights" provides
the justification for participation as a right derived from the presump-
tive right of "respect for persons." Its ulterior purpose was to promote
a "conception of human rights that requires more strenuous political in-
volvement than most (individuals) are presently prepared even to con-
70
template." It was not enough to be merely a "privately virtuous"
person. The point is that a liberal theory of rights implies obligation,
and Kaufman was concerned that people "see what they are obliged to do."
The object of his concern was especially the affluent middle class, for.
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as distinct fro. a personal morality, political
.orallty is
"...typically
relevant to more remote and impersonal consequences of our actiona-to
Obligations towards those who, though usually out of sight, should not be
out of mind."
The ^tter comes down to the problem of how to develop autonomous
persons in a society that has institutionalized practices running at
cross-purposes. Marx's explanation in terms of the Principle of the
Sufficiency of Unalienated Labor is doubted in favor of a more multi-
faceted strategy. As I interpret him, Kaufman's reasomng is that the
development of one's deliberative powers is not only or mainly linked
to conditions of work. (But he is also rejecting the militant implica-
tions, as well as faith in working-class consciousness.) Kaufman's
argument for encouraging a deliberative participation in many settings
seems to rest on a recognition of the individuals' general practice of
relating to many other aspects of life, aside from work. (Noticeably,
Kaufman is also rejecting the recommendation of Marcuse of "The Great
Refusal," which he describes as curiously irrational and absurd.)
We can gain a direct view of Kaufman's account in his I960 essay,
"Human Nature^and Participatory Democracy," and his overview written ten
years later. At the outset, major lines of the elite argument are
disputed. These are arguments that augment Bachrach»s nicely because
of their selected focus on views of human nature and will be noted
briefly:
1. Lippman, for instance, is representative of those who argue
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that while human weaknesses are statistically inevitable, any particular
person's weaknesses are largely remedial. The major institutional de-
vice he recommends for reforming the social ills that he diagnoses is
that of transforming educational practices. Kaufman claims that this
is a typical liberal resort which imposes an intolerable expectation on
the schools in view of the fact that they are inextricably coimected to
the social^ills they are supposed to remedy. It remains an insufficient
solution.
2. The psychological argument, and to which the religious one
(e.g., Niebuhr's) is connected, presupposes that huirian beings cannot be
trusted. Kaufman suggests that the empirical literature is not unified
on this clarim, and that Freud himself was tentative on the matter.
While there are divergent interpretations of Freud's claims—say, between
Klein and Fromm—the theories have substantially the same implications:
"These implications, while they support the case for a form of democratic
organization which protects and stabilizes, in no way rule out the case
for a democracy of participation, though they surely weaken some of the
power for good v;hich some may be inclined to attribute to it."
3. Then there are arguments that human beings are constitutionally
lacking in intelligence. Kaufman supplies five arguments; siiffice it to
say, he is contending that the intelligence quotient implies little
about political responsibility and virtue. Nor is such a claim alert
to the relationship between environment and intelligence and that,
indeed, participation ma.y be an "important if not indispensable" condi-
tion for individuals to develop fully their capacities.
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l4. Finally, the most extreme view would be that human beings are
essentially irrational; Schumpeter, who many important analyses follow,
is indicative. Schumpeter 's case, it is contended, fails to draw the
important distinction between the varied functions of democratic forms-
what can be done to individuals as well as what can be done for them. He
fails to recognize the fuJ.l significance of his own admission, that "only
when men acquire direct responsibility for a certain range of decisions
that social imagination breaks through its parochial barriers and en-
visions larger possibilities."
Drawing upon those essays and on some of his other writings, I want
to suggest now the characteristic featu.res of Kaufman's case for a par-
ticipatory democracy.
1. He has suggested as a starting point for empirical work a
definition of participation as embracing "actual preliminary deliberation
(conversations, debate, discussion) and that in the final decision each
77
participant has a roughly equal formal say."
2. His theory involves bringing into balance a politics of counter-
vailing power (the Madisonian system) and a politics of participation
78
(the Rousseauan model). Democracy's forms have several functions, and
in this view Kaufman's radical-liberal approach represents a modification
of a straight Rousseauan theory of participatory democracy.
3. Participation should be encouraged in settings which directly
affect one's life, for this is what will allow as he expresses it,
"the social imagination to break through." It is not enough, as
Ibid., pp. 186-190, for quote, p. 189.
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Schu..peter supposed for participation, that a person's sphere of activity
be confined to the home. Possible settings would include the workplace.
But more significant and strongly stressed is a fuller style of electoral
participation that would include the development of a "new politics-
through coalition-building around issues/^ Also important was partici-
pation in community associations and local political movements. As
well, Kaufman expressed concern. for political education and the importance
ol
of keeping the universities free.
k. The principle of participation may have to be modified for any
of a number of reasons. So Kaufman is not recommending unqualified
participation. He is, for instance, willing to subscribe to a "decentra-
lized" view of participation, with Bachrach, but not without some additional
qualifications. For instance, it is possible that a decentralized parti-
cipation can become tyrannical, as McConnell and Lowi emphasized. He
suggested that the principle of participation m^y have to be modified for
any number of the following reasons: The dangers of municipal tyranny,
the effort to make expanded participation more defensible, and the
82
existence of unequally distributed wealth and revenues.
5. He maintained that the participatory society would allow both
the superior and the subordinate to benefit, and hoped that this would
provide one of the arguments for opening up administrative practices.
83
He was not convinced that this was a likely prospect however.
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6. The participatory society does not require a life of frantic
activism, such as Dahl tried to suggest of the radical case. It does
i^ly a life brought into a balance shaped by particular social circum-
stances. For the comfortable liberal it implied further reflection
and commitment to action. A '.politics of radical pressure" was required
to overcome a habit of role-playing and adoption of the official point
of view.
7. From preceding discussion of his theory of fundamental human
rights, it should become clear that Kaufman has also contributed an
additional element to the contemporary case and which was central to
the classical meaning. Participation now becomes "informed action."
That is one of its requirements. People should be enabled to see that
the reason they participate is to achieve and protect conditions of
autonomy and relations of "respect for persons." Only in this way might
considerations of policy and selections of delegates emerge as freely
and unstructured as necessary constraints allowed,
8. A "Paradox of Participation" must be allov/ed. The notion re-
flects on the problems of political activism in the 1960's. He phrased
it in this way: "Participation must begin by being unsuccessful if it
is to fulfill its principal functions. For, by hypothesis, participation
is typically an essential condition of making men competent and responsible.
But individuals who are incompetent and irresponsible will not make good
decisions. They will be neither effective nor wise. Therefore, before
participatory decisions can become sound, they will be unsound—necessarily."
'm
—
"A Sketch,,.," pp. 603-60U.
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"Human Nature...," p. 206,
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This is a more cautious, pragmatic consideration that avoids defeatist
Views, and it ta.es into account what radical theories of participation
•
railed to acknowledge
- that even within participating arrangements there
is a place for leadership and representation.
9. Lastly, Kaufman advocates the application of the practical maxim
of William James to guide conduct. The maxim holds, Kaufman suggests,
"making the effort to achieve a possible good depends on our belief il
the possibility of that achievement." For, he contends, "the very nerve
of our effort to^achieve a good may be cut by premature admission of its
impossibility... The maxim thus makes possible a politics of persistent
moral effort, a politics which Kaufman terms "radical pressure."
The radical liberal perspective, which is grounded in a commitment
to authentic human ideals, has enabled Kaufman to suggest an enriched
conception of participation appropriate to the conditions of advanced
industrial society. It is true some accommodations have been made in this
conception that are not found perhaps in the theory of Rousseau. Kaufman
has brought together and framed a synthesis of the Rousseauan model of a
participatory society with the requisites of a representative political
process for a large and highly populated country, the Madisonian model.
But the concern is not chiefly for the most effective, or most economical,
or most efficient decision process as it is with Dahl and other liberal-
pluralists. Kaufman's case rests on the assessment of the value of
development of the self, autonomy, against the case for denying it, and
he conclusively argues in favor of the value of self
-development in the
long run.
~E6
—
"Human Nature...," pp. 206-211.
87
"Human Nature...," p. 19U.
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Conclusion
A summary and assessment to this point is in order.
The examination of the ideas of Bachrach and Kaufman, who frame the
radical liberal perspective, has provided the contemporary justification
for an enriched concept of participation in advanced industrial society.
The emphasis has returned once again to the recognition of the classical
democratic value of self-development, the person is now seen as possess-
ing cognitive and affective capacities for moral conduct. The conditions
requisite for promoting this development then come into focus. And also
brought into focus are the social forces, snd particularly the forces
acting on human consciousness, limiting this development. Kaufman sig-
nificantly relies on Marcuse's argument to make this point. But is not
clear that Kaufman has entirely escaped the problem which was identified
in my discussion of Bachrach's interpretation—that is, the problem of
how objective interests are formed. One important criticism of Kaufman's
interpretation has been that he has not fully escaped the problem of the
way needs (want-satisfactions) are defined by dominant social interests;
he does not work completely with a self-realization model of the individual.
Perhaps thds, if it is a limitation, can be overcome, if we note
Kaufman's relationship to the analysis of Marcuse. It is interesting ttet
he turns to Marcuse 's account and emphasis on the "winnowing and shaping"
processes of society, but he also rejects as inadequate and unserious
Marcuse 's strategy for change, the notion of the Great Refusal, and views
any moral theory of the individual as lacking. It is clear that Kaufman
finds unsatisfactory the more militant recommendations for change. This
m
—
Paul Diesing and Paul Piccone, "Kaufman on Alienation," Inquiry
,
10:208-210.
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is the substance of the criticism of Christopher Lasch, for instance.''
He responds to the revolutionary view of some Marxists as simply "self-
.
indulgent." In terms of the Marcusean argument that reform from within
becomes "cooptive," Kaufman and Bachrach both respond that a structure of
"cooptation" still allows the subordinate individual or group leverage.
Particularly, the situation of frustration may provoke deeper analysis
and a more adequate understanding of the social forces affecting certain
groups. Cooptation may lead to cjTiicism, but it may also have some
positive consequences for increasing self-awareness. Aside from this
point, Kaufman believes that any advance that can be achieved in social
90
welfare warrants the risk, even of cooptation.
One other interpretation, finally, needs to be addressed before
the fuller case for an expanded pai^ticipation in advanced industrial
society can be set out. The next chapter will be an examination of the
philosophy of Marcuse and will begin to construct a theory of repressive
participation as a contrast model to the dominant concept of participation.
The focus on Marcuse 's theory of repressive society will allow us the
possibility of identifying a key factor for structuring advanced indus-
trial society—language development.
^9
Christopher Lasch, The A>ony of the American Left
, pp. 190-191;
.
90
Radical Liberal
,
p. 387.
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CHAPTER VI
THE RADICAL INTJiKPRETATION:
HERBERT MARCUSE'S THEORY OF REPRESSIVE PARTICIPATION
Introduction
^
Of tho political and social theorists under consideration in this
study, the one with the most radical analysis and the most revol.utionary
implications is that of Herbert I^arcuse. Unlike the previously reviewed
theorists Marcuse's writings constitute a highly developed and compleoc
philosophdc corpus. His work spans, formidably, now a period of forty
years. This corpus contai.ns more fully developed and proficient analysis
than many of Marcuse's critics seem to be aware of or are willing to make
the effort to understand. Some of his most frequently cited pieces (e.g.,
^I-^IL^ll^I'J^JP^^n) are the least well articulated at the Philo-
sophic leve], and, therefore, do not give us a strong point of reference.
Thus, to fail to examine his longer works and some earlier essays in
Negations misses the importance, I believe, of Marcuse's contribution to
an insightful and productive, albeit provocative, interpretation of
contemporary social and political life.
Chief influences on I'fercuse's work are Hegel, ^^arx, and Freud. In
many ways his writings are an apparent synthesis of major elements in
each of these thinkers' work juxtaposed to social realities as he observed
them, a selective synthesis. For his analysis of the structure of
dominant interests in the United States, Marcuse is indebted to C. Wright
Mills and he acknowledges the contribution to a lesser extent of Vance
Packard and P'red Cook. Also influential in other ways are several German
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writers who are generally unfamiliar to students in the United States.
Particularly important are the views on language taken by Kark Kraus
.
and the theory of institutions of Arnold Gehlen. The work of Kraus, who
figures in l^gensteii^J^^^ and George Orwell on distorted language
is of major ird^luence on the direction of analysis in Onejimensi^
Given this melange of influences on Marcuse, it is mistaken to read
Marcuse as a Marxist in any purist sense. Surely, he does not offer a
political philosophy according to the conventional treatment of problems
of state, authority, and legality and the appropriateness of particular
forms. Yet, he is not the darling of strict Marxists either. The cliief
feature of his work is its claimed "critical" character, a critical
examination of social forms as they are interrelated in advanced industrial
society. His interpretation lies with the early Marx, which has exponents
in a growing number of interpreters of that period (e.g., Meszaros,
Oilman, Petrovik),
In the "critical model" many see limitations for constructing and
making credible in a non-utopian sense a new social arrangement. Perhaps
it is so that the structure of society Marcuse envisions is not specified
as some particular form of socialism; yet, he does offer what he sees as
suitable guidelines or criteria. He indicates tools for analysis and
2
criteria for deciding courses of action.
1
If one reflects on the fatalism common to these important influ-
ences, including Freud, it is not surprising to find the extent to
which Ifercuse's own negativist position is a reflection of that. Under-
girding each of these theorists is a frustration vd.th the failure of
events to turn out as they hoped, the sense of human pov/erlessness
against the larger inhuman forges. This is a position that is, however,
usefully ameliorated and transcended by the radical-liberals who bring
the cautious optimism of William James* "will to believe" to the
existential experience.
2
This is achieved in "the power of negation" (as the negation of
negation) and in the positive principles of nature and aesthetics.
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The particular significance of Marcuse's work, I believe, can bo
best indicated throueh a distinction between the focus of Marx and the
.
focus of Marcuse whereas Marx raised to historical coenizar.ce the re-
lationship between raaterial forces (specifically, the capitalist mode
of production) and the quality of existence (alienation), Marcuse draws
to our attention a connection between the form of existence and how we
comprehend it mentally and instinctually and what this means for praxis,
putting thought into action. This is the question of the character and
function of philosophy, science, culture, and ideology-the symbolic
forces for the integration of society and the essential components of a
technological society. Marcuse reveals these not as mere superstructure
according to (some) Marxist interpretation or as apologists would have
us believe as neutral forces, but in their forms under capitalist struc-
ture, more coercive and repressive than necesssiry, tald.ng over more
subtle forms. Philosophy, science, cultiu-e, and ideology form a
problem, the problem of "technological rationalj.ty," of immense importance
if change toward a more humane and rational society is to be considered
possible at ell. That future society depends on the capacity of critique,
joined at a very instinctual level (critique revealing false needs, thus,
making possj.ble the reconstruction of the individual in terms of real
needs), to overcome overwhelming resistance by the dominanting force of
"technological rationality."
"Critical theory" has the purpose of niaking manifest this important
connection between human existence and the forms by which it is
Kai Nielsen, for instance, is satisfied that Marcuse offers criteria on
which to base moral action in his essay "On the Choice Between Reform
and Revolution," pp. 17-3'1, esp. pp. ii8-h9, in Held, Nielsen, and
Parsons, eds,, Phi losophy and Political Action (New York: Oxford
University Press, 19727T
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comprehended and acted upon. In this understanding, the sophistical
question of whether Marcuso is a pre- or post-Marxist is laid to rest/
Marcuse-s review of German idealism's treatment of the problem of the
dialectic of the urdversal and the particular in Countej^'.eyomio.i.and
Revolt makes this clear:
But it is only the Marxian conception which, whilepreserving the critical, transcendent element of
Idealism, uncovers the piaterial, historical groundfor the reconciliation of human freedom and natural
necessity; subjective and objective freedom. This
union presupposes liberation; the revolutionary
praxis which is to abolish the institutions of
capitalism and to replace them by socialist insti-
tutions and relationships,
Marcuse, distinguishing his own position, continues:
But in the transition, the emancipation of the senses
must accompany the emancipation of consciousness, thus
involving the totality of hujnan existence. The indi-
viduals themselves must change in their very instincts
and sensibilities if they are to build, in association,
a qualitatively different society.^
My effort in the following pages is simply one of trying to present
the work of Marcuse in a comprehensive (even if reductivist) form
according to his declared and apparent purposes so that his efforts take
on the significance that his more abstract statements sometimes obscure.
The effort will be geared to, first, delineating his critical method
vMch is generally unfamiliar to American social scientists and is the
reason for much misunderstanding of what he is trying to say. I will
then tui'n to an examination of his theory of repressive society, what
3
Alasdain Maclntyre, Herbert Marcuse; An Exposition and a Polemic
(New York: Viking Press, 1970), p. 19.
h
Herbert Marcuse, Count err'evolution and Revolt (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1972), pp. 73-7ii.
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its features are and how it came about, in order to prepare the founda-
tion for a construction of a theory of repressive participation. If
.
much of what passes in the American poHtical process for participation
is really repressive, what is the prospect for true, meaningful parti-
cipation? We will, then, need to consider next Marcuse's answer in the
"Great Refusal," which recognizes the tendency of even progressive move-
ments to turn into their opposite to the degree to which they accept the
rules of the game. Only under another socio-economc condition, one
which resembles very much a modernized Rousseauan world, can true parti-
cipation occur as a pattern of social action among self
-developed and
free human beings.
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Marcuse's Critical Theory
What is "critical theorv''"' Wh^t u.toaeory. wfiat is its philosophic basis? How
does it distinguish itself?
Those identified vdth the Institute for Social Research in
Frankfurt, founded in 1923, refer to their framework as "the critical
theory of society.- The approach, it appears, has been n,orc success-
fully developed in the European than the American setting. l>,uch
important writing rez^ins to be translated from the Ger«n, and a system-
atic survey of the work of the school is not here available to my
knowledge,
"Critical" refers specifically to the critique of political
economy which conotitutes the core of Marx's efforts.^ The thrust of
the approach follows from the concept of historical change and the
relationship of historically changing social structures to conceptions
about them. An emphasis on this point, however, directs the critical
school away from Marxists who claim to be more true to Marx (e.g.,
Maclntyre) in terms of accepting the role of labor (material necessity)
in the conception of revolution. This proposition also separates the
Martin Jay, The Dialectic al IjnaFjjTatjjan - A History of The
Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923-1950
(Boston: Little Brown, 1973). This study is the first to become
available.
6
William Leiss, "The Critical Theory of Society; Present Situation
and Futui-e Tasks" in Paul Breines, ed., Critical Interruptions - New
Left Perspectives on Herbert Marcuse (New York: Herder and Herder
1970), p. 76.
'
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school fro. "traditional theory" which has failed to transcend its early
reason for adopting the scientific (positivist and relativist) and
objectivist status in its theory of knowledge. Traditional theory,
philosophically, according to the critical school, separates its
knowledge from guiding purposes through its method of study. "Failure"
to make this analytic separation on the part of the critical school is
neither arbitrary nor extraneous but necessary, according to the argu-
ment, in terms of the purpose of philosophy. Theory should not only be
able to delineate the existing pattern of social relations but reveal
the present historical possibilities, either for the direction of a
transition^to a more humane society or in the direction of increased
barbarism. To do this the "scientific" character of theory is not to
be rejected. But scientific theory must be enlightened with critical/
normative views-that is, with a purposeful goal whose content must be
spelled out. The vocabulary of "freedom and happiness" and human needs,
biological and aesthetic, have served this function in Marcuse's writings.
Critique of empiricism, liberalism, and pluralism must flow from this
view. According to an analysis by Albrecht Wellmer in The Critical
Theory of Society
,
this "mediating" approach transcends the social and
ideological limitations of behaviorist social science and the inter-
subjective approach of the position articulated by Peter Winch in The
Idea of A Social Science (the study of subjectively intended contexts
7
Ibid., p. 79.
8
See, for instance. Negations - Essays in Critical Theory (trans.
Jeremy J. Shapiro) (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), chap. 3j and One
Dimensional Man - Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society
(Boston: Beacon Press, 196ii), chaps, h and 5.
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of meaning). These latter approaches are useless fr™ the perspective
of ideology-critique for changing society and bringing about the eman-
cipation of men; for they are unable to deal vrith the tension between
the "is" and the "ought."
What, then, are the sources for an understanding of real possibilities
according to the critical school's account? The answer lies in the school'
characteristic view of history and consciousness. The error of idealism
is that it separates the realm of ideas from condxtions in which they
develop, necessitating abandonment of the human condition in its
struggle for justice, freedom, and happiness to another, unreal world.
Marcuse observes:
To the extent that philosophy has nevertheless made its
peace with man's determination of economic conditions,
It has allied itself with repression. That is the bad
materialism that underlies the edifice of idealism: The
consolation that in the material world everything is in
order as it is.... The other premise of this materialism
is that the mind is not to make its demands in this world,
but is to orient itself toward another realm that does not
conflict with the material world.^*^
Or,
In idealism the individual protests the world by making
both himself and the world free and rational in the
realm of thought. This philosophy is in an essential
sense individualistic.
The critical school claims to be materialist, as opposed to idealist, in
the sense that concrete historical experience embodies what is possible,
what is connected to social experience. Another passage indicates what
9
Allbrecht Wellmer, Critical Theory of Society (trans. John Curmning)
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), pp. 31-3i4.
10
Herbert Marcuse, "Ph.ilosophy and Critical Theory" in Negations,
p. 153.
11
Ibid., p. Ii40.
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Marcuse means here:
To be sure, even the highest philosophical categories are
ge~1ac\'\\aTtf '^^"^^ withTh^rosreneral fact th t he struggle of man vd.th nature has notbeen midertaken by mankind as a free subject burinsLadhas taken place only in class society. tea
Wellmor's study calls this recogrJ.tion of thought as historically-
contained, bearing within it a notion of the good life, the "draft
meaning of history." Marcuse's 1937 essay, "Philosophy and Critical
Theory," places emphasis upon the need to rediscover the past, the
links that the future has in the past.
To bo sure, there is another dimension of fantasy or imagination,
and also intuition and reflection. Fantasy has its place in being
instrumental to obtaining the futm-e. But to be useful fantasy must be
connected with historical experience j otherw:.se, it will be boundless
In
and dangerous.
In OneJDijnens^ion^ Marcuse specifies the requirements of this
kind of social theory so dependent on an initial set of abstractions
more closely:
In order to identify and define the possibilities of an
optimal development, the critical theory must abstract
12
Ibid., p. U48.
13
Critical Theory of Society
, pp. i|0-Ul. He writes: "Critical
theory is derivable from a notion of the 'good life' already available
to it as part of the socio-historical situation it subjects to analysis;
which, as the notion of an acknowledgement of each individual as a person
by every other individual, and as the idea of a non-coercive communal
human life of dialogue, is a draft meaning of history already frag-
mentarily embodied in a society's traditions and institutions: A draft
meani.ng v/hich it applies critically in opposing a society and its
dominant forms of self-understanding."
11;
"Philosophy and Critical Theory," pp. l$h-l$^.
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from the actual organization and utilization of societv's
ut^i^r'sucr ""T"'' '"-'^ organxlt^ytuazation. Such abstraction which refuses to accent thegiven universe of facts as the final context o? vaSdationsuch "transcending" analysis of the facts in tL Sht o?their arrested and denied possibilities, pertains to thevery structure of social theory. It is'opposed to aU
te^ o^t'hft^ ^"'r vigorously listorical charac-
^he reach ofT^lT """^' "Possibilities" must be uithin
TollTlf;^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^ ''^^ <^^^inable
In short, what is socially possible must be linked to historical trends,
and that is the role of theory and the constructive conceptualizations
of economic and political categories. The question of possibility, the
lL^^±iAhepj>ss^ is imbedded as a fundamental consideration in the
very dialectical logic of this approach.
The correctness of critical theory is only proved in practice and
^-iiO£i.£riori; theory has only hypothetical status until tested. And
time changes its applicability and appropriateness—hence, Marcuse's
reassessment of certain ideas presented in the 1930' s and 19^0' s is
l6
unabashed. Similarly, in the Essay on Liberation there is no need for
apology for modifying the pessimism about the potentialities for change
during the mid-1960' s. This is a flexibility in Marcuse's position that
conventional political scientists see as a weakness in his system (because
of the assumption of regularities of behavior in their workj only uni-
formities can yield the laws of generalizability that they are seeking).
T5r—
One Dimensional Man
,
p. xi.
16
See Leiss, pp. 87-88 j and Ma.rcuse in "Forward," Negations, p. xv.
The Theory of Repressive Society
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The starting point for Marcuse's theory is the same as that for
Marx: The conception of man that is to be realized. Both are concerned
vith the problem of what becomes of man under varied social arrangements.
Our evidence for this concern in Marcuse appears as early as his 1932
essay on Marx's Economic and Philosophi^ Manus^^ That essay
emphasized the philosophic basis from which Marx's critique of bourgeois
political economy and his theory for revolutionary change proceeded. It
is a conception of man's being that must finally be arrived at when we
ask, what is the ultimate subject of any ethical politics? Plato and
Aristotle, Rousseau, Marx, Thoreau, Gandhi, Solzhenitsyn, Camus, the
Berrigans-diverse figures such as these all give testimony to the
naturalistic-hujnanist cause: Furthering in practical form the conception
of man as a universal free being, the feature of which seems to be the
struggle against the forces that limit his existence. V/hat man can be-
come is the question of Kant, of Hegel, of Marx, of Marcuse. It is the
only significant drama, according to Schiller—the conflict between what
man is and v;hat he ought to be.
17
"The Foundation of Historical Materialism" in Studies in Critical
Phi.losophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. l-ii8. This essay aTTe'i^J^
to overcome several misinterpretations of Marx's definition of man (man
as a sensuous being, and therefore a suffering being: The process of
the objectification of this being, and man as a passionate being).
Marcuse vnritey: "In developing this concept Marx and Feurerbach vjere
in fact coming to grips with one of the crucial problems of 'classical
German philosophy.
'
But in Marx it is this concept of sensuousness
(as objectification) which leads to the decisive turn from classical
German philosophy to the theory of revolution, for he inserts the
basic traits of practical and social existence into his definiti on of
man's essential being. As objectivity, man's sensuousness is essen-
tially practical objectification, and because it is practical it is
essentially a social objectification." p. 21. Here is the opportunity
for the synthesis of treud, and the accent Marcuse provides.
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In Short, we must begin with the contrast model of man as a poten-
tiality in order to understand the features of Marcuse's theory of
repressive politics. For, this is a theory which asserts advanced
industrial society to have material, intellectual, and psychological
features that are repressive of those potentialities. The theory must
first account for such potentialities and indicate the specific features
whi.ch diminish or prohibit the emergence of those potentialities in more
than the exceptional case. Only after this can an effort towards a
theory of repressive participation be undertaken.
In "The Foundation of Historical Materialism" Marcuse shows the
central and original meaning of the position Marx derives from Kant,
Hegel, and Feurerbach concerning "species being"-i.e., a being which
has the species as its object. I want to sketch his account here briefly.
Man was distinguished from animals because he could give shape to his
existence; he could "produce himself." In this, he is a universal and
free being. Man has the capacity to make the species of every being his
object, and, therefore, could grasp the possibilities contained in every
being. He is a urdversal being because he could appropriate nature for
his needs, making it his own nature, his human nature. Labor was the
specifically human life activity in the process of man's own obiecti-
18
fication, his own self-realization. And, work and praxis were the
particularly human modes of self-affirmation. Alienated labor—the
estrangement of man from himself, from nature, and from others—was a
18
Marcuse sees the discussion of "self-actualization" and "autonomy"
by post-Freudian re'd.sionists as ossified sociology, for it fails to
comprehend this relationship between man's condition and his being.
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denial of n^n's humanity, his reduction to an anin.1 or .ore appropriately,
to a cog in a machine, by a particular perverse for. of objectivication
(i.e., reification, estrangement). This is what needed to be superseded.
It is veil to note here that Marcuse has consistently held on to this
early Marxian model of sensuous man and the process of objectivication.'^
But he did amend it in certain crucial ways, to the irritation of certain
latter-day Marxists such as Alasdair Maclntyre.
For instance, Freud seemed appropriate and suitable for synthesis to
this early conception, for what Freud offered in his analysis of the ego
was another-and more developed-explanation of the instinctive side of
man. Marcuse writes: "Freud had discovered the mechanisms of social and
political control in the depth dimensions of instinctual drives and sat-
isfactions." Instincts were, from this original stardpoinb, viewed as
life determimng forces subject to historical modification and illusion
(as distorted communication) and had an important role in this process.
21In other words, psychoanalysis operated from a dynami.c theory of mind.
It was a side that very much coincided with the tasks marked out by Marx's
concept of the process of objectification. Marcuse develops the
19
For the development of this discussion see the essay cited
above, pp. lk-27
,
20
In "The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man," in Plve Lec-
tures - Psychoanalysis, Politics and Utopia (Boston: Beacon Press7~r970)
,
p. hU, According to Marcuse, the individual once seen by Freud no longer exists.
21
This feature is well brought out in Richard Wollheim's study of
Freud. Wollheim writes of the initial insight that triggered Freud's
lifetime career in the following way: "(Charcot) started him off on a new
career, and he endowed him with two gifts, wh.ich, transformed over the
years by experience and by the ingenuity of P'reud's mind, became the
foundations of psychoanalysis. One was a form of therapy, which set out
to remove the symptoms of mental disorder through the use of words, and
the other was a diagnosis, according to which the symptoms of the disorder
were traceable to the influence of ideas." In Sigmund Freud (New York:
Viking Press, 1971), p. xi.
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significance of Freud in this way:
His- psychology does not focus on the concrete .nH . t .personality as it exists in its private and Ihi?
""^^'^^
thfLsr^^^^ T'' ^^'^^^"^^ oonc'e'aS'r^t^t'tt'^n^e™^e e sence and nature of the Derson^l
-i
^^^^^-^s
result Of long historical proc^:::r: L'^'ar ^^n. aledin
o^i^t'rand'ther" -^^^^-t^onal entities Sig'up's ciety, and these processes define the personalitv and
wh\\ U^v^^^^n^"
Consequently, to undLs^^nfJhLtr
^^l^ll^^^^ HMl-e the. by
Of course, Freudian psychology has rested on the specific emphasis
of the internal instinctual (sexual) conflicts of the child. The indi-
vidual's superego and libidinal states took shape in the struggle of the
ego against the father-figui-e. The effect of this struggle was what
gave shape to the instinctual basis of behavior, but Marcuse's modifi-
cation of Freud's theory lead to the rejection of the inevitability or
necessity of domination by a primal father-figure. Marcuse's account
reduced the universalized analysis of Freud to a characteristically
historical-cultural one. And he expanded the number of opportunities
which could effect the ego. Briefly, the father-displaced by the gener-
alized, abstract and depersonalized edjninistered structures of twentieth
century society-had lost his paternal significance. The result was a
weakened ego structure and a superego that was heavily conformist. Man
was the subject of unnecessary repressive domination—unnecessary to the
extent to which he was not allowed the conditions for realizing his full
humanity, conditions which would allow the ego, in struggle, to become
strong and autonomous (i.e., self-determining)
,
22
Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization - A Philosophic Inquiry
Into Freud (New York: Vintage, 1955), p. 52. But Freud was not uncon-
cerned with the "healthy" personality^ see Paul Roazen, Freud; Political
and Social Thought (New York: Vintage, 1968), pp. 273-2B9^;
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What these altered conditions were, and how they differed from
earlier ones, renins to be made clear. What we must now note is that,
for Mane and for Marcuse (as well as for Meadian social psychologists who
help to illu:ninate the radical-liberal position) the analysis rests on
the (insightful) observation that man is not autonomous from his fellow
man and society in any complete sense. He is very much a reflection of
such social relations. This being so, roan cannot be free "on his own."^^
Man needs help to be free-that is, to be free of his class problems. He
needs his culture, his institutions, his language ("Man needs
-a totality
2ii
^
of human manifestations of life.'"). This requi.res the further recog-
nition of man as a "social" being, a view that is denied in the bourgeois
society which celebrates individualism. It is for Marcuse, as it is
for Lukacs and other critical theorists, this particular society whdch
makes man solitary and for which solitariness is the typical human ex-
perience—in other words, a social phenomenon. The problem is the analyz-
ing of this inter-relationship, this intersection, between specific
social institutions and what man is and what he can become. The dialectic
is particularly attuned to this broad task. Toward this end, the analysis
of language, in the sense that there is a political economy of language
(what the ordering of concepts is and how it is achieved), must also
have some significant play.
23
Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," in Wolff, Moore and
Marcuse, A Critique of Pui-e Tolerance (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), pp. 86-
2li
"The Foundations of Historical Materialism," op. cit
., p. 23; Marcuse
is quoting Marx here.
25
See, for instance, the argument of Steven Lukes, Individualism (New
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973).
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Obviously, the view outlined so far (of what man is and can be; the
role of instincts and their modification; the relationship of man to his
society) is quite another position than that offered by the theorists of
what has sometimes been called "the oversocialized conception of man-
or of other views of man.-for example, the Hobbesian view or the views
of man dramatized in Orv^ell's Anirr^ and lonesco's The Rhinoceros/^
Western bourgeois political economy ca^t (indeed, must not) regard
alienation and estrangement as a sociological fact and starting point.
It has not selected man as a starting point; at best the question of
man's being is an afterthought. Marcuse is critical for this reason:
Bourgeois political economy has to be basically trans-
formed in the critique for this very reason: It never
gets to see man and his history and is thus j.n the
profoundest sense not a "science of people" but of
nonpeople and of an "inhuman world of objects and
coiamodities."27
Its starting point is somewhere else (e.g., the concern with how to
achieve a "stable" society) and man takes his value from the world of
exchange. Because of the necessity for the mystification of this
essential premise (the theory of value at the core of bourgeois economy),
bourgeois philosophy requires its non-subversive "analytic" categories and
modes. (Perhaps these are useful under limited conditions, but they are
never transcended and formulated into a more comprehensive construct.)
It is not strange, then, that from the bourgeois perspective, the
lack of control over events is expected and explained by the "apparent
over-powering forces beyond man's control" the concealed notion of
28
inevitability. In a certain sense that is very so. Man cannot be
2^
Cf. Fred R. Dallmayr, "Empirical Political Theory and the Image of
Man," Polity
, 2 (Summer 1970) :hii3-ii78.
27
"The Foundations of Historical Materialism," op. ci t., p. 9.
Cited by Mai'curiC, "The Foundations of Historical Materialism," p. 18,
can
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Viewed as a controlling agent, a responsible agent in his ov. history^
it is logically impossible (mu^tisjou^^ Utopian). This point
be brought out if we recall some previously noted theorists in thi.
study. For instance, McConnell and Lo.^ cannot appreciate the value of
what happens to man's autonomy in the socio-political structure. Social-
ization theorists using a systems fraraework accept and promote the
established integration processes. No encouragement is ever offered,
except in the purely rhetorical sense perhaps, for one to rise above
one's mere existence
^
this can certainly be said of most human relations
and management experts. As Marcuse expresses it, the problem of aliena-
tion allows the objectification of existence to turn into reification.
Explaim.ng away the larger problems of man's existence, and focusing
only on the limited and technologically manageable ones, which seems to
be the tendency of conventional social science, are two important ways
to escape the larger and universal meanings of human existence. Not a
very sweeping role is demanded for pliilosophy.
I have tried to suggest the senses in vMch a concept of man's
potentiality is important to Marcuse 's theory. We might now ask, in
what way is advanced industrial society "repressive?" A brief review of
Marcuse 's application of the concept of repression from Freud's meta-
psychology is in order. This concept referred to the necessary and
inevitable process of controlling the internally conflicting impulses of
He comes back to this point in his criticism of Charles Reich's Greening
of America in which it is asserted that "nobody is in control." "Berkeley
Journal of Sociology, 16 (1971), "The Movement in a New Era of Repression,"
p. 6.
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the individual for the development and progress of civilization/^
Marcuse accepted the fact, in line with Freud, that some aspects of life
.
must necessarily be repressive. Indeed, this necessary repression-
sublimation-was the mark of a civilized person. This was "basic" re-
pression and was defined in Er_os_anlCivi
,3 "the modification
of instincts necessary for the perpetuation of the huraan race in civil-
i7.ation5 these are the restrictions which mark the development of man
from the human animal to homo sapiens." What Marcuse uniquely asserted
in opposition to both the pessimistic Freud and Freud's optimistic re-
visionists (who accepted the environment as a given) was unnecessary
repression wMch was forraed historically-i.e.
,
surplus repression.
like Marx's concept of surplus value, surplus repression was a
concept meant to indjxate magnitude-the magnitude of repression imposed
on man by social institutions j it is "the quantitative sublimation of
individual needs and wants basic to 'pertain social forms but not for
31
human existence and association." It is that portion which is the
result of social conditions sustained in the specific interest of class
29
Wollheim's account of Freud suggests this was not a position
rigidly adhered to by Freud, p. 26I. See also, Peter Madison, Freud's
22I!gfilLi^L^Iggsio''^ and Defense (Minneapolis: University of Mil^Hesota
Press, lyblTand Peter Madison, "Freud's Repression Concept," Inter-
national Journal of Psychoanalysis. 37 (1956) :75-86.
30
Eros
, p. 82.
31
Ibid., p. 81.
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domination. The specific conditions of advanced industrial society in-
troduce additional controls (over and above, or rather underneath the
social conflicts) new strains and stresses in the individual^ and these
stresses and strains are part of the normal function3.ng of the society.^^
Specifically, surplus repression takes two forms: (l) As tendencies or
forces that serve the requirements of the established apparatus of
production, distribution, and consumption, and (2) as systematic manip-
ulation and control of the psyche. Instances of suitdIus repression which
Marcuse provides are the modifications and deflections of instinctual
energies necessitated by the perpetuation of the monogamic-patriarchal
family, or by a hierarchical division of labor, or by public control
33
over the individual's private existence. Social repression in our
society, if I read Marcuse correctly, is almost always linguistic re-
pression and this can take infinite forms.
How does this repressive process occin-? Central to Marcuse 's con-
version of Freudian meta-psychology is his account of the Oedipus story
for explaining the functioning of the superego as a moral structure.
His account depicts the occurrence of an historical shift from the
primal father as the object of authority to another stage in which
there is a father-substitute in the generalized, abstract and deper-
sonalized institutions of administered society. In the domination-
rebellion-domination cycle that Freud postulates, Marcuse 's interpretation
suggests that the second domination is simply not a repeat of the first
domination, but takes on a progressive historical cnaracter:
32
Negations
, p. 2^1,
33
Fros, p. 3^4
.
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From the primal father via the brother clan to the systemof institutional authority characteristic of mature
Pf]^iif^'°''^
domj.nation becomes increasingly rational,
fully developed performance principle, subordination
appears as implemented through the social division oflabor Itself (although physical and persona] force re-
mains an indispensable instrumentality). Society emerges
as a lasting and expanding system of useful performances:the hierarchy of functions and relations assumes the formof objective reason: Lav/ and order are identical withthe life of society itself. In the same process, re-pression too is depersonalized: Constraint and regimen-tation of pleasure now become a function (and "natural"
result) of the social division of labor. To be sure
the_ father, as paterfamilias
, still performs the basic
regimentation of instincts which prepares the child for
the surplus-repression on the part of society during his
adult life. But the father performs this function as the
representative of the family's position in the social
division of labor rather than as the "possessor" of the
mother. Subsequently, the individual's instincts are
controlled through the social utilization of his labor
power. -^^
The sequence has an extremely pathological feature, because the reifica-
tion of the father-figure also transforms the character of guilt. At one
time guilt's object was a concrete and manageable figure. Guilt in ad-
vanced industrial society would have to turn against the very object which
also brings the benefits and pleasures that sustain the individual. The
paradox is internal and self-contained, and the individual no longer
possesses a sphere of private non-conformity. There is no longer mental
space for developing himself against his sense of guilt, and for living
with a conscience of his own. Any recognition of this process is con-
trolled at the level of consciousness by society's institutions:
Civilization has to defend itself against the spector of
a world which could be free. If society carjiot use its
growing productivity for reducing repression (because such
Ibid., p. 81
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usage would upset the hierarchy of the status m.n^productivity
.ust be turned agLnst the indi'X.is.
ecomes itself an instrument of universal control 35
In this line of analysis, there is some real significance, for
Marcuse, and for the purposes of ou.- argument, to the loss of such
traditional institutions as the famly, religion, and s^ll enterprises
(not that these institutions are iHo_facto good), whj.ch are progress-
ively absorbed into large-scale impersonal groupings. Here is the loss
of the conditions for the formation of the superego. Without these con-
ditions the superego is lost to a social (mass-created and atomized) ego
for the lot of the population. Now, under the rule of economic, political,
and cultural monopolies, the formation of the mature superego seems to
skip the stage of individualization: The generic atom becomes directly
a social atom. The repressive organization of the instincts seems to
be collective, and the ego seems to be prematurely socialized by a
whole system of extrafamilial agents and agencies. As early as the pre-
school level, gangs, radio, and television set the tyrannical pattern for
both conformity and rebellion. Deviations from the patterns are punished
not so much within the family as outside and against the family. The
experts of the mass media transmit the required values j they offer the
perfect training in efficiency, toughness, personality, dream and romance.
These are the fantasy forms that characterize class identification. With
this form of indoctrination, the family can no longer compete; in other
36
words, "the substance of the family too is cashed in by the society."
Ibid., p. 85.
36
Ibid., p. 38. The quote is from Aspects of Sociology by the
P'rankfurt Institute for Social Research "(Boston: Beacon Pre'ss, 1972),
chap. IX, "The Family," p. 137.
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and, it is for this reason that Marcuse is derisive of the liberal
notion that the present structure enables the development of autonomous,
.whole and valued beings.
According to Marcuse 's writings and this review of the theory of the
unconscious, there are, then social forces leading the individual psyche
to act repressively^ i.e., to put into the unconscious through the agency
of the now-socialized superego instinctual and healthy desires that
might otherwise disrupt the prevailing and ongoing sets of interests of
dominant institutions. The family, the school, and religion become, for
instance, important transmitting agencies. In this sense, then, the
process of r-epressicn is both social and political as well as individual.
How the mechanism functions is considered a matter of conjecture at this
timej but that there is repression, "that people forget things and that
37there is an ascertainable motive for forgetting them," is indubitable.
There may be some senses in which these repressive forces can be
meaningfully distinguished. First, the materially repressive forces of
the economic structui-e may be indicated; specifically, the capitalist
economic structiu-e is ijiiplicated. The American productive-consumptive
society's progress depends, for its very logic, upon a growth in destruc-
tiveness. As Pilisuk and Hayden put it: "Ovor concept is more nearly
38
that American society is a military-industrial comples." Within this
37
J. 0, V/isdom, "Psychoanalytic Theories of the Unconscious,"
Encyclopedia of Pl-iilosophy, 8:l89-19U.
3B
Marc Pilisuk and Thomas Hayden, "Is There a Military-Industrial
Complex which Prevents Peace?: Consensus and Countervailing Power in
Pluralistic Systems," in Bias of Pluralism, p. 152.
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ruling economy, labor is not self-selected and does not satisfy individual
needs or faculties. The alienation of labor from what is productive and
satisfying is hidden by the veil of affluence; this is the illusory
39
meaning of a "higher" social status. By the very nature of this struc-
ture, only politically insignificant minorities suffer the conditions of
poverty; this is^what has been denoted by Claus Offe as "the permanent
welfare class."
Secondly, the intellectually repressive features of this historical
stage of society are best captured in the dominant ideology which Marcuse
refers to as "technological rationality." The society camouflages its
irrationality—at a conscious level—through a specific form of "rationality"
wMch celebrates a commodity fetishism, and in its "affirmative" character
postulates an eternal idea of happiness in place of real gratification.
At higher levels, this rationality is also intended to set the limits
within which means-ends decisions are made. Habermas has continued this
analysis fruitfully in his essay "Technology and Science as 'Ideology.'"
Thirdly, the psychologically repressive features of this society,
perhaps distinct only in ambiguous ways from intellectually repressive
39
This theme is developed further in Marcuse 's essay "Aggressiveness
in Advanced Industrial Society," in Negations
, pp. 2U8-268,
iiO
Claus Offe, "Advanced Capitalism and the V/elfare State," Politics
and Society
,
(Summer 1972 ) :h79-U88. In numbers this group may not be"
so significant; depending on the definition and the source, the number
in this class ranges from one-fifth to two-fifth's of the American
population.
hi
Marcuse 's essay is "The Affirmative Character of Culture," in
Negations
, pp. 88-133
•
219
features, embrace forces addressed at the unconscious level of instincts,
especially sexual ones. Simply put, sexual and other instinctual drives
are exchanged or converted for some other more socially-desirable form
of behavior-for example, more labor power. As the nature of capitalism's
dynand.cs changed, for instance, the dynamics of the sexually-repressive
process changed from an overtly repressive puritanism to the more oblique
one embodied in hedonism and which Marcuse terms "repressive desublimation,"
for in the^modern coniraercial world consumerist and sexual liberation are
combined. According to Marcuse, "repressive desublimation" has the
appearance of freedom, but its essential quality is one of perpetuating
the "divided self" (in Laing's terminology) or a false individualism,
which is Slater's theme in The Pursuit of Loneliness. There are other
non-symbolic forces affecting the psychic economy—lack of any real free
time. The time for solitude and reflection, is one of them. According
to V. J. McGill in The Idea of Happiness
,
contemplation seems to be a
clear omssion in Bentham's construction of the pleasure principle.
If we recall our Rousseauan paradigm, this was a condition essential to
the development of the reflective process; it v;as a condition vital to
the examination of one's authenticity.
In combination, these repressive forces constitute the warp and weft
of the heavy imposition official and unofficial social agencies place on
the whole sensing being of the mass of individuals in the present historical
—ir2
An interesting passage is provided by Walter A, Weiskopf , Alienation
and Economics- (New York: Delta, 1971), pp. llU-115.
Weiskopf, pp. 71-79, discusses this interpretation.
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period of advanced industrial society. Sorae do escape it as we shall
see.
The important significance of the concept of repression to a theory
of society can be better brought out now. Marcuse, in his account,
is contending that social needs h,ave become individual needs at the very
level of instincts. More precisely, the way the instincts express them-
selves has been set in certain ways. There is, in the Freudian termi-
nology, the usurpation of the Pleasure Principle by the historically-
specific reality principle, the Performnce Principle. Advanced industrial
society has successfully mitigated the recognition of the purpose and the
price that must be paid for this exchange. In this account Marcuse is
implicitly suggesting the inadequacy of Marxist theory. As Robinson's
study of Marcuse suggests: "Marxism had proved inadequate not because it
was overly abstract and revolutionary, but precisely because it was not
revolutionary enough. The social criticism of the future, Marcuse felt,
would have to be both more negative and more Utopian than even Marxism.
"^^
Marcuse' s critique is distinctive just because of his insistent effort to
unravel the dynamics of this split between indi\rLdual and social needs at
their interface-~the level of consciousness and consciousness-modification.
And this is what is seen by Habermas, for instance, as perceptive about
the synthesis of Mara and Freud, even though—as it becomes apparent—
Marcuse may not have been completely successful in the synthesis himself.
Haberaas writes:
Marx had developed the idea of the self-constitution of the
human species in natural history in two dimensions: As a
Paul A. Robinson, The Freudian Left (New York: Harper Colophon,
1969), p. 179.
2roc^ess_of_sen;-pr^^ which is iinpelled forw;,rri w
anrt stored irx the forces of production and as a self-fomatl^^^ which is impelled forward by thi'
critical-revolutionary activity of classes and which isstored in experiences of reflection. On the other hand
SfJ?: the status of
^he sel fTn
critique, was supposed to reconstruct
coLeot Th. 'P'^'"^^ ^'^ materialist
f
synthesis of man and nature remained re-
.
categorical framework of instrumental
action. Thisj£amew^^ productive know-M|l.but_noti^^
productive activity suited for reconstruction of power
and Ideology. In contrast, Freud has acquired in meta-psychology a framework for distorted comraunicative actiontnat allows the conceptualization of the origins of in-
stitutions and the role and function of illusions, that is
of power and ideology. Freud's theory can represent a
structure that Marx did not fathom. ^5
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The end product of this repressive process that Marcuse has dra^m is
a figure who is inescapably the conformist, the role-player, the sub-
servient. These are men and women who vail play the game within an
authoritarian and hierarchical structure of servitude. There is a tragic
dimension here, because these individuals sense the necessity to conform
in order to survive within the institutions they find themselves. Their
identity has failed to crystallize through no fault of their own.
Marcuse 's case, and that of the radical position more clearly, in-
volves the dialectical claim, that, in more than the exceptional case,
there are possibilities for human development, principled action, and
creative expression—despite the human condition's tragic dimension.
115
Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1971), chap. 12, "Psychoanalysis and Social Theory: Nietzsche's
Reduction of Cognitive Interests," pp. 281-282. Habermas makes the point
that, "Marx was not able to see that power and ideology are distorted
communication, because he made the assumption that men distinguish them-
selves from animals when they began to produce their means of subsistance,
p. 282.
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The Marcusean argument, which is, for this reason, very
.uch W3.thin the
Rcussea^ian tradition, underscores and projects the native but vague
possibilities in natural man for growth and autonomy when assisted by
certain features of a social setting that provides conditions of equality,
mutual respect, solitude, and conversation.
Marcuse brings into his work, however, some of the weaknesses in
Freud's conceptual baggage-namely, his static, analytic theory of the
mind, a simplistic and mechanistic model. This problem is readily amended
by a more flexible concept which has been proposed by some of Freud's suc-
cessors who have postulated an Hypothesis of Degrees of Repression, "that
forgotten ideas are unconscious in differing degrees, because as one
idea becomes more acceptable to consciousness than it was, the idea next
to it is less removed from the threshold of consciousness."^^ This hy-
pothesis as to degree is viewed as an essential prenvise for psychoanalysis
to be practiced and to succeed at all.
On the positive side, the point cannot be overemphasized that
Marcuse's amended theory offers a more comraanding analysis than that
offered by the socialization theorists. Contemporary socialization
theorists, such as David Easton and Edv/ard S. Greenburg, perceived surely
correctly part of the human situation, the socializability of man as a
creature of s:yTnbolism. But they failed to ask. What can man become that
is true to hi.s very nature and more than merely the reflection of the
needs of the established institutional arrangements? What can man become
in terms of the best possibilities? If an individual is given a chance
to become a "social" being in the more meaningful and sufficient sense.
Wisdom, p. 190,
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will he? The question is unanswered. These theorists' inability, as
well, to deal with the other side of power, of conflict and confronta-
tion and anti-social behavior, suggests another shortcoming. Must not a
worthwhile social theory provide some account as to whether the society
is evol^•ing in a generative rather than degenerative form? Again, the
answer is not to be found, because they assume what must be proved. As
I shall later suggest, a proper and full account must examine the function
of language in establishing class differentials in the society. Marcuse,
in his theory of repressive society, has lead us to a definition of tasks
yet to be undertaken.
To summarize, Freud's work had allowed the possibility of exploring
the barriers, as well as supports, for making men and women more free to
be genuine masters of themselves. Culture, in its positive and negative
forms, had direct bearing on the defense mechanisms individuals employed
for overcoming, or failing to overcome, aggressive tendencies. As Roazen
points out of Freud's work, "Culture is not conceived only as a necessary
evil providj-ng a variety of compensations, but also a useful buttress in
providing its members with a needed sense of direction."
Such, then, is the Marcusean viewpoint which, in accord with our
Rousseauan model, recognizes, "All art is right which simply enlarges,
but none is right if it distorts us." The manifest result of Marcuse 's
work in One Dimensional Man and essays of that period was to show that
hi
Roazen, p. 209.
hQ
Quote from E, H. Wright as cited by Peter Gay in his: Introduction
to Ernst Cassirer's The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Bloomington and
London: Indiana University Press, 196? [195^ J), p. 20,
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the
.ass culture of technocratic society had little to offer for fostering
the developraent of self
-defining, relatively free and expressive hu:nan
beings and in one essay there was the critical thesis that t^eud's concept
of man had been made obsolete by the gro^rth of certain pathological social
tendencies. But that pessimism need not lead to the view that possibil-
ities for change have become frozen or petrified. There are conceptual
problems in Marcuse's analysis which can bo overcome through a synthesis
of his ideas, as amended and developed by Andre Gorz, particularly, and
the model set out by the radical-liberals. Before suggesting that syn-
thesis, I will turn next to developing a Marcusean theory of repressive
participation.
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Toward a Theory of Repressive Participation
Politics in advanced industrial society is repressive~-that has
been the main thread of Marcuse's argmnent so far. Let us now attempt
"
to set out the concept of repression in terms of a theory of partici-
pation and clarify it.
Repressive politics is a structure of power and a form of political
language that employs a broad spectrum of techirlques to maintain a narrow
consensus that will support the infrastructui-e, which is the productive,
distributive, and consumptive system that defines the dominant class
interests. The chief mark of a repressive style of politics is its
effect on consciousness-specifically, the effect is to diminish, or
force into the unconscious, the range of options that are available to
the domi.nated class and make them appear to be the full range.
The techniques of a repressive style of politics are familiar to the
readers of the literature. There may be the slights of ignoring minority
claims or demands for such apparently inconsequential things as a street-
light or a housing code; frustrated human experience becomes channeled
50
into either apathy or violent confrontation. More carefully organized
grievances from an outgroup stand the chance of being "swalled up" in
C9
For instance: Tom Hayden, Rebellion and Repression (New York:
Meridian, 1969); Issac D. Balbus, The Dialectics of Legal Repression-
Black Rebels before the American Criminal Courts (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1973); Alan ^olfe, The 5eamy Side of Democracy -
Repression in America (New York: David McKay, 1973).
The example is from Michael Parent!, "Power and Pluralism: A
View from the Botton," Journal of Politics
, 32 (August 1970) :501-530.
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the elastic liMts of a "tolerant" system, assigning a problem to a
special study committee predictably assures that some will forget the
original issue. There is also the ideological effort waged by political
elites to manipulate people's motivations and consciousness through the
socialization processes so that they accept the ruling ideology and
distrust and refuse to be moved by competing ones; the profit incentive,
for instance, has become just such a sacred cow. Or, social reality can
be made to appear confusing and uncontrollable j one's reconstruction of
reality is eschewed when information is not preferred, or made difficult
to obtain, or manipulated, or censored, or scrambled altogether. This
was the widely misunderstood point of Marcuse's essay "Repressive
Tolerance:"
All points of \dew can be heard: The Com-nunist and the
Fascist, the Left and the Right, the white and the Negro,
the crusadors of armament and for disarmament. Moreover,m endlessly dragging debates over the media, the stuDid
opinion is treated with the same respect as the intelligent
one, the misinformed may talk as long as the informed, and
propaganda rides along with education, truth with false-
hood. This pure toleration of sense and nonsense isjustified by the democratic argument that nobody, neither
group nor individual, is in possession of the truth and
capable of defining what is right and wrong, good and
bad. Therefore, all contesting opinions must be sub-
mitted to "the people" for its deliberation and choice.
The process is all the more successful when the ideology is able
to have itself reproduced on a massive scale by the educational, adver-
tising, news and entertainment media. State violence, the use of final
coercive power through limiting legislation, partial judiciaries, and a
highly centralized and bureaucratizcd police system (against the back-
drop of a public lassitude toward the violation of basic human rights)
IT—
"Repressive Tolerance," p. 9ii.
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is, however, the ultimate means of controlling the Umits of political
action. Marcuse shows what he is concerned about in a speech at the
University of Califorma at Berkeley on February 3, 197I, entitled
"The Movement in a New Era of Repression: An Assessment:"
We are far from a fascist form of government, but some
01 the possible preconditions are emerging. Thev are wellknown and I will just give you a list:' The counts' used
more and more as political tribunals; the reduction of
education and welfare in the richest country in the world:
anti-democratic legislation, such as preventive detention
ana the no-knock lawsj economic sanctions if you ai^epolitically and otherwise suspect j the intimidation and
sell-censoi-ship of the mass media.... ^2
Marcuse
-s charge has been that the prevailing, narrow, consensus in
which political discourse and non-discourse occurs is socio-historically
produced. The process by which it has developed has shaped the range of
available options, and the insights that might alter important and key
political decisions have been limited, modified, denied, or effectively
neturalized. The mechanism by which we mi^ht unlock ourselves is re -
^r_es_sed. The completion of the passage cited above from "Repressive
Tolerance" conveys the point:
...the democratic argmnent implies a necessary condition,
namely, that the people must be capable of deliberating
and choosing on the basis of knowledge, that they must
have access to authentic information, and that, on this
basis, their evaluation must be the r esult of autonomous
thought.
In the contemporary period, the democratic argument for
abstract tolerance tends to be invalidated by the invalida-
tion of the democratic process itself. The liberating force
of democracy v;as the chance it gave to effective dissent, on
the individual as well as social scale, its openness to
qualitatively different forms of government, of culture.
J2
In Berkeley Journal of Sociology
,
I6 (1971) :8.
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education, work-of the hitman existence in general. Thetoleration of free d iscussion and the equal ri.htof
opposites was to define and clarify the different fomsof dissent: Their direction, content, prospect. But
2ii^J2the^c_oncjn^^^^^ political p3^r
gL^^jg--J^^ec^er^t could friiireniir-Fe7~T^ thelormal^^
in_gPg:g^^. assembly .b3 " ' *
Our ability and confidence in ourselves as sensing creatures-searching
for the effective concepts, the valid concepts by which to live, has been
frustrated. Without constructive, compatibly-ordered concepts, people
cannot organize their energies effectively, either as individuals or as
socially-constituted groups. When the society prevents the insights as
to what is needed conceptually, the individual's energies can be dis-
functional to himself and, hence, to the long-term interests of the
society. This is, for example, the plight of the Iks of East Africa in
Colin M. Turnbull's account, The Mountain People
, as it is for the victims
of Alvin Toffler's Future Shock
.
Marcuse has applied the term "repression" to many aspects of society.
Liberal tolerance is thus, "repressive tolerance." The society's tacit
sanctioning of previously tabooed practice is "repressive desbulimation."
These forms of tolerance and desublimation are "repressive," for they
have the effect of weakening and further obliterating from the senses
the alienation suffered, and they become, instead, instruments of a
system simultaneously of social disintegration and social cohesion.
The term "repressive participation" is not found in Marcuse 's writings
but was coined by George Kateb in raising some critical comments on a
53
"Repressive Tolerance," p. 9$. Emphasis added.
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paper by David Braybrooke. Kateb asked: "In organization and institu-
rional life, what is the relation between increased participation and the
power of the established leadership or authority? How much real power
is usually given? May participating under many circumstances, provide
the best cover for manipulation by authority, in the style recommended by
Elton Mayo? Is there such a thing, then, as
-repressive participation?'"^^
The possibility provides an altogether different perspective on partici-
pation than heretofore considered.
According to the Marcusean variant of radical thought, there would
be some anal^^-tic fruitfulness to characterizing certain political forms
such as voting, which is enjoined for a majority of the population in
liberal democratic society, as repressive. Marcuse, writing in "Repressive
Tolerance" would point us in this direction:
...The exercise of political rights (such as voting, letter-
writing to the press, to Senators, etc., protest demonstra-
tions with a priori renunciation of counterviolence ) in a
society of total administration serves to strengthen this
adjTiinistration by testifying to the existence of democratic
liberties vjhich, in reality, have changed their content and
lost their effectiveness .^5
This is participation that has the effect of diminishing rather than
contributing to the growth of the human personality and, more generally,
the consequence of perpetuating the prevailing class divisions. The in-
dividual in important ways in engaging in voting may be acting irration-
ally as his actions may become an instrument of his own domination. For,
The question is posed and not further explored in a paper by
George Kateb to appear in the forthcoming volume Participation in Politics :
Nomos XVI (New York: Lieber-Atherton, 1975).
"Repressive Tolerance," p. 8U»
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as Wolfe has observed: "The ultimate goal of ideological repression is
to help people support their own repression."
Toward a definition of "repressive participation" I will propose the
following one: ''Re^lgssiA^aj^Ucipat^ suRgests the notion nfjo^p
Rgrfogiance of some political (state) function, such as vniA r.^_nr^_r^.
rormj^o_otji^^ niodes of political behavior
,
at thn_Pvp^;n^
2LJ^_£^^h_22R^~term interest s (needs, wants, purposes, pleasures) of
^Hi^Yil^^L,roup , society (of humanity and nature, in g^eneral) mider
1BI^1S]£1_2LI.^^.9J.^^^ and internal processes of restrai nt, constraint^ and
b (
sijpresslon." There are several implications in this formulation that
must be pointed out:
1. Here, it should be noted that the problem of the flattening of
human consciousness is not located in human nature but in the nature of
Wolfe, p. 133.
S7
Part of this definition is based on Marcuse's own definition of
repression in Eros and Civilization, p. 7. Alain Touraine in The Post-
Industrial Society—Toinorrov/' s Social History: Classes, Conflicts, and
Culture in the Programmed Society (New York: Random House, 1971) proposes
a comparable concept in his formulation of "dependent participation."
Its emphasis is on alienation, which, I feel, misses the dynandcs of the
conscious and unconscious. Touraine 's definition of "dependent partici-
pation" is suggested in the following passage: "A man is alienated when
his only relationship to the social and cultural directions of his society
is the one the ruling class accords him as compatible with the maintenance
of its own dominance. Alienation means canceling out social conflict by
creating dependent participation. The activities of the alienated man
make no sense unless they are seen as the counterpart to the interests
of those who alienate him. Offering the workers, for example, partici-
pation in the organization of an industry without their having authority
over its economic decisions leads to alienation, unless they consider
such participation a strategic move in their conflict with the managers
of industry. Ours is a society of alienation, not because it reduces
people to misery or because it imposes police restriction, but because
it seduces, manipulates, and enforces conformism." pp. 8-9.
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the setting, which is a manipulated and limited one. There is a signi-
ficant difference in saying-as for instance, Stouffer does and others
who share his perspective-that the average voter does not have a high
level of competence and, in fact, the claim that they cannot develop this
competence. This latter claim is not what those studies attempted to
prove,^and it thus remains unproven. Some studies do seem to support oui^
claim.
2. This tentative definition assumes that some interests are more
defensible than other ones, and thus it involves a rejection of the mixed
pluralist claim that asserts that all interests and all classes of
individuals are able and should compete relatively eqi^ally in the political
59
arena. TJ-as amounts to the rejection of utilitarian ethics. Ultimately,
this is a rejection of nihilism with respect to values.
3. There is also a grey area: Does the definition recognize—at
least, dimly—individual acquiescence or compliance in his own domination?
Should it? I suggest that the Hypothesis of Degrees of Repression allows
some limits within v^hich human responsibility can be attributed. Other-
wise, responsibility for an individual's action could never be claimed
or liabeled. Compliance suggests, at a very superficial level of insight,
that the individual is willing to maice a recognizable tradeoff between
For example, Lewis Lipsitz, "Work Life and Political Attitudes: A
Study of Manual Workers," American Political Science Review
, 58 (December
1961): 951-962.
59
A nicely-framed argument on this is provided by Alasdair Maclntyre
in "Against Utilitarianism" in Leslie Brown, ed.. Aims of Education (New
York: Teachers College Press, 1970), pp. 1-23.
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future and present consequences. The individual may or may not, however,
feel
..free" to make this tradeoff (but they ought to be obliged to "see"'
the wider range of choices before them). Marcuse's work on repressive
society would indicate such a role for compliance. For instance, in his
brief critique of Charles Reich's Greening of America Marcuse wrote:
"Persons are directly responsible for the decisions that are made to
bomb in Vietnam; and it is these positions that must be identified and
attacked." Or, in &:os_and_CiA^^ he remarks: "Repression dis-
appears in the grand objective order of things which rewards more or less
adequately the complpng individuals and, in doing so, reproduces more or
61
less adequately society as a whole."
The point about repressive participation is that it is a style of
political activity that becomes unmeaningful to the self as a process of
cognitive and affective growth. Repressive participation is character-
ized by a doriiinant class controlling the behavior of a dominated class
through control of the very mental processes that would enable the
individual's freedom. The individual is shut-off from perceiving the
limited self that he/she is, and is becoming. The style of polj.tical
discourse is closed, the participant-citizen under these conditions has
as atrophied mind no longer capable of grasping the contradictions and
50
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Herbert Marcuse, "Charles Reich as Revolutionary Ostrich," in Phiilip
Nibile, ed,. The Con III Controversy
,
(New York; Pocketbooks, 1971),
pp. 15-17.
"
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Eros and Civilization, p. 12 j also in Negations
, p. 132: "In
affirmative culture, renunciation is linked to the external vitiation of
the individual, to liis compliance with a bad order."
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alternatives. Critical faculties for articulating real interests have
been deadened and the wise handling of public issues smothered. In the
one dimension, as Marcuse expresses it, the Happy Consciousness comes to
prevail.
Tho repressive participants may be more readily identified, in some
measure, by distinguishing them from various segments of the class-
structured society. The following schema may be helpful initially, and
I intend to develop and consider it further in the next chapter. The
schema includes identification of: (l) The oppressed and dissident
members of the population. They are clearly disti.ngui.shed from tho re-
pressed, because members of this group recognize their oppression. They
well recognize their exclusion from the ongoing political process, the
rhetoric to the contrary. This category usually includes the self-
conscious minorities, as well as the truly independent intellectual and
artistic elements. (2) Another gi'oup, identified as the disconnected,
are the politically weightless. They are outside of the political system
by virtue of some economi.c and/or sociological characteristi c— e.g. , their
unemployabili ty by virtue of being unskilled or technically obsolete,
their age, their geographic mobility. In other words, they do not matter
62
to the economic structure. (3) A sizable sector remains: The employed
working and middle classes—the blue- and white-collar wage-earners, the
rentiers and small property owners mortgaged for a lifetime. These are
the potential objects of an ideologically repressive system, (h) Follow-
ing the original supposition of this study, there exists a small group of
62
Some of these groups are discussed in Penn Kimball, The Pi sconnected
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). Also, see the work of Claus
Offe.
23k
individuals vdth inordinately more directing influence and power on the
pattern of human behav:i.or than any other group; this is the promoter
class. This elite, or combination of elites, defines the inain contours
of the prevailing ideology at any historical time.
V/hile this elj.te or ruling class shapes the prevailing consensus
"to fulfill the needs of those who rule," those in the middle level of
power are usefully and correctly, I believe, identified by Wolfe's analysis
as serving the function of "transmission belts." These are the ones who
fill out the contours of the ideological schema to be reproduced. The
growing role of the public relations industry, and its auxiliary in the
information storage and retrieval system of the computer-centered industry,
bespeaks its significance to our economy and language structure. This
public relations industry has now entered every important phase of ad-
vanced industrial society—most particularly, the national and multi-
national corporations and the government at all levels. Perhaps the
most notable and questionable example of the use of public relations tech-
nology is provided by the U. S. Department of Defense's effort to promote
and sell its version of military policy. Also integral to the economic
and political structure is its lav/yer class—the John Dean's and Hugh Sloan's
to dr-aw on contemporary cases. This is, in general, the class that sur-
vives by being adroit and fluent as symbol manipulators, directing its
efforts to whatever the assigned goal.
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Wolfe, p. 65; and chap. 3, "WTio Benefits from Repression?", pp. 60-
89. Also pertinent is C. Wright Mills' essay, "Man in the Middle: The
Designer," in his Power, Politics and People (New York: Ballantine Books,
n.d.), pp. 37U-306.
6h
One account is provided by J. William Fulbright's The Pentagon
Propaganda Ma.chine (New York: Vintage, 1971).
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At the lowest range are the office workers, petty technicians, and
assemblyline operators, and laborers of various kinds. The fractured
nature of the work tasks of this segment makes its members seriously
limited in its ability to perceive and comprehend the interconnections
and implications of a complex and comprehensive social process. Class
differentials in educational opportimities and limited opportumty at
meaningful dialogue compound the problem.
The critical interpretation suggests that this segment—the working
class, but more especially what is called the affluent working class—
cannot allow itself to comprehend its social situation, its alienation.
Affluence and a manipulated consumptive orientation have made doubtful
the expectation Marx had, for instance, of the working class becoming
conscious of its own alienation and struggling to throw it off. The work
of Marcuse, Haberrnas, Touraine, and Gorz cast this Marxist proposition
into doubt. Their claim is that the ideology of advanced industrial
society, technological rationality, prevents the concepts through which
people can feel and communicate this alienation. Some careers are not
likely to be liberating ones, while individuals in others are not in a
position to critique the sets of interests that dominate.
For purposes of illustration, we may note that administrators and
65
This has been termed "the embourgeoisement thesis," and an important
sample survey of affluent i!.nglish workers was made to study the validity
of the proposition. The researchers claim that little such embourgeoise-
ment can be discovered. John H. Goldthorpe et al, The Affluent Worker in
the Class Structure (England: Cambridge University Press, 1969). For a
critique see,- James W. Rinehart, "Affluence and the Embourgeoisement of
the Working Class: A Critical Look," Social Problems, Fall 1971.
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managers, bankers and investors, accountants, marketing experts, design-
ers, lawyers, engineers, and technicians of various kinds, as well as
many in education and research, are all impelled to not question their
roles because they are the immediate beneficiaries of a war economy that
must manufacture napa]jn, nuclear weaponry, anti-ballistic missiles,
billion dollar submarines, and more and more sopliisticated air- and
space-craft, and sell $8.5 billion annually in military equipment to
foreign nations to keep its economy precariously afloat. We can note
even the spinoff effect for florist shops from the termi.nation of the
Vietnam War, so deeply ar-e the interests vested in the society. The
interests that these various occupation groups are immersed in, then,
make it highly unlikely for them to want to question the overall dynamics
of the system of which they are a part. As Marcuse's theory maintains,
ideological structure has worked so well institutional needs have, in
fact, become individual needs. As Touraine says it: "What dorainates our
type of society is not the internal contradictions of the various social
66
systems and the needs of individuals."
The selling of the candidate for public office, in the manner of
selli.ng everytMng else, has radically changed the nature of the American
67
party system in the past century. Part of the process of the deperson-
alization of politics which was initiated by the Progressives' nonpartisan
^
Touraine, p. 6l.
67
The changed nature of the party system is the interpretation of
William Dean -Burnham in Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American
Politics (New York: Norton, 1970). Also see the work of Samuel Hays.
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efforts was extended in the more thorough isolation of the candidate and
elected officials from one another and from their constituencies by mass
media techniques. As the process proceeded, key features of citizenship
were dropped along the way, and voting and party identification becaiae
an emptied ritual. Most participants in the American political scene
in recent years would have no recall of the forms of participation that
occurred at the apex of the political party in the nineteenth century,
acknowledging the limitation of the franchise at thet time. Voting has
been devalued and ritualized as other more leisure activities have become
highly prized. Some people may vaguely sense that there is not much
significance to the voting decision and respond out of civic duty or
social pressure. Others fail to respond at all. As Andrew Hacker brings
out, many corporate employees, belonging to the new propertyless middle
class, are in no position to be active in politics; they have neither the
interest nor the inclination to identify themselves vdth politics.
I believe it can be successfully shown that the students of voting
behavior helped to give credence to the increasingly impoverished role
for citizensMp. Marcuse's work provides two specific accounts of the
deflation of the meaning of participation in contemporary society.
Marcuse's treatment suggests that the definition of participation that
this school assumes, in fact, purveys a single meaning and any other
meanings escape them, because their interests foreclose any other possi-
bility. The studies Marcuse examines are now old ones but they are
classics; the one on political activity was conducted by Roper and
^
Andrew Hacker, "Polities' and the Corporation" in Hacker, ed..
The Corporation Take-Over (Garden City: Anchor, 156h), pp. 23)3-25U.
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Woodward, the other is a study in industrial sociology, the famous West
Electric or Hawthorne experiments. Both still have their followers, and
contemporary counterparts to these studies are available. For example,
the professionally-acclaimed study by Verba and Nie, Participation in
ATn^ica_-_Pon follows the same
narrow definition of Roper and Woodward. The analysis and conclusions
in the "human relations" study are followed by the mainstream of public
admi.nistration.
So it is not too remote for our purposes to review the arguments
Marcuse sought to make about these selected studies. The direction of
his critique is guided by his conception of the term "concept," as open
textured, Ms.rcuse provides a cui^sory definition of "concept" as desig-
nation "the mental representation of something that is understood,
69
comprehended, known as the result of a process of reflection." Marcuse
views concepts as abstract and general, "Because the concept comprehends
more and other than a pai'ticular thing—some universal condition or re-
lation which is essential to the particular thing, which determines the
70
form in which it appears as a concrete object of experience...." Con-
cepts have "excess" meaning, they have a transitive nature by virtue of
this trait. They do not merely denote one particular, concrete thing.
But this is just the what the empirical researchers, in the unwitting
separation of methodological from philosophical concerns, do. In their
operational concepts and indices, they have created "reduced concepts,"
These, then, come to govern realityj they lead to a false sense of
"59
One Dimensional Man
, p, 10^.
70
Ibid., pp. 105-106.
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concreteness, and, thereby, ac^iieve a political function. For Marcuse,
"the therapeutic and operational concept becomes false to the extent to
which it insulates and atomizes the facts, stabilizes them within the
repressive^whole, and accepts the terms of the whole as the terms of the
analysis."
The Woodward and Roper studies were a series carried out over a
period of five years by the Public Relations Department of the Standard
Oil Company of New^Jersey "to find out how the company stands with the
American public." In order to distinguish people who are relatively
active in relation to political issues from those who are relatively in-
active, the researchers developed a procedure by which to formulate an
operational index of "political activity:"'
The procedure followed was to write a large number of
questions, the answers to which would presumably throw
light on an individual's political behavior and then
try these questions out in personal interviews with a
test national sample of American adults. Some of the
questions are found not to work well in doorstep
interviews, and were discarded. Others were found to
yield results so closely intercorrelated that one
question could in effect stand for several others.
One of the problems here is one that all survey studies exhibit—asking
respondents what they do (and that within a fairly closed structure of
the interview schedule), not observing what they do. This introduces a
bias based on the respondent's need to protect and develop a flattering
71
Ibid., pp. 107-108.
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From: Julian Woodward and Elmo Roper, "Political Activity of
American Citizens, American Political Science Review
, Ui. (December 1950)
872-885.
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Ibid., p. 872.
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self-image as he perceives is expected of him, indeed, the attempt to
respond may become "a neurotic situation for the person answering.
"'^^
Political activity, according to this derivation nevertheless,
means: (1) Voting at the polls, (2) supporting possible pressure groups,
(3) personally comunicating directly with legislators, (I4) participating
in political party activi.ty, (5) engaging in habitual dissemination of
75
political opinions. For Karcuse, these might be taken as the para-
digmatic cases of repressive participation, because they so unreflectively
and uncritically accept the established parameters of conflict (i.e., the
issuer to be debated) and drop so much else that may have bearing on the
facts of political activity (e.g., the tendencies for a two-party system
to move toward a mid-point of consensus on many important issues; the
role of big publicity media in shaping opinionj the differing weights
various political interest groups have in the system; the significance
of influential contacts had between members of various elites). With
this empirical formulation, Marcuse, suggests, many of "the determining,
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constitutive facts remain outside the reach of the operational concept."
While the Woodward and Roper studies suggest the staging of a meaning
for political activity, the Western Electric studies illustrate the case
in which an unwarranted meaning is concluded from the set of facts. (To
some extent the way the facts are arranged certainly help to do this.)
7I;
From, Theodore J. Lowi, "A 'Critical' Election Misfires," Nation
(December 18, 1972).
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Tlie argument critical of the reduced meaning of political activity
is illustrated as well in Marcuse 's conunents on Marvick and Janowitz's
paper, "Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent," pp. Ilii-ll8.
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One Dimensional Man, p. 119.
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From the same facts another meaning is readily arrived at when the point
of view taken is different. Marcuse, for eocample, looks at the analysis
of worker complaints about working conditions and wages. The researchers
took the general form of the complaints and translated them into concrete
and particular referents. For instance, the statement, "wages are too
low," can be seen, as Marcuse views it, as a statement that in its gen-
eralized form is meant to transcend a single individual's experience and
indicate a relation relative to ojbects of the same class; but for the
empirical researcher assigned to treating these complaints, complaints
which cannot be treated as a class because the remedies would be so
radical, these complaints must be regarded in particularized forms,
as an individual's unique grievance. The solution mi.ght be to provide
a loan for a worker, for instance, Marcuse writes: "The general form
was dissolved into statements identifying the particular operations and
conditions from which the complaint was derived and the complaint was
77
taken care of by changing these particular operations and conditions."
Hampden-Turner makes the same point when he reviews the researchers'
study of the women in the Relay Assembly Test Room experiment. This was
sometimes called "a bad experiment" by those who found their research
framework cast into doubt j human, subjective factors had been extran-
eously introduced. It was discovered that workers' production increased
not because of any of the altered conditions of the environment but be-
cause in the process of setting up the experiment the women had become
involved in the decision-making process. Two women were enabled to
77
One Dimensional Man, p. 109', for this discussion, see pp. 108-llU.
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select four others to work with them, and the foreman had been removed.
According to the account:
With the foreman removed the girls became so "cheeky"that even the academics became miffed. Evil^tually
two ringleaders were returned to the shop floor. Butlater in the experiment there was no longer any ques-tion of discipline. The "independent variables" werediscredited. It was the girls who had the power now.Ihey knew why they were working more effectively andthe researchers were asking them for the reasons.
We have no bosses here'" cried the girls, sounding
not unlike the Wobblics, and they were correct. The
researchers, eager to discover any scrap of evidence
that would expla.in the climbing productivity, hung on
the girls' words, and immediately relented when the
girls derfi,anded veto power over any feature of the
experiment they did not like.^^
Aside from tins participatory role, the young women had sensed their
importance now as co-experimentors
;
they were no longer merely workers.
Nearly every conclusion the researchers came to, was voiced by the young
women and was not expressed in their "variables." But when the findings
came to be institutionalized, the workers had lost control. The eventual
outcome v/as to set up a counseling program involving figures of a "motherly"
sort, and this program was finally phased out.
I want to turn now to the development of a model of repressive parti-
cipation, guided by the insights and theory of repression that Marcuse
provides. Then, I plan to show its utility by applying it to a number of
controversial areas. For instance, can we make some assessments as to the
character of participation in elections? The suggestions that can be
drawn from the model will, undoubtedly, prove controversial, but the
benefit from undertaking this examination is that it will force theorists
from other perspectives to state more explicitly how they reach their
7B
The account is given in Charles Hampden-Turner, Radical Man - The
Process of Psycho-SocJ.al Development (Gai'den City, New York: Anchor,
1971), pp. 215-222, quote p. 218.
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assessments according to specific, justifiable criteria.
The follo^,ri.ng paradigm of repressive participation, which draws
from our foregoing discussion, is constructed. Participation becomes
repressive to the extent that:
1. Fewer and fewer persons affected by public decisions are involved
in the significant decision-making;
2. the political and social importance of the issues becomes more
and more limited and the issues themselves are more and more particular-
ized, vague, confused, or mediated by some limited and instrumental point
of viewj
3. the methods for arriving at informed, humane, and just decisions
are mitigated through the control and access of necessary information and
the shaping of the conceptual processes of the participants;
h. an exchange of intersubjectively-achieved meanings between
affected members is limited;
5. conformity to dominants cues is obtained through a system of
penalties and rewards so that the act of participation is not performed
for intrinsic and autonomous reasons. Moreover, the contradictory sit-
uation of participants, when power relations are suspended in one issue
area for one period of time but not on others, must be perceived and rec-
ognized. There must be the recognition that the basic relationship of
subordinate to authority will persist in other areas for some time and
have consequence for the forms of action taken;
6. policies and decisions arrived at are not, in fact, carried out
and fulfilled.
From these features, v;e are enabled to examine instances of parti-
cipatory activity in terms of the degree to which they may fit or relate
2hk
to this paradigm. Not every feature would be present in every instance
for us to be able to speak of "repressive participation."
The limiting case in which repressive participation would be at its
extreme woiad probably occur under the totalitarian structure. The role
of members of the Soviet Russian political system would seem to indicate
most of these aspects. Voting, which is the only apparently political
act open to non-Communist Party
.
members , has the most ritua.lized features
on several counts: (l) Only elite party members take part in the noirdna-
tion of candidates; (2) candidates seem to be party members, receiving
nominations for their exemplary performance; (3) the ballot lists only
one candidate for an office but, on occasion, a candidate can be rejected
by scratcl:iing his name off; this act could call attention to oneself, but
apparently one percent of the population is non-coaformist in this way;
(J4) all voters are expected (through a system of penalties and rewards)
to cast their ballot; one would have to be "artful" not to; (5) information
is controlled by the party agencies and press; (6) a generalized, random
state of terror reinforced conformity under the Stalinist period, while
persecution of minorities and dissidents achieved the same coercive tone
in the post-Stalinist years. The chief consequence for the members of
Russian society is the inabiQjLty to discuss freely personal troubles that
might be handled socially and politically, and the need to find ways to
remain inconspicuous or most exemplary to the commissar becomes crucial.
The situation is little different in the "total institution," which
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Goffman defines in terms of what becomes of their inmates. These are
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places like prisons, asylums, and army training camps, where few rights
are upheld for their inmates. To one extent or another, all features of
the paradigm would fit, with perhaps the exception of (U) which may be
limited to the capacities and ingenuity of the inmates. There is
apparently in these places a higher emphasis on a system of rewards and
penalties which satisfy basic physical and psychological needs, needs
which are less controlled and easily obtained outside the institution.
Until recently, such institutions operated their internal affairs without
much interference from outside public authorities. Matters have been
slowly changing as courts and legislatures are more concerned to secure
its inir^tes basic human and procedur-al rights. This outside pressure
may account for the simulacrum of participation which some institutions
practice, in the form of encounter groups or in other ways. Here inmates
are asked their opinions, "consulted," but at the sairie time they are
treated as reduced beings in some defined respect and control over
conditions, including self-determination to come and go as one pleases,
is beyond reach. Goffman's point was that the most important factor in
forming the character of persons in such institutions was their reactions
and adjustments made to its structure. In "total institutions" the in-
mates may make primary and secondary adjustments, but the conditions dis-
allov; prisoners and army recruits, for example, from developing images
of self-respect and the cognitive and moral insights needed to make
social decisions once they have departed from the institution to rejoin
the community.
The structure in which constituents of a political machine in the
early style of Mayor Daley of Chicago find themselves may not be
2U6
strikingly different from some practices in a total institution. Feature
(5) of the paradigm is most highly emphasized and other features are not
aikely to receive as much attention from the machine, largely because the
populations were new iirimigrant groups with language difficulties. In an
important way, however, the city controlled by a political machine is not
the saiae as a total institution, it is not cut off from the general soci-
ety and has regular, commercial, social, legal and other ties with an
open society and a critical press. With conditi.ons supporting machine
politics apparently disappearing, this form of repressive participation
may become more negligible.
The situation v/ith which we must be concerned is the national
Presidential election. To what extent do these elections approximate
the features of "repressive participation" in the paradigm? The contin-
uing declining voter turnout should be noted, perhaps as a sort of
secondai-y adjustment. The 197i| Gallup and Roper polls regard tbds
decline as related to the disillusionment vjith "Watergate" politics,
but the decline has been taking shape over many years as the political
parties continued to lose party identifiers. Many of the features of the
paradigm appear applicable: Feature (l) is manifest in several ways.
While more individuals have the opportunity to become involved in national
politics at the caucus, primary and convention levels, the chances are
not uniform, and elite control of local party organizations has been a
dominant factor in the exclusion of all interested groups. Elite-made
strategic decisions tend to determine nominations and platforms. Choices
are limited between two look-alike candidates; sometimes general elections
at the state level are not even competitive in this narrow sense. Feature
2kl
(2) is approached to the extreme. The general parameters of the agenda
'
for political debate are seldom challenged in a visible way. When they
are, as was the case during the 1968 Democratic Convention, efforts were
made to discredit its proponents. In the two elections where clearest
distinctions, ideologically, could be made between the candidates, turn-
out approached new lows. Cross-cutting issues and the emphasis on
personality helped to confuse the process of choice. In the case of the
1972 McGovern candidacy, I suggest it was as much the unfai.iiliar social
vocabulary of the cajididate as it was any other factor that explains his
failure to engage a broader following. To this extent feature (3) was
operative in deep ways. Efforts to control the press by Spiro T. Agnew
as a matter of policy, the appointment of a Director of Coirimumcations
as part of the VMte House Office, the alleged use of the Internal
Revenue Service to harrass news reporters, and other intelli.gence-
gathering activities, all attest to the attempt to control and manipulate
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public opinion in other ways as well. Less important are features (ij)
and (5) except that other settings which could provide for the develop-
ment of conceptual processes do not permit and encourage political
transactions, generally. Feature (6) is also satisfied in varied
degrees. Common usage acknowledges political "rhetoric" in terms of
the degree to which promises are not carried out or not carried out to
the extent necessary to make it more than token (for example, Nixon's
1968 secret "plan" to end the Vietnam War upon his election).
Wliatever interest there is displayed at national elections, there
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is even less exhibited at state and local elections. This pattern of
dropoff has usually been attributed to the nationalization of politics
during the 1932 Depression and the politics of the New Deal. Factors
such as industrialization and urbanization contributed to the tendency.
As community power studies seem to suggest, the difficulties of coping
in face-to-face situations with elite social and political dominance may
also be a factor. Following the 196h Office of Economic Opportunities
legislation and later the Model Cities legislation, attention was re-
focused on this local level for citizen involvement. But it brought
with it conflict by actively involving outgroups while the elected
officials own constituencies were not broadly involved. Mayor Daley's
outrage, for instance, expressed a sensed loss of control. Nevertheless,
the general problem, as many observers and participants themselves noted,
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was that the community action boards were cooptive. The minority
representative more often than not played the role of an Uncle Tom
caught in an ambiguous position. Neither a solely recommending role for
the boards nor determination of issues by the majority rule principle
gave much sense of povier and self-respect to the emerging, politically-
conscious poor. Especially is this so in the cases inhere their own
representatives were appointed by the mayor, not by themselves. The
politicians, were, in the end, not at a loss for protection their
interests. In mild ways features (2), (3), and {$) of the pai-adigm are
in play. The way the community action boards were put to use, in cer-
tain instances, was to buy off and divert the aggrieved, the same
g2
For example, Kenneth B. -Clark and Jeannette Hopkins, A Relevant
War Against Poverty - A Study of Conim.uni.ty Action Programs and Observable
Socl'al ChangeTTJew York and EVanston: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 2hS"2Uli,
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principle that was at work in the "human relations school." Unless the
minority groups saw their role as a struggle against the existing struc-
ture and its established values, such agencies limited ways for the
fullest development of its participants.
As the Western Electric studies show in regard to nianagement of the
firm in American society, management's solution to production problems
and the problems of alienation is, usually vdien it can be afforded, the
solution of therapy, informing, and consultation (from some critics point
of view,
—
placation). It is management's role in its pov/er of carrying
out the intent of ovmership to set the parameters of conformity in the
firm. This is the most basic condition limiting the autonomy of the
employees and workers. The firm, moreover, also has ties to the society
such that its rights and prerogatives of ownership are legally sanc-
tioned and upheld. The problem of control may be more constrained in
non-union and company-union settings, but even in the unionized setting
of advanced industrial society there are, therefore, signi.ficant con-
straints. As Touraine points out: "In liberal societies, it is appro-
priate to say that unions' objectives are mostly withj.n the company
itself since the power of economic decision-making remains private and
the intervention of the unions is on the level of organization and
institution, either directly or by means of mixed or representative
83
consultative bodies." The union when it exists has become a pressure
group among pressure groups, having to bridge the contradictions between
B3~~ •
Touraine, p. 18^.
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its needs for survival within the firm and the desire to expand its
power base from outside the firm. Rights and procedures are a matter of
generosity of the firmj workers may feel self-important in being consulted
and sometimes their recommendations may be followed. But, in the main,
there seems to be no federal law that requi.res them to be listened to,
just as there has been no application of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth /imendment to the private workplace. The important decisions
made by management- -budgeting, personnel, objectives—as well as union
85
decisions, are still out of control. To some extent or another, de-
pending on the particular characteristics of the workplace and the union,
one or all of the features of the paradigm apply. But consistent frus-
tration of the worker, in terms of the contradiction between being con-
sulted and not listened to, can lead to his/her politicization.
As v/e are coiidng to see, just in those settings vihere Devjey suggested
the opportunities existed for individuals to become more experienced and
intelligent in the making of social decisions, the opportunities are
limited or denied altogether. That is true of the opportunities in the
local setting as much as in the workplace; it is true as well for the
educational system—at the primary, secondary, or university level
j
private or public. The public secondary school model, which was exemp-
lified until recently by the New York City School Department, was highly
—W~
The beneficial results from increasing working involvement—both
to the morale of the worker and for the sake of production—is recommended
by the Report of the Special Task Force to the Societary of Health,
Education, and V/elfare, Work in America (Cambridge: MIT Press, n.d. [1973]).
Stanley Aronowitz examines this structure in close detail in False
Promises - The Snaping of American V/orking Class Consciousness (New York:
McGraw Hill, 1973), chap. ii.
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centralized and in the hands of a politically-appointed school board who
was not representative of the various constituencies in the city or
86
cognizant in any rationalized fashion of their peculiar needs. Those
affected by their decisions were the most ignored and furthest removed
in the important processes of budgeting, personnel, and curricula pro-
gramming.
Such vjas true, as well, in the university structure, whether pri-
vately or publicly controlled—a strange sit\iation, for the students were
in a good position to see the contradictions between the destructive-
nature of the production demands of the society upon the university and
the traditional function of the university to be intellectually independent
07
and critical. Student complaints exhibited the role of fcatui-e (3) par-
ticularly: The attempt to shape a conforraing consensus, in effect, boards
of trustees had final power as to what speakers might have access to the
campus and could inhibit associational activities in other ways—by con-
trolling funding and the selection processes of speakers, as vrell as by
its faculty appointments and granting of tenure. Moreover, according to
some complaints, curricula was fragmented, uncritical, and not geared to
finding vrays to address and resolve social problems. Where the opportun-
ities of developing the processes of conceptualizing and developing in-
formation for forming knowledge are most important, they are severely im-
peded. The significance of such efforts at suppression was not lost on
EE
The work of Marilyn Gittell is helpful here; also, Mario Fantini
and Marilyn Gittell, Decentralization Acl-iieving Reform (New York: Praeger,
1973), chap. 3.
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The structure is examined in Habermas' Toward a Rational Society
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), chaps. 1 and 2, and in Touraine, chap. 2.
some student elements, and so the one feature that vould make this
setting peculiarly repressive (3), the shaping of conceptual processes,
is not achieved.
V
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Conclusion
Marcuse's attention to the Freudian theory of repression and his
unique effort to apply the concept of repression historically to ad-
vanced industrial society has proved useful. We have been enabled to
draft a contrast model to the dominant conception of participation in
political science today. As a critical model, the paradigm of repressive
participation establishes a set of questions that must prompt the libc-.Tal-
pluralists to reexajnine their empirical and normative theory of partici-
pation. They must nov: demonstrate what tliey have so readily assumed, if
they wish to be taken seriously. For others, it might compel more
rigorous investigation into quaJities of participatory forms in various
settings and the social trends developing with regard to these forms,
A Karcusean theory of impressive participation, nevertheless, remains
negative in character. Theorists of diverse perspectives have identified
this particul.ar problem—of negation—with Marcuse's philosophic approach.
The point is that the critical approach Marcuse applies does not success-
fully lead out of a conceptual impasse. It seems not to be able to
transcent itself. As Jeremy J. Shapiro, a student of Marcuse, critically
suggests: "Marcuse's retention of the two-dimensional model combined
with the biological trend of Freudian theory lead him to look for forces
of negation outside the very system which he has shown to have no outside.
Tills prompts fluctuation between pessimism about the lack of a revolution-
ary agent and optimism that sometimes leads to an almost uncritical
8d
identification with existing anti-authoritarian forces." Similarly,
SB
Jeremy J. Shapiro, "One Dimensionality: The Universal Semiotic
of Tec^mological Eixperience" in Critical Interruptions , p. 185.
2^h
A. Maclntyre and Peter Clecak also detect the problem but without seeing
his significance and dismiss him prematurely, I believe. Maclntyre, for
instance, in his polemic concludes that "Marcuse underrates most men as
they are; the false contempt for the majority into which his theory leads
him UTiderpins policies that would in fact produce just that passivity and
89that irrationalism with which he charges contemporary society." Un-
fortunately, Maclntyre himself fails to see that his own position lacks
a view of the human being as a language
-constituted being which Marcuse »s
work embraces. For another example, Clecak dismisses Marcuse by charg-
ing him with being a "utopian Marxist;" his critical theory becomes
90
"primarily a mode of therapy" and "a myth of consolation." If we were
to take careful measure of Marcuse, it would be clear that the problem
of Majxuse's work is his involuted and metaphorical style. His style
is not essentially analytic but literary, and this feature is severely
in evidence in the last part of Eros and Civilization and also in Coimter-
revolution and Revolt--perhaps in these two pieces more than elsevjhere.
It may be conjectured that this style is explained by Marcuse 's cominit-
ment to the view that language that is not interest-dominated is essentially
open-textured. We can gain this view from, for instance, his comment
in Essay on Liberation : "The new sensibility and the new consciousness
whiich are to project and guide such reconstruction demand a new language
to define and communicate the new 'values' (language in the wider sense
91
which includes words, images, gestures, tones....)."
"59"
Maclntyre, Herbert Marcuse
, pp. 10^-106.
90
Clecak, p. 199.
91
Essay on Liberation
, pp. 32-33.
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The least ambiguous recommendation Marcuse makes touard a strategy
of change was expressed in his notion of the "Great Refusal," the negation
.
of the negati on. The notion was first proposed in One Dimensional Man
and has been reasserted elsewhere. It was the notion that individuals and
groups must step outside the established system and "reject the rules of
the game that is rigged against them." It appears the concept originally
was more negative than the one applied toward the end of the 1960«s.
In the Essay, for instance, Marcuse began to hint that students and other
liberation movements could develop intervening structures and successful
counter-institutions. His rejection of established settings, which vras
the basis for change for the radical liberals, vjas premised on the view
that established institutions would become cooptive and that there was no
way to preserve one's integrity and autonomy by continuing relatioiiships
with established structures. By the earD.y 1970" s, it seemed, Marcuse was
reverting to hi-s earlier pessimism, doubting the possibility of these
movements to overcome the force of dominant structures.
It has been my claim, however, that there are some latent possibili-
ties lurking in the philosophy of Marcuse. Marcuse supplies, in effect
the "bridge" av;ay from a society of limited participatory forms toward a
more himanized and participatory society. And this is a possibility while
simultaneously vje are members of the society undergoing reconstruction.
Importantly, Marcuse works with a dynamic philosophy of mind. His concept
of man is that of the active and creative agent, the fabricator of his
own history. And implicit in his thought is the vision of a qualitatively
different society, a society that is rooted economically in socialism.
His ideal society could very we'll be a Rousseauan, participatory society.
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whoce conditions are those which approach economic, social, and political
equality.
Marcuse's philosophy, therefore, lends itself to a synthesis with
the pragmatic tradition of thought, its theory of knowledge, and view of
man as the active agent, or agent-patient
. There is here a basis for a
synthesis between the radical-liberal perspective of Dewey, Bachrach, and
Kaufman and the critical perspective of Marcuse. For, what the radical
liberal contributes is its appreciation of the growth of knowledge in
terms of active persons in experiential settings trying to discover the
principles to guide social living. The problem thus becomes one of
developing a strategy of change and of identifying structures of change.
One group has been more affirmative in this regard than Marcuse, aiid has
been recoraraended by Bachrach and Kaufman. These ere the options provided
in the settings of the community, labor unj-ons, schools and imivarsities,
and the workplace (e.g., co-determination and self-management )
.
What becomes clear, if vre apply the significance of Marcuse 's theory
of repressive society to settings for participation, is that the meaning-
fulness of participatory settings only develops when participation
approaches the paradigm of "communicative interaction." In the style of
good conversation, political discourse must be based on the mutual respect
of all parti cii)ants; discussion must pertain to important issues j and
deliberation must lead to a reasonable attempt to fulfill and realize the
intent of the decision. Language, as the primary structuring force of
human consciousness, becomes the force for further scrutiny, for it is
this factor that can limit—indeed, prohibit—the participatory role of
some groups in advanced industrial society. However, even if language
2Sl
is open-textured, it does not mean that we can do without concept-
ordering and concept clarification. The purpose of the next and con-
cluding chapter is to suggest the r elationship of language as a
structuring force in society to forms of participation and non-participation.
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CHAPTERVII
PARTICIPATION AND THE LANGUAGE-STRUCTURED SOCIETY
This project began with two explicit purposes: (l) To illuminate
some basic uses of the term "participation," and (2) to consider whether,
theoretically, a defensible case for a politics of participation in ad-
vanced industrial society could be adduced. By way of conclusion, I
want to summarize the main distinguishing uses of the term under in-
vestigation and, then, draw up the arguments for an enriched conception
of participation. I want to clarify my notion of a humanj.zed, moral
participation in tenns of a particular feature of advanced capitalist
society, vrhich is the language-structured character of its social
groupings. It is this particular feature of society wMch has been
Printed at in my critique throughout, and I wnat now to bring it out more
fortbrightly.
My analysis attempted to be, broadly, contextui\l. It was my working
assumption that a theorist's concept of participation was related to other
features characteristic of h3.s perspective and explanatory approach.
Below, I summarize the usage of the t erm within each of the five inter-
prettitions examined:
1. The Classical Conception
According to the classical conception, members of a community are
required to be self-realized, moral agents. Emphasis was placed on the
need to determine the "public interest" through widely-engaged in pro-
cesses of debate, reflection, and de]J. beration. No one might be excluded
from this civic obligation. Individuals were expected to sublimate self-
interests to the interests of the community. The expectation was that
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only in such a way might the individual achieve "freedom" in civic
society, for rancor, of particular wills, have been controlled rationally.
2. The Liberal-Pluralist Conception
"Participation" is one of the laany roles assigned to individuals
in democratic society. Its members are "free" to engage in a range of
political forms, including voting, cairipaigm.ng, and running for office.
They also may choose not to participate in these ways (but are not
justified in choosing other ways to express their interests). In a
pluralist society it is appropriate to consider expanding opportunities
for citizens to participate. But prospects for expanding participation
(say, as voting) among the working class is regarded as unlikely in view
of their more private-regarding interests. When one "participates," one
is indicating one's personal or subjective preferences on alternative
choices. It is meaningful to claim that the choices an individual maJces
in his role as one voter among many other voters effectively constitutes
control over the political process.
3 • The Constitutional Republican Conception
"Participation" is a hortatory word, successfully used by the
liberal-pluralist to manipulate the electorate. One important way it
is manipulated is in the local setting where elites have the power to
set the agenda and induce compliance to programs and proposals that fail
the test of constitutional legitimacy. Citizen politics to reform the
political parties has proved counter-productive. Advisedly, a policy
of non-partiqipation, of refusal to participate on the grounds of
principle, is advocated, A crisis of legitimacy will impel reform,
k . The Had Leal-Liberal Conception
"Participation" provides the best promise for a revitalized and
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socially Just polity. But the narrow usage which dominates social science
researcn, and poUtxcal rhetoric, must be rejected in favor of the classic
conception. Essential to the advancement of this enterprise is the view
of the individual, not as a role-player but as an active, creative huanan
being capable of redirecting history in important ways. The settings for
participation must be expanded beyond the political parties and processes
to include the workplace, trade
. unions, the schools and vmiversities, and
the local neighborhoods. Special effort must be given to provide meaning-
ful opportunities for sharing in decision-maidng processes to those who
have heretofore been excluded from conventional political processes.
Such forms of participation must require the deliberation, debate, and
deternrlnation of issues of significant impact on one's life. Despair
of success can only lead to defeat, and so an important component of the
radical-3.iberal case is the practical maxim that success is in part con-
stituted by beli^ef in its possibility.
^* lhe__Radical Case of Marcuse
Conventional fonns of participation in advanced capitalist
society (for exa^iiple, voting and being consulted) are "repressive," and
this repression is unnecessary. Social and political arrangements compel
forms of t>u.nking and behavior, through psychological defense mechanisms,
on the part of the great mass of individuals so that they are unable to
reflect critically upon the alienating and destructive character of their
li.fe. Life is irrational, instrumentally and substantively. The needs
of the teclinological society have become primary, not the needs for growth
and autonomy of the human being. The condition is so dominant that it
is not likely that more than a few elements of the population will be
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able to perceive the social mlaise (e.g., blacks, poor, feminists, and
radicalized students). Their strategy should be the "negation of
negation," a deliberate atteirij^^t to break the established structure of
thought and behavior. Under some conditions acts of protest may be
appropriate.
From the review it becomes clear that far from having a simple and
clear-cut socially-established meaning, the term "participation" is
complexly related to a theorist (s whole structure of thought.
I would like to turn now to the basis for grounding an enriched con-
ception of participation for advanced industrial society. The task is
controversial since the failure of the New Left's rhetoric to either
capture or hold the public Blind to the significance of a participatory
1
democracy. Nevertheless, I believe the failure of the rhetoric and the
resistance of corporate and political institutions to advance opportuni-
ties can be coped with in steady and constructive ways and that the
human benefits, in terms of the reaffirmation of liberal values like free
speech and free press, vjarrant the continued effort in this direction.
It seems to me that the compelling moral justification for expanding
participation is best set out by that tradition of ideas beginning v.dth
Rousseau, but tracing itself out in the arguments of Dewey and Kaufman,
on behalf of fundamental human rights. Participation is a right that
follows from the fundamental human right of "respect for persons." The
argument for equal consideration for every person defeats the claims
1
The doublebinds of radical analysis is the subject of Peter Clecak,
Radical Paradoxes - Dilemmas of the American Left: 19U5-1970 (New York:
Harper and Row, 197U). This study, however, may overstate the failures
of radical analysis j this surely seems to be the case with the exposition
of Marcuse's ideas.
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of the tecl:inocrat at the start.
It is easy to give verbal homage to the notion of expanded parti-
cipation. We can note how closely this fits in with liberal-pluralist
rhetoric v.lthout effecting the qiaality of life significantly. For,
social and political arrangements may go in important directions to
modify, limit, and deny its own promises. It seems to me that Marcuse's
analysis of the specific structiire of contemporary false consciousness is
substantially correct, because what he points to is how actual social
practices conceal the dehujnanizing nature of capitalist-consumer society.
I believe his insight into the superfluously, or historically specific,
repressive features of society is theoretically sigrdficant
. There may
be difficulties in rigorously investigating repression sociologically,
but it is a critical conception wl-iich it would be unfortunate to give up
2
just because it is intractable. It can be suggestive in this v;ay. VJhat
it prompts us to focus on is how the limits of hm\&n conduct can be in-
sti tu-ticnally proscribed in subtle, unjustified vjays—linguistically.
But Marcuse does not develop a theory that would guide action generally.
At least, the notion of the "Great Refusal" does not seem to satisfy this
criterion very clearly.
The radical-liberals would seek to expand more developed forms of
participation than have been generally practiced heretofore during the
twentieth century. But their most outstanding critics suggest that a
pai-ticipatory politics, even though sustained by radical pressure,
underestirriates the resistance of the large, established economic and
2
This claim is asserted by Robert Paul Wolfe, "Marcuse's Theory of
Toleration," Polity, 6 (Summer 197U) :U7l;-U75.
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political institutions, and the only resolution to this difficulty is a
pontics of militant socialism. There are several difficulties with this
recommendation. It is by no means evident that this strategy is any more
precise and clear-headed than the one advocated by the radical-liveralsj
nor is it clear that the present social conditions are appropriate to
meaningful hearing of its claims j finally, it is not so certain that
socialist society necessarily realizes universal social justice and free-
dom. There is an arrogance of vision and means betrayed in the approach
that is lacking in the pragmatic approach to inquiry. I believe that we
can frame an em'iched theory of participatiomMch combines the best of
the Marcusean and radical-liberal perspectives. The problem of social-
izing at least some segments of the economy stands as important but not
as primary, then.
One way this might be done is as follows. The focus of om- attention
is on the nature of "action," since the word "participation" belongs to
the family of "action" concepts. To participate means "to take or have
a part or share of or in; to possess or enjoy in coinmon with others; to
taJce part; to have a part or share; to share ( Oxford EngLls h Dictionary )."
Implied in the common usage of the verb, to participate, is a "shared"
community. In what way can we say that the range of activities of members
of a commurdty is constituted by this community?
An answer to this problem resides in the conception of the human
being which a political theory assumes. My review of the political inter-
pretations in this study has been critically linked to a conception of
the human being not as a behavioral mechanism in conformance with laws
but as an active, creative being infonr^_by_jn^ The contention has
been that the conception of the human being in a system of explanation
to an important extent limits the possibilities a political theory is
able to envision. This was Rousseau's significant insight. A culture is
in good measure characterized by what a people believe they are. The
constraints are not primarily biologic but mental. Contemporary social
science in its behavioral orientation has supplied a limiting and dis-
torted vj.cw of political possibility in advanced industrial society and,
it may even be suggested, seals itself off from self-corrective possi-
bilities. We need to correct this distorted conception that conventional
political science has resorted to by developing alternative interpretations
rooted in an understanding of man as an agent, an active being engaged
in various forms of practice.
If, under this conception, the hiunan being can be d efined as a being
that has intentions, then how tliose intentions arise and are formed becomes
a most important subject for political inquiry. This is the common groimd
chared between radical-liberals (e.g., Dewey-Kaufman) and a critical-
radical like Marcuse. They shared the concern with the way "objective
interests" are formed in advanced industrial society. I think Touraine's
conclusion in his study of Post-Industrial Society is essentially correct
in this regard: "What we need most urgently is not an analysis of social
behavior but of society, considered no longer as a situation but as a
3
See Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (New York: Viking Press,
1959); Alasdair Maclntyre, "B.motion, Behavior and Belief" and "Rationality
and the Explanation of Action" in Against the Self-Imapes of the Age (New
York: Schocken Books, 1971) J and Steven Lukes, I ndividualism (New York:
Harper Torchbooks, 1973), chap. 20.
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system of action, a network of cultural orientations and power relation-
ships." Jurgen Habem^s and Claus Mueller significantly undertake this
sociological task5 and I believe this work follows up the critical in-
5
sights of Marcus e in fruitful ways.
Consciousness in advanced industrial society is mediated and con-
trolled by language. Social language serves not only as the repository
of cultural traditions and as the instrument by which individuals
establ3.sh links between themselves and others j it also has a socio-
political function for securing legitimacy. Control through predicta-
bilj.ty is not obtained coercivcly in a physical sense in those places
which have highly developed communications and inforination apparatus,
but by the structuring of roles. And this is accomplished linguistically
in various ways. The ways, it seems apparent, are related to some extent
to class position. Since language is the vehicle for sharing in the life
of a community as much as it is the vehicle for self-reflection and in-
dividuation, an individual's language development sets the limits of his
Alain Tourai.ne, The Post-Industrial Society (New York: Random
House, 1971), p. 229.
3'
From Habermas I found particularly helpfiil "Technology and Science
as 'Ideology'" in Toward A Rational Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970),
pp. 81-122 J Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972);
and "Labor and Interaction: rLemarks on Hegel's Jena Philosophy of Kind"
in Theory and Practice (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973). Habermas seems to
have been directly influenced by Dewey and the pragmatic model of inquiry.
And, Claus Mueller, The Politics of Communication - A Study in
Political Sociology of Language, Socialization, and Legitimation (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1973).
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action. Distorted commumcation becomes a question of considerable
importance to the extent that it interferes with open political commun-
ication, "since the intentional and unintentional distortions.
. .preclude
the articulation of deraands as well as an unobstructed discussion of
6
specific issues." I want to sketch some possible connections between
language-structuring in society and some forms of participation and non-
participation. I sm trying to show that it makes a difference what con-
cepts we load the political environraent and the political socialization
processes i/ith. And this sketch may, ultimately, make clearer the
relatio2iship between Bachrach and Kaufman's ideas and Marcuse's critique,
and I will point to some further directions for social and political
analysis.
The idea I want to suggest is schematized in Table 1. V^at the
table does is chart participatory (and non-participatory) forms, already
identified in the main text, in terms of participants' level of under-
standing of language. There is established six corresponding roles of
language as the vehicle of self-understanding. The stages are progressive
in terms of the capacity for language; they would seem to be invariable,
I wnat to quote Mueller to the point here: "If the semantic, vocabulary,
and syntactic levels of his language are limited, the individual is not
7
likely to develop his full potential." The perspective of this schema
is historically-specific and critical; that is, it doubts the capacity
for present socio-political arrangements to effect the cognitive and
-z
—
Mueller, p. 16,
7
Ibid., p. 17.
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emotional development of ,„oot h^«n beinos. But i t does not deny that
posalblUties are available. A. KuelDer-s analysis sugReato, the absence
of effective legitimating rationales is a problem to which the political
system has no answer.
.'It is precisely this problem that undermines,"
Mueller argues, "a political system tenuously held together by material
benefits."
B
Ibid., p. 182.
PARTICIPATORY STATES AND CORRESPONDING UNGUAGE Fi^JlTURES
1. Non-Participation
fxxcludod groups; oppressed
j
isolatfid and luunobili zed;
latent protestors
2. Kon-Participstion as Acquiescence
Vague recognition of costs of non-
conforiJiity; these individuals see
themselves v.athout complex needs or
rights—as objects; accept roles as
defined; sometimes too con^fused to
make much meaning out of them
3. Participation as Role-Playing
Indi.viduals get some returns-material
rewards or some modicum of security;
liberal style and image may be
attractive; sees relationship to
system as a social contract; Perform-
ance Principle dominates the Pleasure
Principle
(a) Dependent Participation -
voting, performance of civic duties,
etc. Has a well-developed ration-
a].ity for hj.ding irrationality
(b) Cooptive Participation -
(CAP), collective bai'gaining, human
relations programs
Elites attempt to ameliorate aliena-
tion through consultation and limited
opportuTii-ties for self-determination
U. Non-Participation as Refusal
Individuals refuse to play by the rales
of the game; reject the settings of
politics as usual; problem here is
that such activity may remain un-
copjiected to the political process
and so do nothing to reform or change it
5. Protest
Ex. strikes, parallel and counter-
institutions; Cohn-Bendit 's "march
through the institutions"
6. Participation as Becoming
Worker's Control; community control
corporations; characterized as develop-
ing an articulate notion of principles
needed in pubLic decision-making;
capacity to identify with position of
others; to operate with foresight; to
uphold authentic ideals; non-repressive
ci-Q.ture
Language functions as
expansive rhetoric and
token action
Language functions to deny
one's own features, to
repress; simple language
forms satisfy
Language functions with myths
and illusions to develop a
complex, anesthetic ration-
ality to protect established
structure of interests (property
derived) gives cues to
penalties for non-conformity
(Sham experience may provoke
reassessment of one's role)
Language functions as cri.ticue;
language coritains referents to
limits of the possible; "language
of authenticity"
Language serves as g^aides to
action; importance of strategic
concepts
Union of thought and action-
Praxis; attention is directed
tov/ard improving his, and
otners, life-condition
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1. Non-participation is a widespread feature of advanced indus-
trial society, and for some it is a non-selected pattern of response to
the political environment. It is simply the natural condition and
predica/nent of that segment of society which remains isolated or margi-
nal (e.g., Appalachians, migrants, ghetto poor, urban aged). These are
the underprivileged who do not even form a social class because the
economi.c system does not profit from their labor. They are virtually
irrelevant, and afi Habermas points out, their demands have merely
an "appellative" character. At this primary language level, the oppor-
tunity for sharing in a wider social community is minimalj the language
code is "restricted." Liberal rhetoric to participate does not even
stretch to meet this disadvantaged segment of the population. This is
best exhibited by the nature of governmental programs under a liberal
admini.stration targeted to this group. As in the War on Poverty program,
these were conceived of as "training" prograias intended, at most, to
provide a irdnimal skill. To quote Mueller again: "The absence of
sufficient conceptual development and of certain value predispositions,
which is related to both socialization patterns and language codes, can
prevent the individual from understanding the political code of society."
2. At the next stage, non-participation may be more nearly a form
of acquiescence based on the vague recognition of the structure's pen-
alt j es for non-conformity. These individuals see themselves without
complex needs or rights—more particularly, as objects rather than equals
among equals. They believe they must accept the limited roles available
to them. Their language code is, again, properly regarded as "restricted
9
Mueller, p. 17 and chap. 2.
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to apply Basil Bernstein's distinction. But I would want to detach this
conception from the author's apparent anti-working class bias, for some
working class groups have highly developed linguistic structures and
some middle class groups, if we accept the repression thesis, are, indeed
10
*
impoverished in their communicative capacity. The language content here
may be one of resignation (e.g., nou can't fight city hall."). Perhaps
individiuils joined in this class have felt victimized by the manipulation
of vjords by the politicians and other interest groups. Power is not per-
ceived, however, as connected directly to the manipulative factor of
specific language forms.
3. With the opportunities for widespread public school and higher
education and the pervasiveness of the mass media, a large segment of the
population has gained a general fluency of language. But language as a
vehicle of communication has become sophisticated at the level of logic,
not at the level of conceptualization. Perhaps the concept of "language-
game" becomes helpful here, v/here individuals are able to apply the rules
of the language-game in appropriate ways but they are unable to step out
of the structui-e of social reality it creates to investigate it with
11
objective criteria. Habermas is helpful here in the distinction he
dra.ws betvreen the model of "purposive-rational activity" and "communi-
cative interaction." The key feature of the pruposive -rational model
is the absence of norm-guided principles. Science and its mode of justi-
fication leads to the (false) equation of all human problems to teclmical
10
Harold Rosen, Language and Class - A Critical Look at the Theories
of Basil Bernstein (Bristol, England: Falling Wall Press, 1972).
11
The notion of "language-game" has been helpful to me; it is
discussed in, for instance, Anthony Kenny, Wittgenstein (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1973), chap. 9.
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problems. A lai)guage without a norm-guided principle manipulates con-
sumers and also m^anipulates participation forms by robbing language of
its HolUical meaning. In the critique of Dahl's conception of partici-
pation, and of other behavioralists generally, I tried to point out the
effort to hypostatize one notion of participation as real, based on a
scientistic argument. As Mueller argues, "...vast segments of the pop-
ulation are integrated into the political order because their capacity
to engage rationally and s^bolically in public discourse is severely
12
limited by their linguistic environments." We have noted, for instance,
how little face-to-face dialogue occurs between voter and candidate in
recent election years.
Several particular developments might be expected from the social
process which depoliticizes and limits interactive forms of communication.
Language-games may proliferate in order to cover the diverse fancies of
"individiuilized" groups (e.g., Tippies and other kinds of subculture
groups). This is an "inverted" individualism, for what is accomplished
is the fragmentation of the collective energies of the social comjiunity.
Promotions are rampant. As well, the language as the vehixle of self-
reflection and individuation may become impoverished in grammatical ways
and the shared vocabulary still more constricted, repetitive, and re-
dundant. It seems, many cultural critics are now concerned with the
qualj.ty of the English language itself. It may be that this is what
must occur for the purposive-rational model to predominate; in all ages
it seems, institutions have a need to transfix language,
ii. If the suggestion to this point is correct, that forms of
12
Mueller, p. 12.
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participation are directly related to language capacity of the partici-
pants, then it becomes important to a theory of a participatory society
that language capacities be advanced and distorting structures be iden-
tified. Marcuse's recommendation to overcome the problem of repression
vias to remove one's self from the ongoing structures of society, the
process of "negation of the negation." What he did not directly express,
but what, I believe, was implied in that formulation, was some sense of
a linguistic breakthrough or transcendence. This can occur, for instance
when individuals begin to share their comiTion experiences as in the case
13
of the Vauxhall plant, in the account of Gorz,
The notion of a language-game is of that order of insight, a
linguistic breakthrough, for it suggests a reflective understanding
through language. That it is our language, and it goes a good deal
toward shaping our world. Attention is directed to the level of con-
ceptualization, of developing criteria by which to inspect the shared
community's rules and standards and interests.
It would be an interesting subject-matter, I think, to study the
13
Andre Gorz, "Workers' Control is More than Just That," in Hunnius,
Gars on and Case, eds., Workers' Control ; A Reader on Labor and S ocial
Change (New York: Vintage, 1973), PP. 332-335. This was the setting
for the Goltthorpe survey of workers which found them individiially resigned
to, if not reconciled with, their condition. Gorz writes: "And as they
discussed things, they found out that they all felt alike: They felt
apathetic but frustrated^ they were apathetic because, as individuals,
in their individual isolation and loneliness, no one could do anything
to change things. But when people start talking about their loneliness,
their frustration, their powerlessness, they cease to be isolated and
povrerless. They start melting into a group which holds immeasurably
greater power than the individual power of all those who compose it." p. 33U.
Ih
Wittgenstein is quoted to this point: "We remain unconscious
of the prodigious diversity of all the everyday language games because the
clothing of our language makes everything alike." Kenny, p. 166.
273
conditions which would bring about this insight. One of the points I
believe Bachrach and Kaufman were suggesting about forms of cooptive
participation was that the disjunctions experienced in this form of
participation might prompt some such reevaluation of the established
cultural language.
Tl-iis fourth stage is a critical one, then, because it begins to
question and invalidate the cultural language-game an individual has
been initiated into. Individuals refuse to play by the "rules of the
game," and language has begun to serve as the vehicle of a critique of
established authority relations.
5. Language now viewed in an objective sense may lead to a para-
doxical situation. It allows individuals to control others; but it
also allows them to join with others in the use of language at the level
of coriiiTiuni.cative interaction. It can reinstitute communication as the
search for the realization of practical goals. "It is governed by
binding consensual nor!ns_, which define reciprical expectations about
behavior and which must be understood and recognized by at least two
acting subjects. Social norms are enforced through sanctions. Their
meaning is objectified in ordinary language commimication. WOiile the
validity of technical rules and strategies depends on that of empirically
true or analytically correct propositions, the validity of social norms
is grounded only in the intersubjectivity of the mutual understanding
15
of intentions and secured by the general recognition of obligations."
At thJ-s level language opens up new possibilities for participation, and
I think these are suggested in such experiments as the "free universities"
Habermas, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology,'" p. 92.
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and worker's control movements. As Touraine points out: "Alert educators
have replaced the idea of a worker-literature or a worker culture with
the much :nore realistic and fruitful description of workers participating
in the total culture—which may mean participating in a movement of
16
overall social and political opposition."
6. The paradigm case of developed language capacity would be non-
distorted com:nujiication, "commmiicative interaction." ^ Thought and
action are related synergestically. Language is dialectical and con-
ceptualj there is an appreciation of developing socially, strategic
guides to conduct. Individuals at this level, ideally, would have
achieved a moral sense, and these individuals' lives would be bound up
vri.th the life of the comiTiunity. Characteristic features of the person-
ality would seem to include the capacity to identify with the position of
others, to act with foresight, and to uphold authentic human ideals.
Hampshire provides a rich characterization at this level vMch I feel
merits citation:
That the thought which guides action may attain to different
degrees of explicitness, and may correspond to different
degi^ees of self-consciousness, has been a constant theme of
this book. The more explicit a man is in formulating to
himself the ends of his action, and the grounds upon which
his decisions rest, the more he is aware of himself as
having made choices between specific possibilities, choices
that are always subject to revision. The more self-
conscious he is in his criticism of his own intentions
and activities, the more he is aware of the limits of his
habits of classification, limits that determine the
possibilities open to him. He becomes aware also of the
limits set by conventions of communication and classifi-
cation into w^iich he was born. He can begin endlessly to
1
T^ouraine, p. 196.
See Habermas, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology,'" pp. 92'%,
and Mueller, p. 20.
question and tc criticise the vocabulary and the form
of language which he has learnt always to use jn
considering alternative ends of action. He cannot
any longer consistently think of his more specificjudgments of ultimate value as timeless truths,
insulated from his practical intentions, or of his
practical intentions at any time as disconnected from
his opinions about the essential powers and interests
of men. His moral and political opinions, and his
practical intentions, are two phases of a single
process of thought that always revolves in his mind
aro\md his idea of the activities that are essential
to men, of those that, are essentially destructive and
that prevent men from realizing their potentialities
as human beings. lo
Communi.cative interaction would be guided by the purpose of forming a
non-repressive culture that aims at the harmonized relation between
emotions and reason. Sublimation is of a non-repressive kind. Partici-
pation is represented in the idea of "becoming," or in Dewey's notion
of the realizing self. The life of action is cliaractcrized as a process
Participation is no longer a fractured-segmental, assigned and instru-
mental role. It is a style of conducting one's life in a community.
Participation conceived as "becoming" can avoid the problem of moral
claims turning into empty, manipulative rhetoric. The study of parti-
cipation can become the study of political biography: "In the future,
ideals will not be communicated by attempts to describe them, which
inevitably distort, but by the models of an appropriate conduct in life.
This was also the point of Tolstoy's stories. I believe that we have
some examples of such communities of participants so that this ideal is
19
Paul Engelmann, Letters from Ludwig V/ittgenstein, With a Memoir
(New York: Horizon Press, 1965), p. 135.
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not practically impossible
^
the Quaker meeting may be suggested, and so
might the Amsh commuiii.ty. Gandhi's ideal of the "satyagraha" campaign
is also appropriate.
Obviously, this is only a very general and hypothetical sketch of
relationships between language-structuring and forms of participation
and non-participation. I believe it offers some advantages. For one
thing, this model overcomes the .limitation provided by one recommendation
that suggests "we increase the cognitive appeal of propaganda." It does
not lean heavily on flamboyant rhetoric or. Utopian visions and avoids
political parsdysis. In other ways it may be of benefit. It may begin
to offer some clues for developing constructive strategic guides to a
more radical, humanized process of social change. By focusing on
language capacity, we have focused on the root structuring principle in
contemporary society. Social and economic equality have been seen as
essential conditions for the reform of society in Rousseau and Mai-x,
wi-iile not much attention has been directed to the need for linguistic
equality, the implicit insight Marcuse gained from psychoanalysis. The
symbolically-satiated environment and the growingly impoverished natui'e
of social interaction in the United States, for example, presently ought
to be a disturbing sitiaation for persons concerned with sustaining and
extending humanistic values.
Participation would promise to provide a meaningful mode of activity
for the advancement of this purpose. I shall sketch here, now, my model
of a humanized participation:
1. It involves individuals acting as moral agents, who have become
conscious of the demands meaningful, purposeful participation places on
them.
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2. It will begin at the local setting, close to the lives of most
individuals and where it can be expected that individuals will begin
to relate specific local, contradictory problems to the general condition
of society.
3. Rationality, as dialogue and action in the service of social
justice and human dignity, will be achieved by virtue of the application
of a broader frame of rand to public problems developed through expanded
public discussion via the media, socializing agents, and through other
creative ways,
h. This will require that our theory of participation be connected
to some more fully articulated account of the place of language in group
and community interaction. There will be a need to investigate and dis-
tinguish "technical" from "promotional" languages.
5. In compromising settings participants must have a mode of
analysis, a set of meaningful explanatory concepts, that helps to explain
the structure of relations.
6. Finally, members of communities must have opportunities and
settings to develop and confirm these capacities, the significance of
which Marcuse missed. I doubt that all the opportunities to expand
humanized forms of participation have been seized. Especially important,
as Andre Gorz and others bring it to our attention, is participation in
the workplace (e.g., worker's control structures) as an advancement to
practices of industrial democracy and collective bargaini-ng. E. F,
Schomacher, for another, reports on the imaginative experiment of one
ovmer of a profitable business finn in England who transfered ownership
in 19'jl to his employees. The Scott Bader Commonwealth continues as a
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highly successful venture, expanding worker satisfaction, as well as
20contributing to many charitable purposes outside the organization.
There are other possibilities to consider. Starting at the local
level of government, there are many places for the imaginative consti-
tution of a participatory style of politics. Planning boards and zoning
boards are in urgent need of reform. In metropolitan areas neighborhood
control corporations provide an excellent remedy to urban decay and
poverty. The experiments in community control of the schools, with
firm recognition of the need to eliminate racism and parochialism and
22
vjith a participatory role for faciaty and students, remains an option.
Metropolitan areas are suffering from housing blight, and this also
is an opportunity for members of a housing community to organize its own
management system. This solution may even be the one that forces itself
upon residents of buildings and housing complexes where the landlord has
23
abandoned property claims. Hospitals and other organizations lend
themselves to democratic participatory governance, though this has not
been widely tried.
20
For this interesting story, see E. F. Schumacher, Small i s
Beautiful - Economics as If People Mattered (New York: Harper T'orchbooks,
1973T7Tp. 258-266.
21
Milton Kotler, Neighborhood Goveriiment ; The Local Foundations of
Political Life (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969). Also,
Charles Hamden-Turner, From Poverty to Dignity : A Strategy for Poor
Americans (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 197i-i).
22
Mario Fantini and I-Iarilyn Gittell, Decentralization; Achieving
Reform (New York: Praeger, 1973).
23
"Crime and Fear Decline as Tenants Take Over Housing Development,"
V/all Street Journal, April 18, 1973.
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At the regional level, plaiining districts, where technical,
engineering, and real estate d ecisions all too often predominate, have
a need for the inception of popular participation. The same could be
suggested for environmental councils. At the national level the re-
establishment of a constitutional politics requires that those shut out
from political party structures-for example, various groups at party
presidential conventions-should persist in thejr endeavors to advance
their just claijns to participate, and tMs can be legally achieved.
One might imagine public convocations on national policies and the in-
itiating of a comprehensive, long-term plan of controlled growth for the
country. Perhaps a now constitutional convention is in order.
There are also movements in the process of establishing their claims
—the woman's movom'jnt which is pressing claims for equal dignity and
opportunity, for exairiple. There is, as well, an active "public interest"
and consumer movement grovri.ng in tMs country. Launched by Ralph Nader,
it envisions the inception of widescale public citizenship, of people
who will hold governiaent and corporation publicly accountable. Thei'e
are, as Nader recommends, the possibilities for opening up boards of
26
trustees and independent regulatory commissions to public representation.
~2T~~
Recognizing the need to decentralize planning, through the in-
fluence of Jane Jacob's study Death and Life of Great American Ci ties
,
the New York City Planning Department has rejected its ear]j.er commitment
to a master plan in favor of miniplans. Paul Goldberger, "Why City is
Switching from Master Plan to Miniplans," New York Times
,
June 27, 19lh',
and Glenn Fowler, "Community Boards Assert Growing Influence on the
Financing of Capital Projects," New York Times
,
September 22, 191k*
25;
Bo Burlingham, "Popular Politics—The Arrival of Ralph Nader,"
Working Papers
,
Summer 197h. And also, John W. Garner, In Common Cause
(New Yark:" Norton, 1972).
26
Eileen Shanahan, "Reformer: Urging Business Change—Ralph Nader
the Consumer Advocate Calls for Federal Charter for Corporations, and
Much More, In A Plea for Business Reform," New York Times , January 2ii, 1971.
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Finally, both public and private bureaucracies might be re-conceived in
27terms of the demands of a "public interest." These are some of the
more apparent possibilities which may offer opportunities to broaden
sectors of the population to become engaged in political dialogue as
the first step toward the more participatory society.
Mobilizing the participatory society will also requi.re the directed
and conscientioiLS efforts of social scientists and governmental leader-
ship; the assistance of corporate leadership would be an asset but
unlikely. The role of governmental agencies will be to establish and
further the opportunities for wide-spread public participation. Re-
invigorating the party organizations in a more populist direction will
probably be required. The role of responsible social scientists will be
to exanilno participatory styles and to explore the possible avenues for
developing cognitive and affective capacities that will make participa-
tion in various settings a more meaningful, self-realizing experience.
The participatory life and the participatory style of politics, in
conclusion, presents itself as a just and firm alternative for resolving
the contradictions of an advanced industrial-capitalist society wliich
places more claims on consumption than useful production, which makes
more claims on the human mind to conform than to seek autonomy, and
wbj.ch institutionalizes poverty amidst affluence. The problem of find-
ing specific ways to encourage a self-realizing participation remains.
27
One argument is that of Kenneth A. Megill, The New Democrati c
Theory (New Y'ork: The Free Press, 1970), chap. 7. He suggests: ""By
rejecting the distinction between policy malcer and policy implementer,
the new democrats have opened up the possibility for the development
of control institutions in an advanced industrial society." p. 116.
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To this point we have recognized that the synthesis of the radical-
liberal case for participation and the radical critique of Marcuse rests
on the recognition that social reconstruction is not exclusively a task
of addressing material conditions. The symbolically-satiated environ-
ment and the growingly-impoverished nature of social interaction in the
United States pose the particular problem of discovering and fostering
those conditions that develop the Hnguistic and conceptual capacities of
all persons, and this is the engagement of all in the ongoing human
dialogue we know as politics.
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